

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: *PS* REVIEWED *AK* LOGGED: *45*¹¹⁻¹⁶ PUNCHED: *0* VERIFIED: *P* 16 NOV 1967

VERIFIED: 16 NOV 1967

[illegible]

CLOSE!

05 MAR 1987

[illegible]

AIRCRAFT / OF /

CODE SHEET 1 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: DE

REVIEWED _____

LOGGED: _____

PUNCHED: _____

VERIFIED: _____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																				No. Occupants All Aft. Involved											
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	"B" Injuries		"C" Injuries		"D" Injuries		"E" Injuries		"F" Injuries		"G" Injuries		Total Injuries																								
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day				Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy																					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	
67	07	20				1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	

ESCAPE SYS. DATA																																													
Sys.	Comp- onent	Spec. Data									Pri Acct. Type	Pri Phase of Operation	1st Acct. Type	1st Phase of Operation	2nd Acct. Type	2nd Phase of Operation	Trans. Code	Card No.																											
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80								
B	0	4	A																C	2	3	3							C	2	3	3			F	5	3	3			A	1	3	1	

CARD 4

											Contributing Causes				Pilot Error Causal Fac.				Other Personnel Causal Factor				Inv. Mat. Comp.															
3rd Acct. Type		3rd Phase of Operation		Type Operations						First		Second		Third		Pilot Factor After Fact.		First		Second		Third		Other Pers. Factor After Fact.		1st Causal Factor												
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)								Material Fact. After Fact.				Act. Design Comp. Causal Factor				DESIGN C.F.		Trans. Code	Card No.																
2nd Causal Factor				3rd Causal Factor				Cross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Cross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Special Equipment Pilot Equipment																			
Cross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.	Cross Ref.	Compo- nent	Ass'y.	Sub Ass'y.																												
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80					

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: 01 REVIEWED: _____

LOGGED: _____

PUNCHED: _____

VERIFIED: _____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Weather Causal Factor				Facility Causal Factor				Environ. Factor				Cause + Factor Primary				Cause + Factor 1st Possible																				
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number																																										
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																													
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42						
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1									9																												
Cause + Factor 2nd Possible						Cause + Factor 3rd Possible						Cause + Factor 4th Possible						Special Date and Conditions																													
Misc						Misc						Misc																																			
Wx						Fact Wx						Fact Wx						Fact Wx																													
Pers						Factor Pers						Factor Pers						Factor Pers																													
Met						X Ref						Ass'y.						Sub Ass'y.						Met						X Ref						Ass'y.						Sub Ass'y.					
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80										
																		8 B D																													
																								A 1 1 1																							

CARD 8

3M — Material Special Data																																						Trans. Code		Card Number	
			First		Second		Third		Fourth		Fifth																														
			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code	Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code	Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code	Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code	Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code	Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code	Hence, Prior To Occur. OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.A.																										
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49				
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80											
																																						A 1 1 1			

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 9

RECORD IDENTIFICATION												Aircraft Data																		Power Plant Model Number									
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	1st Flight After Maint.	D. I. R.	Year	Hours Since Acceptance	Since Last Insp.			Since Last Par/O'Haul																							
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day	Type	Hours	Days								Activity	Hours	Months																								
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	1			2	6	6	C																					

Power Plant Serial Number												Primary Involved Material Component																		Trans. Code		Card Number								
												Manufacturers Part Number												Total Hours		Since Last Par/O'Haul		Trans. Code	Card Number											
																										Hours														
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																				A	0	0	0	

CARD 10

Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd)												Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component																		Trans. Code		Card Number							
Since Last Check Perf.						Manufacturers Part Number												Total Hours		Since Last Par/O'Haul			Since Last Check Perf.			Trans. Code	Card Number												
Type	Hours	Days	Activity	Number	Hours															Type	Hours	Days																	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49		

50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80										

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 21

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CODED: 22 REVIEWED _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 11

CARD 12

AIRCRAFT _____ OF _____

CODE SHEET 5 OF 21

* CODED: JS REVIEWED _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CODED:

REVIEWED

LOGGED:

PUNCHED:

VERIFIED:

CARD 13

[illegible]

CARD 14

[illegible]AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: W.C.

REVIEWED: W.C.

LOGGED: W.C.

PUNCHED: W.C.

VERIFIED: W.C.

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model								Number of Carrier →														
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Last Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Holo Time	Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model																		
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
67	07	20																																					
Landings				This Individual in Act.	Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Act.)																Number of Personnel Records	Trans. Code	Card Number																
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days																																					
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

CARD 16

File or Serial Number (All Persons)											Name											Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inf. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code											
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49				
(b) (6)											(b) (6)																														
Equip 1					Equip 2					Equip 3					Equip 4					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																			
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data																							
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80											
J	1	1	6	A		J	1	6	2	A		J	1	1	0	A	3	H	2	0	8	A			0	1	A														

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

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NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5					Equip 6					Equip 7					Equip 8					Equip 9									
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data										
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	H	2	6	1	A	C	H	B	0	7	A		H	B	0	3	B	N	K	5	1	0	A		B	4	6	5	T	

Equip 10					Equip 11					Equip 12					Equip 13					Equip 14					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data														
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
E	E	0	4	T	D			A	1	5	6	T	N	A	1	0	0	T	J	A	1	3	4	T	B	A	1	1	0	A	H		0	1	A	1	1	0

CARD 18

Equip 15					Equip 16					Equip 17					Equip 18					Equip 19					Equip 20												
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
S	1	0	0	M		P	2	6	0	M		0	4	0	0	M	W	R	F	6	0	M		R	1	0	0	M	W	R	1	0	0	M	N		

Equip 21					Equip 22					Equip 23					Equip 24					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number								
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data											
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
S	A	0	0	M	N	S	6	0	0	M		P	8	6	0	M		S	2						0	1	A	1	0	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 8 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____

REVIEWED: _____

LOGGED: _____

PUNCHED: _____

VERIFIED: _____

CARD 19

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 25					Equip 26					Equip 27					Equip 28					Equip 29										
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data												
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																							
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	N	2					R	8					Q	7					E	2											

Equip 30					Equip 31					Equip 32					Equip 33					Equip 34					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number												
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data																
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
I	7							J	8					D	A					M	8					P	4							0	1	A	1	9	1

CARD 20

Equip 35					Equip 36					Equip 37					Equip 38					Equip 39					Equip 40													
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data										
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	

Equip 41					Equip 42					Equip 43					Equip 44					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number															
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data																			
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80							

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 9 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45				Equip 46				Equip 47				Equip 48				Card Code	ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTION	Type of Mishap														
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day	Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data																			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40					
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1																																		

Type of Egress	Eject. Info.	Egress Problems									Type/Mod. Eject. Seat	Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Altitude/Manes. A/C at Exit	Altitude When Ejected	Airspeed	Weight	Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time in Water	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																	
		Prior			During			Subsequent																																
		Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob																														
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
A	F								R	W		I	J		H	N	M	D		D	G	A	I	1	2	0	1	7	8	I					0	1	A	2	1	0

CARD 22

Time in Raft	Vertebral Fractures		Eject. Fatal Causes		Injury	Combat Zone	Card Code 67	Wind Velocity in Knts	Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature	Water Temperature	Alerting Factors			Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Location																		
	Pri.	Sec.	1st Factor	2nd Factor										3rd Factor																							
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
						B														0	1	0	2		1	6	5		L	D	F	G		Q	0	M	

Survival Factors		Fatais Time Lapse From:		Time Lapse Last Training		Training Factors		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																					
Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locat. to Victim	Mishap to Death	Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival																									
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
A	B				B	B	B	P	B																	0	1	A	2	2	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 10 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED:

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RECORD IDENTIFICATION											CARD CODE		Time of Day				Rescue Vehicle		Rescue Vehicles				Rescue Vehicles Back Up		Sea Cond.		Wind		Rescue Equip. Used										
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Mishap	Rescue Report	Rescue Locate	ACC/ABAN	Location			Duty	Model/Type	Model/Type	Model/Type	Model/Type	No. Personnel To Rescue	No. Personnel Rescued	Model/Type	Model/Type	Actual Water Temperature	Actual Air Temperature	Wave Height	Wave Interval	Gen. W.L. Cond.	Wind Velocity (Knots)												
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
67	07	20				1	01	01			00	00	21	11	11		G	B	D	U			21						80				B	02	M				
RESCUE TEAM TRAIN'G		COMM EQUIP'T TECH		RETRIEV EQUIP/ TECH		RESCUE TEAM WORK F.				Alert Prob		Methods of Alert		Time Lapse Alert to Depart.		Departure Delays												Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code		Card Number							
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
						A	B	B	D					L	O	F	C	C																01	A	2	3	4	

CARD CODE		Time Lapse Alert to Locate		Prob. Enroute		Vehicle Failed To Reach Scene		Failure Reason		Time Lapse Locate to Reach		Locator Means		Prob. Locating		Survivors Signalling Problems		Rescue Problems						Rescue Problems													
69				Prob		Prob						Primary						Vehicle		Individual		Problems						Vehicle		Individual		Problems					
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
8	8	4	5	B				0	0	6	Q			C	B	I	K		D	U	H	O	F														
Rescue Problems								Rescue Problems								Rescue Close Out								Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code		Card Number		PERSONNEL		AIRCRAFT					
Vehicle		Individual		Problems				Vehicle		Individual		Problems				Vehicle																		Individual		Close Out Code	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67																	68	69	70	71
																D	U	A								0	1	A	2	4	8						

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 11 OF 21

CODED: REVIEWED LOGGED: PUNCHED: VERIFIED:

CODED: REVIEWED LOGGED: PUNCHED: VERIFIED:

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's																														
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Problems			Condit.		Time Lapse Reach to Rescue	Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion	Rescue Recommend	CARD CODE 73	Weight	Height	Age	Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 inch	Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 inch	Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 inch																		
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day										During	After																												
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	
6	7	0	7	2	4	1	0	1	0	1	3	E			C	B	3	0	D	J			1	1	1	5	5	7	2	2	9										
Backlog		Knee		Log Length		Bilateral		CARD CODE		Role of Individ.		Supervisory Factors		Pre-Flight Factors				Experience Trans. Factors				Person Sequence		Trans. Codes		Card Number															
Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch	Nearest 1/4 inch																
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80			
											7	4																	P				0	1	A	2	5	1			

Design Factors										Communication Problems					Environmental Factors										Psycho Physiological Factors															
Design of Inst/Controls	Location of Inst/Controls	Failure of Inst/Controls	COCKPIT LIGHTING	Lighting Runway	Lighting Other A/C	PERSONAL ECU INTERFERENCE	WORK SPACE IN- COMPAT. W/ MAN	Other	MISINTERPRET COMM	DISRUPTED COMM	Language Barrier	Noise Interference	Other	ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	DECOMPRESS ION	Vibration	Glare	Smoke Fumes	Heat	Cold	Wind Blast	Wx Hazards Dark	VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS Icing Wind down Fog DUST WIND SMOKE	WX OTHER THAN VISIBILITY	Other	CARD CODE 75	Food Poisoning	Motion Sickness	Other Acute Illness	OTH PER EXIST DISEASE/DEFECT	Get "Homelets"	Hangover	Sleep Deprivation	FA TIGUE	OTHER Miscellaneous					
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49			
																		P	P			P					7	5												
Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd)																																								
DRUGS PRESCRIBED MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual Illusions	HALLUCINATIONS	UNCONSCIOUS NESS	DISORIENTA- TION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper- Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATION PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOT ATION TO SUC	Over- Confidence	Lack of Self- Confidence	LACK OF CONF ENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Codes	Card Number	PERSONNEL					AIRCRAFT									
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80										
														P											0	1	A	2	7	8						CODE SHEET 12				

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 12 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED _____

LOGGED: _____

PUNCHED: _____

VERIFIED _____

CARD 29

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Other Factors To Be Considered																	Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.											
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Other Factors To Be Considered																	Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.													
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day							MAINT INTERF.	WRONG CONT.	CONFUS OF	CONTR. OTHER	Misread Instruments	MISINTERPRET	MISLED BY	PAUL INSTRUM.	VIS. REST. BY	EQUIP. STRUCT.	Task Over-Saturation	Inadequate Good/Timing	Misjudged Speed/Dist.	WRONG COORD. OF ACTION	DELAY TAKING	REC ACTION OF VIOLATION OF	PLT. DISCIP.	Navigation Error	Incorrect Operation	Other	CARD CODE 77	Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing	VISUAL ACUITY OR NONE	Hearing	Cardio-Vascular	NEUROLOGICAL	Gastro-Intestinal	Respiratory	Unregisted
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
67	07	20	1	01	01																				1	1	3	1	1	0									1

Estimated Duration of Grounding	Pri. Cause of Death Diagnosis Number	Autopsy		Lab Toxicological Test On		GI Contents	CNS Contents	Muscle Tissue	Visceral Tissue	Other	ULTRA-VIOLET OR OTHER SPECIAL INVESTIG.	CARD CODE 78	Unconsciousness	Head, Neck or None	Thorax	Abdomen	Other	Cerebral Concussion	Facial Injuries	Infra Oral Injuries	Eye Injuries	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number															
		Preformed	Protocol	Conducted By	Blood or None																				Urine														
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
N	N								1	2	3																												

CARD 30

Fractures																	Dis-Locations																					
Group A								Group B									Group A								Group B									CARD CODE 79				
Cranial or None	Facial	Cervical	Thoracic	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Shoulder Girdle	Rib	Pelvis or None	Upper Arm	Lower Arm	Hand Incl. Fingers	Upper Leg	Lower Leg	Foot Incl. Toes	Other Fractures	Jaw or None	Cervical	Thoracic	Vertebral	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Vertebral	Shoulder Girdle	Ribs	Pelvis	Shoulder or None	Elbow	Wrist	Hand Fingers	Hip	Knee		Ankle	Foot Toes	Other Dislocations	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	
0									0								0										0										7	9

Amputations/Avulsions				Soft Tissue Injuries																	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number							
HEAD, NECK OR NONE	Trunk	Upper Extrem.	Lower Extrem.	LACERATIONS OR NONE	C.S.S. Head	Abrasions Head	LACERAT NECK	C.S.S. Neck	Abrasions Neck	LACERAT THORAX	C.S.S. Thorax	Abrasions THORAX	LACERATIONS ABDOM/MONE	C.S.S. Abdomen	Abrasions Abdomen	LACERAT UP EXTR	C.S.S. UP EXTREME	ABRASIONS UP EXTR	LACERAT LOW EXTR	C.S.S. LOW EXTREME				ABRASIONS LOW EXTR	Other S.Y. Injuries	Asphyxiation Suspected				
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74						
0											7	9										9	A	0	0	1	A	3	1	1

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 13 OF 21

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 31

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 14 OF 21

NAVYNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: WJ

REVIEWED: _____

LOGGED: _____

PUNCHED: _____

VERIFIED: _____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model				Number of Carrier																		
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Mile Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Volo Time	Number of Carrier				Total Mile This Model	Total Mile This Model																	
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day															Total	Day	Mile	Total Day This Model			Total Mile This Model																
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1																													
Landings				This Individual in Act.	Name (Instr. Pft. in Other Acft.)																Number of Personnel Records	Trans. Code		Card Number															
This Model Day Last 30 Days	This Model Mile Last 30 Days																																						
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

CARD 16

P		File or Serial Number (All Persons)										Name										Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Ref. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code	65	66	67	68	69	70											
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49										
P																																															
Equip 1										Equip 2										Equip 3										Equip 4										Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number					
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed Special Data								
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90							
H	B	0	3	T	B	S	6	6	3	T		E	B	6	3	T	B	E	B	6	3	T	N		0	2	A	1	0	0																	

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 15 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6					Equip 7					Equip 8					Equip 9								
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data					
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	8	7	2	8	1	8	1	8	1	M	7	1	9	M	H	L	5	7	1	M		S	A	8	8	M	N	M	8	1	9	M	H	A	1	8	8	T	H

Equip 10					Equip 11					Equip 12					Equip 13					Equip 14					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number												
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data															
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
K	5							H	2					D	A					N	2					P	1							8	2	A	1	1	8

CARD 18

Equip 15					Equip 16					Equip 17					Equip 18					Equip 19					Equip 20												
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
R	8					Q	7					B	4					J	8					E	2					J	1						

Equip 21					Equip 22					Equip 23					Equip 24					Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number								
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data											
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																									8	2	A	1	8	8

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 16 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48						Card Code	ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTION	Topog. of Mishap		
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data										
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1																														
Type of Egress		Eject. Info.		Egress Problems											Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.		Seat Position		Altitude/Maneu. A/C at Exit		Altitude When Ejected		Airspeed		Weight		Alt. Chute Open		In Crash Area		Time in Water		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code		Card Number	
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
A	F								R	W		I	E		N	M		D		G	G	A	I	1	2	0	1	9	8	I					0	2	A	2	1	0

CARD 22

Time in Ref		Vertebral Fractures		Eject. Fatal Causes		Injury	Combat Zone	Card Code	Wind Velocity in Knots	Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature	Water Temperature	Alerting Factors			Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Location											
12	13	14	15	16	17										Pri.	Sec.	1st Factor			2nd Factor	3rd Factor	46	47	48	49						
						B																									
Survival Factors		Fatal Time Lapse From:		Time Lapse Last Training		Training Factors		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code		Card Number		PERSONNEL		2		OF		2											
Mishap to Site Locat.		Site Locat. to Victim		Mishap to Death		Low Press. Chamber		Eject. Tower		Eject. Seat		Survival		AIRCRAFT		1		OF		1											
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
A	R				C	P	C	A	B																	0	2	A	2	2	0

CODE SHEET 17 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____

REVIEWED _____

LOGGED: _____

PUNCHED: _____

VERIFIED: _____

CARD 23

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											CARD CODE		Time of Day				Rescue Vehicle		Rescue Vehicles				Rescue Vehicles Back-Up		Actual Water Temperature		Actual Air Temperature		Sea Cond.		Gen. Ws. Cond.		Wind Velocity (Knots)		Rescue Equip. Used				
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	CARD CODE	Mishap	Rescue Report	Rescue Locate	ACC/ABAN	Location	Duty	Model/Type	Model/Type	Model/Type	Model/Type	No. Personnel To Rescue	No. Personnel Rescued	Model/Type	Model/Type	Actual Water Temperature	Actual Air Temperature	Wave Height	Wave Interval	Gen. Ws. Cond.	Wind Velocity (Knots)													
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	F	I	Y					2	1				8	0			B	0	2				
RESCUE TEAM TRAIN'G		COMM EQUIP/ TECH		RETRIEV EQUIP/ TECH		RESCUE TEAM WORK F.		Rescue Site Topography Res. Vehic. Dist. to Scene		Time Lapse Mishap To Alert		Alert Prob		Methods of Alert		Time Lapse Alert to Depart.		Departure Delays												Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code		Card Number					
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
									A	0	D				M		0																	0	2	A	2	3	0

CARD 24

CARD CODE		Time Lapse Alert to Locate		Prob. Enroute		Vehicle Failed To Reach Scene		Failure Reason		Time Lapse Locate to Reach		Locator Means		Prob. Locating		Survivors Signalling Problems		Rescue Problems				Rescue Problems															
69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80															
81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92															
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
0	0	0	0					0	0	3	5					I	K																				
Rescue Problems						Rescue Problems						Rescue Close Out																									
Problems						Problems						Problems						Problems						Problems													
Vehicle Individual						Vehicle Individual						Vehicle Individual						Vehicle Individual						Vehicle Individual													
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	
																Y		A									0	2	A	2	4	0					

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 18 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's		Time Lapse		Time Lapse		Rescue		CARD CODE		Weight		Height		Age		Sitting Height		Trunk Height		Functional Reach									
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Problems		Condit.		Reach to Rescue	Rescue to Mishap	Rescue to Rescue	Rescue to Platoon	Rescue to Recommend	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73											
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	E	K			B	B	0	0	D				1	1	1	7	6	6	8	2	8	3	7	3	2	6	1			
Betlock			Leg			Bidehold			CARD CODE			Role of indiv.			Supervisory			Pre-Flight Factors			Experience			Trans. Codes			Card Number													
Knee			Length			Nearest			74			In Cause			Factors			Factors			Factors			Factors			Factors													
Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4			Nearest 1/4													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch			Inch													
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CODED: REVIEWED LOGGED: PUNCHED: VERIFIED

CODED: REVIEWED LOGGED: PUNCHED: VERIFIED

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Other Factors To Be Considered																	Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.											
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Other Factors To Be Considered																	CARD CODE	Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing	VISUAL ACUITY OR NONE	Hearing	Cardio-Vascular	NEUROSCUL SKELETAL	Gastro-Intestinal	Respiratory	Urgestral	Other Abnormal	REASON FOR GEOMING	
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day							NABBY INTERPRET	WRONG CONT.	CONFUS OF CONTR.	OTHER MISREAD	Instruments	MISINTERPRET INSTRUMENTS	MISLED BY PAUL INSTRUM.	VIS. REST. BY EQUIP. STRUCT.	Task Over-Saturation	Inadequate Good/Timing	Misjudged Speed/Dist.	WRONG COUES OF ACTION	DELAY TAKING	REC ACTION VIOLATION OF PLY. DISCIP	Navigationl Error	Inadvertent Operations	Other														
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1																1	1	3	1	1	0			P				1	

Fractures																												Dis-Locations																				CARD CODE			
Group A														Group B														Group A										Group B										Other Dislocations		CARD CODE 79	
Cranial or None	Facial	Cervical	Thoracic	Lumbar	Sacral	Coccygeal	Shoulder Girdle	Rib	Pelvis or None	Upper Arm	Lower Arm	Hand Incl. Fingers	Upper Leg	Lower Leg	Foot Incl. Toes	Other Fractures	Jaw or None	Cervical Vertebral	Thoracic Vertebral	Lumbar Vertebral	Sacral Vertebral	Coccygeal Vertebral	Shoulder Girdle	Ribs	Pelvis	Shoulder or None	Elbow	Wrist	Hand Fingers	Hip	Knee	Ankle	Foot Toes																		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49														
																																			7	9															
Amputations/Avulsions					Soft Tissue Injuries																										PERSONNEL <u>2</u>																				
					Group A										Group B																AIRCRAFT <u>1</u>																				
HEAD, NECK OR NONE	Trunk	Upper Extrem.	Lower Extrem.	Other	LACERATIONS OR NONE	C.S.S. Head	Abrasions Head	LACERAT NECK	C.S.S. Neck	Abrasions Neck	LACERAT THORAX	C.S.S. Thorax	ABRASIONS THORAX	LACERATIONS ABDOM/NONE	C.S.S. Abdomen	Abrasions Abdomen	LACERAT UP EXTR	C.S.S. UP EXTREME	ABRASIONS UP EXTR	LACERAT LOW EXTR	C.S.S. LOW EXTREME	ABRASIONS LOW EXTR	Other S.T. Injuries	Asphyxiation Suspected	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number																								
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																					
																					8	9	A	D	2	A	3	1	1																						
																												CODE SHEET <u>20</u>																							

CODE SHEET 20 OF 21

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD 31

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Control Characters																												Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number				
Date			Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Asphyxiation Established	Shock Reported	Exposure	Burns/ Frostbite																																				
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																											
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40						
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1		3	4	6																															
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80						
																																											0	2	A

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PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 21 OF 21

I.D. Number		670720101					1		N N N			/			20			A			
1 2	3 4	5 6	7	8 9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24		
Yr.	Mo.	Day	Typ	Log	Typ Brief	Narr I.D.	CL	Orig. Use	75 76	77	78										
										Tot-Cds		Trans. Code									

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS

CODE

1 - Non-Class
- Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS

CODES

1 - GEN. HIGHAP
2 - H2O-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO.	CODED	REVIEWED	KEY PUNCHED	VERIFIED	
11 12	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68				
01	COLL TREES/FIRE/EJECT. DIRECTLY FOLLOWING MIGHT 710. PL				
02	T ATTEMPTED REMAIN VER BY FLYING UNDER CLOUD APPROX 3				
03	C FT AG 4. 1.5 MILES FROM RMY THE ACFT COLL TREES 115				
04	FT MSL, SEPARING STBD EXTERNA 4 DROP TANK CAUSING AN E				
05	XPLOSIVE IGNITION OF FUEL, PLT RELEASED HIS OXY MASK.				
06	A 400 FT LATER, ACFT COLL WITH SECOND GROUP OF TREES, S				
07	SHATTERING FRONT CRY + TEARING OPEN ONE OR BOTH INTERM				
08	NAL WING TANKS, + SEPARATING PORTIONS OF PORT LEAD EDS				
09	G E FLAP + SPD BRAKE FROM ACFT. 184 FT LATER, ACFT COLL				
10	L TREES THIRD TIME CAUSING LOSS OF PORTIONS OF FLAPS +				
11	STBD AFT ENG HOUSING, ADDITIONAL FUEL LINES, A PLT RE				
12	CEIVED INT AT THIS TIME. COLL WITH FOURTH GROUP OF TR				
13	EES SEVERED BOTH WING TIPS. WHEN ACFT EXITED TREES IT				
14	T WAS ENGULFED IN FLAME. CREW SUCCESSFULLY EJT BETWEEN				
15	175-20 FT AG 4. RE: SEVERED UNDER 2000 FT IN 175-20				
16	RE: REMAINE VER. 1000 FT TOWARD. PLT FAILED TO PERFORM H				
17	IS DOTTES. AFTER THE FACT PERS. COMPLACENT IN PREHAT				
18	SEARCH OF ACFT. OTHER AIR CREWS FAILED TO REPORT BACK				
19	SIGNALS + FLARE SIGHT WAS OBSVD. DIR REVL'D NO MARK				
20	LAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION.				

CARD NO.

I.D. Number	6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	3	N	N	N	1				1	6	A
	1 2 Yr	3 4 Mo	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	11 12 Narr File I.D	13 14 15 CL	16 17 18 Orig Use	19 20 21 22 23 Tot Cds	24 25 26 Trans Code									

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS

CODE

1 - Non-Class

2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS

CODES

1 - GEN, HISHAP

2 - BIO-IED

3 - SAF-SURV

4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED REVIEWED KEY PUNCHED VERIFIED

11 12	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
01	EJT. COLL WITH TREES IMMED AFTER TAKE OFF RESULTING I
02	NFLIGHT FIRE. PLT ENGULFED IN FLAME RETAINED CONTROL
03	OF ACFT UNTIL RIO EJT THEN EJT HIMSELF. RIO NO GLOVES
04	(b) (6) PLT (b) (6) RELEASED SELF FRO
05	M EQPT THEN ASSIST RIO RELEASE EQPT. (b) (6) PLT WITH U
06	SE OF HANDS AND RIO WITH SIGHT WORKED AS TEAM TO SURV
07	ONE SEEING TO DIRECT, THE OTHER PERFORMING WITH HAN
08	DS. AFTER 3-1/2 HRS RIO LEFT TO SEARCH FOR HELP. PICK
09	ED UP BY PVT AUTO. PHONED BASE GIVING ACFT LOCATION.
10	TAKEN TO BASE HOSP. SAR HELO SUBQ RESCUED PLT. BOTH E
11	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
11	JT WITH VISOR UP. FLIGHT BEGAN IN DARK BUT WOULD BE F
12	LOWN MOSTLY DAYLIGHT. TINTED VISORS WORN BY BOTH DUE
13	TO EXPECTED DAYLIGHT FLYING. DUE TO SUPPLY INADEQUACY
14	PLT FORCED TO WEAR FLIGHT SUIT WITH TATTERED SLEEVES
15	SLEEVES ROLLED UP ONE TURN DUE TO CONDITION RESULTI
16	NG IN (b) (6)
17	
18	
19	
20	
11 12	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

CARD NO.

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM*not on
m/F yet.*FROM: Records DEPTDATE 3/6/70TO: (1) CODING SECT ch
(2) REC CONT BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV 288 MAR 1970
(4) REC CONT BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "00" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT		LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	
6	7	4	7	2	4	1	4	1	4	1	

FIELD NAME		CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)															
1	3rd Recd Type	4	15	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	TAPE REC DIV NO.	TRANS CODE		
2				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47				
3				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65			66	67

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

**REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM**

FROM: R4DP DEPT.:

DATE 7/16/68

TO: (1) CODING SECT. [Signature]
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH 7/16/68
(3) ADPE DIV. 1 DP
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH 18 JUL 1968

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "99" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE REPT	LOG	NUMBER	AIRCRAFT	NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1

(b) (6)

- RF4B-153113

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)																												TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
				FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ. NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH																								
1	CONTR. CAUSE	4	21	0	2	1	8	0	1	0	2	R	1																				
2																																	
3																																	

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

**REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM**

FROM: AOA DEPT.

DATE 2-29-68

TO: AOA CODING SECT.
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH AOA
(3) ADPE DIV AOA 6 MAR 1968
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH _____

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "00" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE REPT	LOG	NUMBER	AIRCRAFT	NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)																TAPES REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
				FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS	PERSON SEQ. NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH															
1	CONT. CAUSES	4	22	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	02 19 00 02 R																
2	Other Pers	4	36	30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47	02 53 00 02																
3	WX CAUSAL FACTORS	6	12	48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65	02 73 00 01															01	M
4	ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS	4	20	02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	02 81 00 01 9																

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

5. Am CODE PAGE 6 34 0 2 9 9 4 0 0 2 X G
(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

SEE ADDITIONAL SHEET

(b) (6)

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: AOA DEPT.

DATE 2-29-68

TO: (1) CODING SECT BTB
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH WOP
(3) ADPE DIV DP 6 MAR 1968
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH _____

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "99" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.									AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR	MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPORT	LOG	NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	0	7	2	0	1	0	1	0	1

[illegible]

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE
JPL

Dispatch Code Sheets

Acft. Accidents Only

(Rev. 2-67)

Coded 24 Date 7-21

Logged BB Date 7/24

Punched JP Date 27 JUL 74

Card No. 010

Record Ident. (common all cards)

Source

Don't Count

Enemy Action

Aircraft Model

Model Code

Aircraft BuNo.

Reporting Custodian

Type Duty

Major Command

Time of Day

Accident Damage

Aircraft Damage

Accident Injury

Aircraft Injury

Hull No.

Kind of Flight

Location (Name Code)

Transaction Code

Card No.

Codes

Card
Columns

67	07	20	10	10	1	01-11
					5	12
						13
						14
						15-21
						22-23
						24-29
						30-32
						33-35
						36
						37-41
						42
						43
						44
						45
						46-48
						49-51
						53-59
						77
						78-80

Card No. 020

Total "A-U-L" Navy Injuries

Total "A-U-L" Non-Navy Injuries

Transaction Code

Card No.

09	33-34
	61-62
	63-64
	77
02	78-80

Card No. 030

Primary Accident Type

Primary Phase of Operations

Transaction Code

Card No.

03	62-63
	64-66
	77
03	78-80

Card No. 040

Type Operations

Contributing Causes

Transaction Code

Card No.

04	19-20
	21-22
	77
04	78-80

Card No. 060

Primary Cause

Special Data & Conditions

Transaction Code

Card No.

06	23-29
	63-69
	77
06	78-80

See reverse side

Card No. 150

No. of Personnel Records
Transaction Code
Card No.

Card No. 160

P
Pilot's Name
Status
Transaction Code
Card No.

Codes Card
Columns

0	1	70-71	
	A	77	
1	5	0	78-80

		P	12
			27-36
		A	41
		A	77
1	6	0	78-80

(b) (6)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

131/ras
Ser 234
5 March 1963

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron TWO
Subj: VMCJ-2 AAR ser 1-68A concerning RF-4B BuNo 153113 accident
occurring 20 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers with the following remarks:

a. The question has been raised as to the requirement for two pilots for UH-2B IFR operations and its pertinence to this accident. The necessity for two pilots in the H-2 aircraft remains a valid requirement when helicopter IFR conditions are to be expected. Situations may arise in which IFR flight is required enroute to a VFR rescue underneath. It remains the prerogative of the air station, facility, or ship as to the degree of SAR services made available to local commands based on pilot and aircraft assets.

b. The RSO might have prevented this accident by more carefully monitoring the night takeoff and climb progress. His actions cannot be considered a direct cause factor as crew duties are not specific in this VFR situation. The remarks of the second endorser are generally concurred with in this regard.

c. The pilots and crew involved in the pickup of this downed pilot are to be commended for a professional rescue performed under highly adverse conditions. The Aircraft Accident Board should also be commended for a thorough and detailed investigation of this mishap.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded at the NAVAVNSAFECEN indicating PILOT (error in judgment) as the primary factor and WEATHER as an environmental factor.

(b) (6)

Copy to:
CMC (CODE AAP)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 404) (2)
COMNAVAIRLANT
CGFMFLANT
CGSECONDMAN

By direction

CG MCAS CHERRY PT
CO MAC-14
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

Code 63/we
23 August 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 5-68

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Accident. At 0455(Q) on 20 July 1967, RF-4B BUNO 153113 assigned to MARINE COMPOSITE RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON TWO (VMCJ-2) and piloted by CAPT (b) (6), USMC (b) (6), crashed and burned (ALFA) shortly after takeoff from MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina. Both the pilot and the Reconnaissance Systems Operator (RSO), 2ND LT (b) (6) USMC (b) (6) ejected successfully. The final resting place of the aircraft was located in a swampy, wooded area, four miles from the takeoff end of runway 32. The pilot suffered (b) (6). The RSO suffered (b) (6) but was not wearing gloves during the flight. The accident caused no damage to private property.

b. Synopsis of Flight. At 0454(Q) on 20 July 1967, BUNO 153113 departed MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina on a scheduled bogey track for an anti-war exercise. The night flight was properly briefed and filed on a local instrument clearance. Prior to departure, the tower notified CAPT (b) (6) that the field was VFR and CAPT (b) (6) changed his flight to VFR but requested to keep his 0655(Q) approach time for IFR recovery. The weather at the time was 300 feet scattered, visibility four miles with scattered patches of ground fog. The scattered layer was 200 to 400 feet. The pilot's statement indicated that "he ducked under a cloud" to remain VFR, after completing a normal afterburner takeoff. The pilot saw a master caution light in the cockpit when he was further distracted by a mass of cockpit fire. A jar was felt followed by the sound of an explosion. Ejection by both crewmembers was initiated almost simultaneously.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

a. History

(1) Pilot. CAPT (b) (6) is 29 years of age and was designated a Naval Aviator on 25 October 1963. He has logged 1550 total flight hours, of
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Enclosure (1)

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NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 5-68

which 1483 hours are in jet aircraft. He has accumulated 400 hours in the F-4 aircraft, of which 98 hours were flown in the past three months. He is considered to be an excellent pilot, an aggressive Aviation Safety Officer and a staunch advocate of rigid adherence to regulations.

(2) RSO. 2ND LT (b) (6) is 28 years of age and was designated a Naval Flight Officer (NFO) on 27 May 1966. He has logged 92 total flight hours, including 11.4 hours in the F-4 aircraft. This was his first night flight in the F-4.

(3) Aircraft. BUNO 153113 was accepted on 27 December 1966 and had been flown for 266 hours. A first calendar even inspection was performed on 3 June 1967 and 71 hours were subsequently flown.

(4) Engines.

	<u>NUMBER 1</u>	<u>NUMBER 2</u>
MODEL	J79-GE-8B	J79-GE-8B
SERIAL	421070	421330
DATE ACCEPTED	15 Feb 1963	6 Sep 1963
HRS SINCE ACCEPT.	1355	1046
NUMBER OVERHAULS	2	1
DATE LAST OVERHAUL	6 Jun 1966	27 May 1966
HRS SINCE OVERHAUL	272	272
DATE MAJOR INSP.	5 May 1967	5 May 1967
HRS SINCE INSP.	71	71

b. Field Investigation

(1) Witness statements indicate the aircraft entered low clouds after takeoff.

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(2) About 1-1/2 miles from takeoff, the aircraft struck the tops of the first of four groups of trees. Six hundred feet further, the second group of trees were contacted and 225 feet further, the third group. From this point, the aircraft flew over a creek and cleared all trees (average tree height 110 feet MSL) for 3000 feet, descending again through more trees at a 30 degree angle, impacting the ground nose high and right wing down. Ejection was accomplished immediately following the third tree strike.

(3) The following items were located in the immediate vicinity of the first tree strike:

(a) Pieces of unburned drop tank.

(b) Piece of plastic slide track from the pilot's helmet which was unburned.

(c) Pieces of unburned canopy plexiglass.

(4) From the point of initial tree strike to the aircraft's final resting place, scattered aircraft parts were found indicating extensive in-flight fire both within and outside the cockpit. The cockpit areas indicated a fire and heat level of less intensity than the outward adjacent areas.

(5) The pilot's helmet was blackened by smoke and his oxygen mask had been burned from the inside. Recovered canopy plexiglass along the flight path evidenced more external than internal heat damage.

(6) Prior to its flight over the creek, the aircraft lost both external tanks, fuel cells were ripped open, and large sections of wing and stabilator were torn off while the aircraft burned profusely.

(7) Inspection of yellow sheets directed special attention to pressure altimeter systems. The front cockpit altimeter had been replaced on 12 July when it was reported "sticky." It was gripped again on the following day and a switch was made with the rear cockpit altimeter. Avionics did not perform the functional tests required but there were no gripes for the remaining seven flights. The DIR did not reveal any malfunction of the suspect altimeters.

(8) The oxygen system was thoroughly examined with no apparent

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discrepancy. The internal and external burning of the mask was attributed to the ignition of the oxygen after the pilot tore his mask free and after the inflight fire entered the cockpit area.

(9) The pilot sustained an eye injury prior to ejection. He states that he held his eye open with his fingers in order to find the face curtain. He could not recall if he saw the initial mass of fire with one or both eyes.

(10) The pilot recalls two jolts prior to ejection when in fact, three tree strikes were encountered prior to ejection. It is therefore most probable that the first tree strike was not easily recognized due to either the distraction resulting from the illumination of the master caution light, de-selection of afterburner or both simultaneously.

(11) On the previous flight a yellow sheet gripe was noted: "Auxiliary air door light illuminated." The door was ground checked and no discrepancy found. It is considered highly probable that the light illuminated again momentarily during the gear up process during this flight.

(12) The first interview with the pilot revealed that he reached 700 feet altitude prior to ducking under the cloud. He later revised this altitude estimate to 500 feet and on final interview stated that he never saw more than 300 feet on his altimeter. The pilot also stated that he felt a rush of air in the cockpit as he first saw the flame.

(13) Of particular significance is the evidence at the initial aircraft tree strike i.e., the piece of plastic slide track from his helmet and the bits of canopy plexiglass. It is considered most likely that this is where the pilot sustained his eye injury caused by canopy breakup due to tree contact.

(14) It must be noted that over four hours had elapsed from the time of the accident to rescue of the crew. The pilot had activated the "beeper" which was picked up by other aircraft and reported to the tower. It was discounted as an inadvertent activation and "no aircraft were missing or overdue."

(15) Several ground witnesses observed two to three flashes of orange light at approximately 0500(Q) and reported these to the tower.

4

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NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 5-68

Again, since no aircraft were missing or overdue, the flashes were evaluated as afterburner lights in the night fog.

3. CONCLUSIONS. The most probable cause of this accident is pilot error in judgment. Directly following a night takeoff, he attempted to remain VFR by flying under a cloud, resulting in collision with the trees.

4. ACTION COMPLETED

a. VMCJ-2 is re-emphasizing to all pilots the hazards associated with VFR night/low visibility departures and letdowns and encouraging the utilization of IFR procedures when practicable.

b. All VMCJ-2 arrivals and departures are being monitored by Cherry Point RATTTC personnel (VFR and IFR).

c. Continuous reminders of the importance of flight equipment and its proper utilization are being re-emphasized within the squadron.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

Distribution:
List "A"
CNO (Op-05F)

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DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON
ORIGINAL REVIEW

- NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT: *No comment*

(b) (6)

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT:

Concur with conclusions & recommendations of AAR & endorses. X0/32

No Comment 3/8

INITIAL/CODE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

101/wm

DATE: 28 February 1968

FROM : 10

TO : 02

SUBJECT : VMCJ-2 AAR ser 1-68A concerning RF-4B BuNo 153113 accident occurring
20 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

1. We concur with the Aircraft Accident Board and subsequent endorsers. However, in view of the remarks contained in paragraphs 2a, b, and c, close-out letter recommended for 02 signature.

Very respectfully,

(b) (6)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to Correction to	Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1		/
DIR		/
Misc. Items for Action or Correction		
To Code	<div data-bbox="241 774 435 854">From Code/Date</div> <div data-bbox="656 1197 867 1298">CLOSED</div> <div data-bbox="565 1338 822 1399">05 MAR 1967</div> <div data-bbox="777 1661 822 1761">7</div>	<div data-bbox="1351 895 1381 935">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 995 1381 1036">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1116 1381 1157">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1217 1381 1257">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1318 1381 1358">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1439 1381 1479">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1540 1381 1580">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1641 1381 1681">/</div> <div data-bbox="1351 1741 1381 1782">/</div>

Endorsements Reviewed and Action Completed on All Phases of this Report.

UNIT VMCS-2
MODEL RF4B
BUNO 153113

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT.	ROUTING CODE/INIT.
	M&M		11-20-67		/	/
	AERO MED	20 Nov.			CSW Poy	/

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS, FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:

REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NASC 12 DEC 1967 (10 working days)

EXTENSIONS _____

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT. DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT.	ROUTING
A&R			2/4-68	JHW	/	/

NASC ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.
1	R&S	2-29-68	3-4-68	8TB
2	M&M		2.25	O
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT.	ROUTING
AERO MED				/	/

- NOTES:
1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.
 2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.
 3. Any Department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY NAS QUONPT RI		2. REPORT NO. 287		3. DATE OF RPT 9/7/67		4. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION RF-4B		5. REPORT NO.	
6. ASSEMBLY (Model) J79-GE-8B		7. ASSEMBLY (Serial) 421070		8. ASSEMBLY DTS 07482		9. DATE RECEIVED 8/15/67		10. RECEIVED FROM (Eng Div) 153113	
11. TOTAL HRS SINCE NEW 1354.8		12. HRS SINCE LAST O/V 272.8		13. DATE LAST O/V 6/30/66		14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY NAVAL REWORK FAC NORVIS		15. NO. PREV O/V'S 2	
16. OPERATING ACTIVITY VMCJ-2		17. FOR EPS - ASD - 1/74/66		18. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE Aircraft Accident (45)		19. AIRCRAFT (Serial) RF-4B		20. AIRCRAFT (DMS) 153113	
21. FINDINGS <input type="checkbox"/> NO DISCREPANCY		<input type="checkbox"/> BASIC (INFO/DESIGN) DISCREPANCY		<input type="checkbox"/> NON-BASIC (MAINT/OPER) DISCREPANCY		<input type="checkbox"/> FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE		22. PRIMARY PART FAILURE (Part No.)	
23. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)						24. DISCREPANT PARTS (Part No.)			
<p align="center"><u>Engineering Analysis</u></p> <p>NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT msg 272052Z Jul 67 requested an engineering analysis on J79-GE-8B engine Ser No. 421070 to determine if engine experienced compressor stall, what caused foreign object damage and determine power setting at impact.</p> <p>26. <u>DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS</u></p> <p>Transfer and rear gear box assemblies and majority of accessories were ripped and torn off engine.</p> <p>Upper compressor front casing and front frame assembly evidenced excessive heat from ground fire.</p> <p>Three inlet guide vanes were ripped from compressor front frame and jammed into compressor rotor.</p>						25. POSTING BULLETIN, CHANGES, ETC., INCORPORATED			
						26. DATE			
27. PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> DIS		28. REQUESTED BY NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT Control No. J79-115-67		29. REFERENCE msg 272052Z Jul 67		30. WBS 114		31. APPLICABLE INCORPORATED	
32. SIGNATURE (b)(6)		33. TITLE DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT DIV HEAD		34. DATE 7 Sep 1967					

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVJEP FORM 4730/2 (11-61)

REPORT SYMBOL BUMPS 4730-2

All first and second stage compressor rotor blades sheared off just above the blade platforms. Blades of other stages rubbed, ripped, torn, and bent opposite direction of engine rotation.

Compressor stator vanes, stages one and two, were ripped from housing and forced into rotor blades. Remaining vanes rubbed, ripped, torn, and bent.

A considerable amount of wood sawdust was packed in around domes of the combustion inner liners.

DISTRIBUTION

NATSF PHILA
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-4113, 53612B, 4041)
NAVAVNSAFECEN
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
COMNAVAIRLANT
COMFAIRNORVA
NAS OCEANA
NAVAIRWORKFACNORVIS
ENGINEERING & QUALITY OFFICER

Shop 500
Shop 433
AFFRO Gen Elec Evendale
General Elec. Rep. (2)
McDonnell Corp.
VMCJ-2

Compressor rotor blades, stages 3-17, were rubbed, ripped, and torn and bent opposite to direction of engine rotation.

Stage one and two compressor stator vanes were ripped from housing and forced into rotor blades. Remaining vanes rubbed, ripped, torn, and bent.

A considerable amount of wood and wood sawdust was packed in the compressor section and around domes of the combustion inner liners.

Turbine rotor evidenced minor blade tip rubs and metallization.

Complete disassembly of engine revealed no evidence of oil starvation, bearing failure, engine or engine component malfunction or failure.

27. CONCLUSIONS

No evidence of engine or engine component failure or malfunction was found.

Engine speed at time of impact considered to be at or near military rpm.

It is believed that foreign object damage to engine occurred at time of impact and was due to ingestion of tree limbs.

Could not be determined if compressor stall occurred prior to impact.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS

None

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY NAVAIREWORK PAC		3. CASE NO. 643	4. DATE OF RPT 8-7-67	5. AIRCRAFT MODEL AND PART NO. Central Air Data Computer	6. PART NO. 42400-101
2. AIRCRAFT (Model)		7. AIRCRAFT NO.	8. DATE CRASHED	9. CRASH SITE (Lat Long)	10. CRASH SITE (Mag Dec)
---		BIG-11	70210	---	---
11. TYPE OF UNK	12. TYPE OF UNK	13. DATE LAST KN	14. LAST ORIGINATING ACTIVITY	15. NO. OF UNK	16. AIRCRAFT (Model)
Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	RF-4B
17. OPERATING ACTIVITY		18. FOR -OPS - AND - I/OPS	19. REASON FOR CRASH AND LOSS		
VMCJ-2		AAR	Aircraft Crash 4B		

20. PREPARED BY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY	<input type="checkbox"/> NO DISCREPANCY	<input type="checkbox"/> NO DISCREPANCY	<input type="checkbox"/> NO DISCREPANCY
---	--	--	--

21. DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)	22. DISCREPANCY CODE (Part No.)
NASCREPLANT CONTROL NR. F4-67-67 (Report No. 1 of 5)	
MATERIAL RECEIVED 28 July 1967	

26.1 Central Air Data Computer, P/N 42400-101, could not be functionally tested due to crash damage. Visual inspection of components not crash damaged revealed the following conditions at input:

- 26.1.1 Altitude - sea level.
- 26.1.2 Total temperature - 595° R.
- 26.1.3 Airspeed - .54 MACH.

27.1 All available evidence indicates CADC was operating correctly prior to impact.

28. RECOMMENDATION: None.

PRIORITY

29. PRIORITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY	30. DATE VMCJ-2 271330Z Jul 67	31. DATE NASCRPLANT 312114Z Jul 67	32. TYPE Electronic Engineer	33. DATE 8-16-67
---	--	--	--	----------------------------

DISCREPANCY AND INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER FOR CRASH (11-01) REPORT NUMBER 11-01

DISTRIBUTION:

REQUESTING ACTIVITY - MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
 NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-5339)
 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
 COMNAVAIRLANT
 NATSF
 NAVAVNSAFECEN
 COMUSCINCPAC CG SECOND MAW
 NAVPLANTREPO ST. LOUIS
 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
 COMNAVAIRPAC
 MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

1. REQUESTING ACTIVITY NAVAIREWORKFAC		2. REPORT NO. 644	3. DATE OF R/P 8-8-67	4. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION AND REPORT NO. P/N 230E420G-1	
5. AIRCRAFT (Part 1) UNK		6. AIRCRAFT (Part 2) UNK	7. AIRCRAFT OPS 89954	8. DATE RECEIVED	9. AIRCRAFT FROM (Part 2) RF-4B
10. TYPE AND UNK	11. USE DATE UNK	12. DATE LAST UNK	13. LAST ORIGINAL ACTIVITY UNK	14. NO. COPY UNK	15. AIRCRAFT (Part 3) 153113
16. OPERATOR AND ACTIVITY VMCJ-2		17. PART - OPS - AND - I/P/OPS AAR	18. REASON FOR CRASH AND LOSS Aircraft Crash 4B		
19. F. NUMBER <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY					
20. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM (Include name and part no. of primary part failure) MASCREFLANT CONTROL NR. F4-67-67 (Report No. 2 of 5) MATERIAL RECEIVED 28 July 1967					
26.1 Auto Pilot Amplifier, P/N 230E420G-1, could not be tested or inspected due to extensive crash and fire damage.					
27.1 None.					
28.1 None.					
PRIORITY					
29. PRIORITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY VMCJ-2 271335Z July 67		30. NASCRLANT 312114Z Jul 67		31. TYPE Electronic Engineer	
32. DATE 8-16-67		33. SIGNATURE 8-16-67			

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT SHIPWRECK FORM 100-4 (11-61)

REPORT ORIGIN: SHIPWRECK 100-4

DISTRIBUTION:

REQUESTING ACTIVITY - MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
 NAVAIRSYSQBHQ (AIR-5339)
 NAVAIRSYSQBREPLANT
 COMNAVAIRLANT
 NATSF
 NAVAVNSAFECEN
 2ND MAW CG SECOND MAW
 NAVPLANTREPO ST. LOUIS
 NAVAIRSYSQBHQ
 NAVAIRSYSQBREPAC
 COMNAVAIRPAC
 MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

1. OVERALL ACTIVITY NAVAIREWORKFAC		3. REPORT NO. 645		5. DATE OF R/T 8-8-67		4. ASSEMBLY IDENTIFICATION AND PART NO. SLZ9170B	
2. ASSEMBLY (Sub-1) MCAS CHERRY POINT		6. ASSEMBLY (Sub-2) BGL-107		7. ASSEMBLY UIC 10639		8. ASSEMBLY NAME (Sub-3) Angle of Attack Transmitter	
11. TOTAL NO. OF PARTS Unk	12. NO. OF PARTS LAST USE Unk	13. DATE LAST USE Unk	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY Unk	15. NO. OF PARTS Unk	16. ASSEMBLY (Sub-4) RF-4B	17. ASSEMBLY (Sub-5) 153113	
10. OPERATING ACTIVITY VMCJ-2		18. FOR OPS - AIR - 1/10/67 AAR		19. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND USE Aircraft Crash		4B	
21. FINDINGS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO DISCREPANCY		<input type="checkbox"/> BASIC DISCREPANCY		<input type="checkbox"/> MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY		<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DISCREPANCY	
20. IDENTIFICATION OF FINDINGS (Exclude name and part no. of primary part failure)							
NASCREPLANT CONTROL NR. F4-67-67 (Report No. 3 of 5) MATERIAL RECEIVED 28 July 1967 26.1 Angle of Attack Transmitter, P/N SLZ9170B, could not be functionally tested due to extensive crash damage. Vis inspection during disassembly revealed the following: 26.1.1 Unit impacted at least twice. 26.1.2 Unit was electrically and pneumatically energized prior to and at time of first impact. 27.1 All available data indicates A/A Transmitter was operating correctly prior to impact. 28. RECOMMENDATION None.							
PRIORITY							
25. PRIORITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY		26. RECEIVED BY VMCJ-2 251325Z Jul 67		27. RECEIVED BY NASCRLANT 312114Z Jul 67		28. APPLICABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPLICABLE	
(b) (6)				29. TITLE Electronic Engineer		30. DATE 8-16-67	

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT SHIPWRECK FORM 0700-2 (11-61)

SHIPWRECK FORM 0700-2

DISTRIBUTION:

REQUESTING ACTIVITY - MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
 NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-5339)
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~~COMNAVAIRLANT~~ CG SECOND MAW
 NAVPLANTREPO ST. LOUIS
~~BOARD/BOARD/BOARD~~
 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
 COMNAVAIRPAC
 MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY NAVAIREWORKFAC		2. REPORT NO. 642	3. DATE OF RPT 8/7/67	4. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION AND REPORT NO. Counter Pointe		
MCAS CHERRY POINT				Pressure Altimeter, P/N B003-22102		
5. AIRCRAFT (Model)	6. AIRCRAFT (Serial)	7. AIRCRAFT W/O	8. DATE REPORTED	9. REPORTED BY (Sig. and)	10. REPORTED BY (Sig. and)	
Type MC-3	1167	13903	UNK	---	---	
11. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	12. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	13. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	14. LAST ORIGINATING ACTIVITY		15. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	16. AIRCRAFT (Model)
UNK	UNK	1967	NAVAIREWORKFAC, CHERRY PT		UNK	RF-4B
17. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY		18. FOR - RPT - AND - 1/2/2/3		19. REPORT FOR ORIGINATING AND DATE		
MARCOMPRECON 2		N/A		Accident Damage 4B		
20. <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY		21. <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY		22. <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY		23. <input type="checkbox"/> DISCREPANCY
						3-00301-2070 070
24. DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)						25. DISCREPANCY (Part No.)
NASCREPLANT CONTROL NR. P4-67-67 (Report No. 5 of 5)						
MATERIAL RECEIVED 7/28/67						
NOTE: Item 5 of 5						
26. DISCREPANCY						
See next page.						
27. DISCREPANCY						
See next page.						
28. DISCREPANCY						
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100. DISCREPANCY						

PRIORITY

Aerospace Engineering Technician - 16 August 1967

DISCREPANCY AND INSPECTION REPORT SAMPLE FORM 00000 (11-66)

REPORT ORIGIN: DISCREPANCY 0000-0

DISTRIBUTION:

REQUESTING ACTIVITY MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
 NAVAIRSYSCOMBIQ (AIR-5339)
 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
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 NAVPLANTREPO ST. LOUIS
 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
 COMNAVAIRPAC
 MARAIRCRO ONE FOUR

26. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS:

26.1 Due to condition of instrument, complete test could not be performed.

26.1.1 The motor control, P/N 10M10-656386, was tested and found to be normal.

26.2 External inspection revealed the barometric pressure was set at 30.07 inches of mercury.

26.2.1 The glass assembly, P/N 3-02401-2170, was missing.

26.2.2 The pointer, P/N 4-00301-2001, was missing.

26.2.3 The mounting flange, P/N 2-00301-0070, was partially missing.

26.2.4 Two each lamps, P/N MS24367-715, were missing and two each were intact and were operable.

26.2.5 The dial, P/N 4-00301-5001, was dented and distorted.

26.2.6 The 10,000 foot drum assembly, P/N 4-00301-2201, exhibited zero reading and was badly dented on the zero reading. The 1,000 foot drum, P/N 4-00301-2101, was not damaged and exhibited zero reading.

26.2.7 The knob gearshaft, P/N 2-00301-0620, was broken and the knob was missing.

26.3 Disassembly and inspection revealed the shaft and sector, index 26, figure 3, of NAVAIR 05-30-75 (no P/N), had broken pivot shaft and was displaced.

26.4 The handstaff assembly, P/N 3-00301-2160, was not seized.

26.5 The diaphragm assemblies, P/N 3-00030-2210, were operable.

26.6 The barometric pressure counter spur gear stud, P/N 2-00301-0260, was bent thus seizing the gear.

26.7 All other parts were in normal condition.

27. CONCLUSIONS:

27.1 That all damage was due to impact and the unit was operable prior to impact.

27.2 Since the pointer handstaff, P/N 3-00301-2160, was not seized at impact, the position of the 100 foot pointer could not be determined.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.



1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY MCAS CHERRY POINT		2. REPORT NO. 941	3. DATE OF RPT 8/8/67	4. REPORT TITLE AND SUB TIT. Oxygen Mask P/N MS 22001-5	
5. ANALYST (Last, First, Middle Initial) UNK		6. ANALYST (Last, First, Middle Initial) UNK	7. ANALYST ORG 96906	8. DATE RECEIVED UNK	9. REPORT DATE (Day, Month, Year) UNK
11. TYPE OF TEST UNK	12. TEST SITE UNK	13. TEST LAB UNK	14. LAST OUTSTANDING ACTIVITY UNK	15. NO. OF PAGES UNK	16. ANALYST (Last, First, Middle Initial) RF-4B
17. OPERATING AND ACTIVITY VMCJ-2		18. FOR - JMW - AND - L/PLANS VMCJ-2 AAR No. 1-60-A		19. REASON FOR REQUEST AND DATE Fire 5B	
20. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS (Include name and part no. of primary parts failures) NASCREPLANT CONTROL NR. Survival Equipment 3-67 MATERIAL RECEIVED 1 August 1967 <u>Chemical Analysis</u> 26.1 Oxygen mask P/N MS 22001-5 had extensive fire damage leaving charred and gummy rubber surfaces. 26.2 Dirt, leaves, and pine needles were found adhering to gummy rubber surfaces. 26.3 Due to the condition of oxygen mask no other foreign matter could be detected. 27.1 Conclusions cannot be formed because of deteriorated condition of material. 28.1 None.			21. ANALYST'S SIGNATURE MS 22001-5 900 22. ANALYST'S TITLE (Last, First, Middle Initial) 23. ANALYST'S ORG 24. ANALYST'S DATE 25. ANALYST'S SIGNATURE 26. ANALYST'S TITLE (Last, First, Middle Initial) 27. ANALYST'S ORG 28. ANALYST'S DATE 29. ANALYST'S SIGNATURE 30. ANALYST'S TITLE (Last, First, Middle Initial) 31. ANALYST'S ORG 32. ANALYST'S DATE		
33. PRIORITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY		34. DATE OF RPT VMCJ-2 241735Z July 67		35. DATE OF RPT NASCREPLANT 252032Z July 67	
36. (b) (6)		37. TITLE Chemist		38. DATE 8/15/67	

PRIORITY

DISSEMINATION AND INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER FOR CURE (11-01)

REPORT NUMBER CURE 11-01

DISTRIBUTION:

REQUESTING ACTIVITY VMCJ-2
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-531)
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
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USMC 2ND MAW

NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ

14/HLJ/ras
3 OCT 1967

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VMCJ-2 serial 1-68A, concerning RF-4B, BuNo 153113, accident occurring 20 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VMCJ-2 AAR 1-68A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the board as modified by subsequent endorsements.
2. As evidenced by this report the dangers inherent in limited visibility operations (particularly during darkness) cannot be over emphasized. This report also illustrates pictorially (see Encl 7 picture #1 to Medical Officer's Report) why proper flight clothing and equipment must be worn at all times.


B. B. MITCHELL
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CMC (CODE AAP)
NAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM
COMNAVAILANT
CG, 2D MAW FMFLANT
NAVPLANT REP ST LOUIS
CO, MAG-14
CO, VMCJ-2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST
3750.6 SERIES

42:GND:jfr
3750
18 Sep 1967

ORIGINAL

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VMCJ-2 serial 1-68A, concerning RF-4B, BuNo 153113, accident occurring 20 July 1967, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

Subj: VMCJ-2 AAR 1-68A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the findings, comments, and recommendations of the board as modified by subsequent endorsements, subject to the following.

2. The primary cause of this accident re-emphasizes the inexorable consequences of human error in the aviation business. Although the pilot in this case had a well founded reputation for sound judgment and professional performance, he appears to have erred twice in this instance:

a. Changing his climb-out from IFR to VFR, in the interest of getting the job done on time, was the first fallacy.

b. Miscalculation of the visible path, immediately after take off, was the second.

3. It should be emphasized that there was no delay in SAR helicopter response to this accident. The delay insinuated by NATOPS regulations, which requires two pilots for IFR flight, was not a factor in this instance. On the contrary, the helicopter rescue of Captain (b) (6) is to be commended. It should be noted that the helicopter used was an H-2 yica the H-34 referred to in the Medical Officers Report.

4. It is recommended that all available Safety publications utilize this graphic illustration to re-emphasize the preeminence of terrain clearance under conditions of restricted visibility.


H. M. ELWOOD

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NAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
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CMC (Code AAP)
COMNAVAIRLANT
CG FMFLANT
NAVPLANT REP ST LOUIS
CO MAG-14
CO VMCJ-2
File

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

106:JW:ab

3750

1 SEP 1967

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VMCJ-2, serial 1-68A, concerning RF-4B, BuNo 153113, accident occurring 20 July 1967, pilot (b)

From: Commanding General, MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C.
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

Subj: VMCJ-2 AAR 1-68A, forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the accident board and in the comments contained in subsequent endorsements, subject to the following comments.

a. It has been reiterated to all MCAS personnel responsible for control of aircraft that the MCAS Operations Duty Officer must thoroughly investigate any and all reports indicative of a possible aircraft accident and positively determine if an accident has or has not occurred.

b. Paragraph 1.b. of the second endorsement indicates there was some delay caused in aircrew recovery by lack of a second SAR pilot on duty and recommends that two pilots be on duty during IFR conditions. Do not concur that two pilots should be on duty during IFR conditions. If the ceiling and visibility is so low that the flight must be conducted in IFR conditions then a search should not be attempted by the SAR helicopter.

M. E. Carl
M. E. Carl

Copy to:

NAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
CMC (Code AAP) (2)
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COM NATC (1)
CG FMFLANT (1)
CG 2dMAW (1)
CO MAC 14 (1)
CO VMCJ-2 (1)
NAVPLANTREPO MC DONNELL ACFT CO, ST LOUIS, MO. (1)
CO NAVAERRECFAC EL CENTRO (1)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

42800J:1fs
3750

23 AUG 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VICJ-2, serial 1-68A, concerning RF-4B, BuNo 153113, accident occurring 20 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding General, MCAS Cherry Point
(2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

Subj: VICJ-2 AWR 1-68A, forwarding of

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the accident board and in the comments contained in the first endorsement, subject to the following comments.

a. The primary cause of this accident appears to be aircrew error and not singularly pilot error in judgment. The duties of the pilot/RSO team are necessarily integrated, each must support and contribute to the performance of the other. The NATOPS Manual specifically spells out that the RSO, during IFR departures, will monitor departure procedures and will inform the pilot of any deviation from the prescribed flight path. Right take offs are IFR by nature. Common sense tells us that he should do this on all take-offs whether day, night, VFR, or IFR. The RSO's failure to do so on this flight is a definite causative factor in this accident since a warning from him would almost certainly have reversed the pilot's dangerously low descent prior to impact. Recommended changes to the NATOPS Manual relative to the monitoring duties of the RSO are being submitted by this Group.

b. SAR performed its role adequately in aircrew recovery. (Reference Enclosures 39 and 40 of the AWR).

(b) (5)

2. This aircraft Group now requires that all flights depart and return under radar control or surveillance. This will not prevent the occurrence of another accident similar to this one but it should provide adequate ground control and assistance to the flight while operating in the early and terminal phases of flight. This would still leave the major portion

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMNAVIST 3750.6 SERIES

of the flight unmonitored. This Group is investigating with HACC-2, NCAS, Cherry Joint NATC, and FIA various means of extending the radar monitoring to eliminate or reduce to a minimum the periods of time which flights will not be receiving direct ground assistance while operating on local flight clearances.

E. H. Finlayson
E. H. FINLAYSON

Copy to:

NAV. VES. SECTION (2)
CIC (Code 44) (2)
COMNAVJAG (2)
NAV. DIST. SCOUT (1)
CG NATC (1)
CG F FLANT (1)
CG 2d NAV (1)
CG NCAS Cherry Joint (1)
CG V. C-2 (1)
NAV. DIST. O. McDonnell Aircraft Co, St. Louis, Mo. (1)
CG NAV. DIST. C, El Centro (1)
File

BBS /par
5220
16 Aug 67

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on AAR, VMCJ-2 Serial 1-68A of 20 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 14
(2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C.
(4) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(5) Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet

Subj: AAR., VMCJ-2 Serial 1-68A of 20 July 1967, RF-4B, BUNO 153113,
Pilot (b)(6)

1. Forwarded concurring with the report of the aircraft Board subject to the following comments.

a. Captain (b)(6) reputation as a pilot is one of excellence. He is aggressive and his average monthly flight time (33 hours) since joining VMCJ-2 is indicative of his desire for flying. As is noted in the report Captain (b)(6) has accumulated a total of 1548.6 hours flight time (1483.3 jet hours) with no previous accidents. He is investigative and precise by nature and thus has acquired an exceptional knowledge of the RF-4B. This same trait carries over to other facets of flying and as a routine he has devoted numerous off-duty hours studying various aspects of flying. Captain (b)(6) is a staunch advocate of rigid adherence to not only NATOPS but all flight regulations. This rigid adherence to regulations no doubt played some part in his decision to duck under the clouds following take-off.

b. The hazards of VFR night/low visibility departures and letdowns as mentioned in part X are recognized. I strongly concur that pilots should utilize IFR procedures whenever practicable under these conditions. This avoids the danger of attempting to remain VFR when IFR conditions are encountered in flight and may prevent a recurrence of this type accident in the future. Accordingly, this organization has implemented procedures where by all flights will utilize RATO monitored departures and letdowns. In addition a continuous program of reminding aircrews of the hazards associated with contact flying under marginal VFR conditions has been re-emphasized through the squadron's training and safety programs.

c. Part X of the report recommends that specific instrument monitoring duties for crew members in dual seated aircraft be set forth in NATOPS. Although certain IFR duties of the crew member are set forth in NATOPS, it is believed that these duties should be carried out during both IFR and VFR conditions (particularly at night) and that specific mandatory reports be made as appropriate by the crew member at specified limiting deviations from normal in respect to altitude, airspeed and angle of bank during transitory phases of flight. This squadron is in the process of drafting specific recommended changes for NATOPS relative to monitoring duties of the crew member.

Subj: AAR., VMCJ-2 Serial 1-68A of 20 July 1967, RF-4B, BUONO 153113,
Pilot MANZ

d. Paragraph 3. of part X of the basic report deals with the importance of complete follow-up on distress signals or information concerning them. Factors relative to the rescue phase have been reviewed and the following comments are considered pertinent:

(1) A review of the orders for the VMCJ-2 Operations Duty Officer has been accomplished and found to be sound but requirements for further delineation in some areas was indicated, a revision is currently under way. Further, it is felt by the undersigned that Captain (b) (6) was not remiss in his duties as Operations Duty Officer. It is recognized however that more aggressiveness on his part might have enhanced the rescue.

(2) I am in complete agreement with the board's analysis of the laxity of those who elected not to report emergency signals or flashes and for the lack of some follow-up action. It is paramount that the personnel in the three vital links of the aircraft control system (aircrews, tower and RATC) be continually reminded of the importance of follow-up action on all distress signals. It is strongly felt that positive action must be initiated, upon reports of anything that indicates a possible accident, to confirm the facts. Additionally, it is recommended that procedures be adopted that will ensure positive aircraft control until departing tower/RATC frequencies for RIO with other control agencies.

2. It is noteworthy to point out that in examining the statements of Captain (b) (6) and Lieutenant (b) (6) it is readily apparent that both were well indoctrinated in the various aspects of survival. They utilized all of their survival equipment to gain maximum results including utilization of the parachute to deter shock of the pilot. It is unfortunate that Lieutenant (b) (6) elected to disregard that portion of his training that sets forth the need for flight gloves. Had he been wearing his gloves he would have sustained only minor injuries. In this respect, a program of continuous reminders of the importance of flight equipment has been re-emphasized within in this organization.

3. A safety survey was conducted 18 December 1966. Another survey was being conducted by Captain (b) (6) at the time of the accident.

B. B. Skinner
B. B. SKINNER

Copy to:	
NAVAVNSAFCE	(2)
CO MAC-14	(1)
CG 28MAW	(1)
CG MCAS CHERPT	(1)
CG FMFLANT	(1)
CNAL	(1)
CNC (AAR)	(1)
NAVPLANTREPO STL	(1)
COMNATC	(1)
CO NAVAIRRECFAC	
EL CENTRO	(1)

PART 1 GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY Commanding Officer, VMJ-2	2. SERIAL NO. 1-68A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MIDSHIP 2004559	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT RF-4B	5. BUREAU NUMBER 153113
6. TO: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center	9. LOCATION OF MIDSHIP 322 Rad., 4.5NM NKT TACAN	10. DAMAGE ALFA		
7. VIA CO MAG-14 CG 2ND MAW CG MCAS, CherPt., N.C. CG FMP/ANT COMNAVANTFLT	11. TIME OF DAY NIGHT	12. TIME IN FLIGHT 00+01	13. FLIGHT CODE 395	
18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MIDSHIP A/C collided with trees while attempting to remain	14. CLEARED FROM MCAS CHERRY PT. TO BENNETT FIX, NKT	15. TYPE CLEARANCE VFR/IFR	16. AIRSPEED 360KTS. E	17. A/C WEIGHT 48,637/33.5M.A
20. LIST MODEL, BUREAU, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED	19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MIDSHIP S.L. 115 TERRAIN 81			

FACTOR	FACTOR	FACTOR
1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT	9. SERVICING PERSONNEL	17. WEATHER
2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES	10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)	19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)	12. ADMINISTRATIVE	20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
5. CREW	13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TARMAC, FLIGHT DECK	21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	14. FACILITIES-NAV AID, LANDING AID (CCA, CCA, U.S. NAVY)	22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL	15. FACILITIES-OUTPULP, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)	23. UNDETERMINED
8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)	16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)	24. OTHER (Specify)

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) (b) (6)	2. GRADE CAPT.	3. SERVICE NO. (b) (6)	4. BRANCH NA	5. TYPE OF SERVICE USMC	6. AGE 29	7. YEARS OF SERVICE 4	8. POSITION PILOT	9. POSITION FRONT	10. POSITION CKPT	11. POSITION B
CO-PILOT (Specify & submit separate page 2)										

ITEM	ITEM	ITEM
11. ALL MODELS 1548.6	17. CV LANDING DAY/NIGHT ALL 28 / 0	25. DATE/PLACE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK 1 APRIL 1967
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS 431.6	18. FCPL LANDING LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT ALL 0 / 0	26. TYPE INSTRUMENT CASE STANDARD
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS 149.5	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED ALL 17.6 / 22.9	
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL A/C 399.7 OFT/CPY	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ALL 5.1 / 2.9	
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS A/C 355.6 OFT/CPY	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELDS (if helo mishap) 1483.3	
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS A/C 98.3 OFT/CPY	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL DATE 15 JULY 67 DURATION 1.4	

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) (b) (6)	26. GRADE 2/1R	27. SERVICE NO. USMC	28. BRANCH (b) (6)	29. TYPE OF SERVICE VMJ-2	30. AGE B	31. YEARS OF SERVICE RSO	32. POSITION REAR	33. POSITION CKPT
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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2

SPECIAL INQUIRY REQUIRED in accordance with

Dir. 66 INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA										
A. A/C HISTORY	1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR/OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK	
	27 DEC. 66	265.7	0	0	0	0	1st Cal. Even	71.0	47	
B. ENGINE HISTORY	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIP REQUESTED	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
	(1) J79 6e 8b	421070	1354.8	2	YES	272.8	NORIS	MAJOR	71.0	76
	(2) J79 6e 8b	421330	1046.3	1	YES	272.8	NORIS	MAJOR	71.0	76
	(3)									
C. COMPONENT HISTORY	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURER'S PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIP REQUESTED	8. SER. NO. FOR AMPLEUR		
	(1)									
	(2)									
	(3)									
D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS	1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED		2. PARTS REPLACED					
	PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE			PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE				
E. ENGINE FAILURES	JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional recuring to prevent engine damage)									
	AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. WAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ALTITUDE		
	8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT	10. ALTITUDE		11. WAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS		
		<input type="checkbox"/> ATTEMPTED <input type="checkbox"/> ACCOMPLISHED					<input type="checkbox"/> PRIMARY <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL			
	INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS				16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				
RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE										
	17. ALTITUDE	18. WAS	19. ALTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/HP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE		
	INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS				26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS				
F. OTHER REPORT	IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT									
	1. AIRPORT SERIAL NUMBER									
	2. ON MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME GROUP 231735Z JULY 1967									
	3. OTHER 261250Z JULY 1967									

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

 PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
 Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED <input type="checkbox"/> CRIPPLER <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR		2. PRESSURE SETTING		3. WIND OVER DECK		4. RELATIVE WIND		5. APPROACH/END SPEED	
6. MARK NUMBER		7. MODEL NUMBER		8. LOCATION OF SHIP		9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER			
10. CRIPPLER/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR MEMORANDUMS USED									
11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, windings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.									
G. SHIPS DATA	ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.) RATIO		15. CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	16. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	17. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no landings and months in service)	
	DECK PENDANT								
	DECK PENDANT								
	BARRIER/BARRICADE								
FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)									
H. DEPLOYMENT	1. DATE DEPLOYED COMUS			3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT			4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS		
	2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD			5. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT			6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS		
	7. BEST HOUR LOADED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED								
WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP									
I. WEATHER	1. CEILING		2. VISIBILITY		3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY		4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY OUTSIDE AIR		5. DEW POINT
	7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (clouds, light, icing, fog, sea state, density altitude, etc. appropriate)								

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
			CO, NAVAFRBCFAC, El Centro	200 NAWRISAFCEP DIRECT (NAV) 100 NAVAFRBCFAC (AIR-1) 1cc CO, MAG-14 1cc CG, 24MAW 1cc CG, MCAS, Chert Pt 1cc CG, FMPLANT 1cc COMNAVAIRLANT 1cc CMC (AAP) 1cc NAVPLANTREPO StL 1cc COMNAFAC
COST DAMAGE TO:			3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NONE	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY NONE
5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CG				

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. SENIOR MEMBER MAJOR T. D. SYORODA		2. MEMBER (b) (6)		3. MEMBER (b) (6)	
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PART V - THE ACCIDENT

At 0454, 20 July 1967, aircraft RF-4B, Bu No 153113 departed MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C. on a scheduled bogey track for a Second Marine Aircraft Wing anti-air warfare exercise with Captain (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC as pilot and Second Lieutenant (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC as Reconnaissance Systems Operator. Captain (b) (6) was launching as a single aircraft following the in-chocks abort of his flight leader in an EA-6A aircraft.

The flight was filed on a local instrument clearance but was modified to a VFR departure/IFR recovery by the pilot upon notification of VFR conditions by Cherry Point departure control. The weather at the time was 300 scattered, visibility 4 miles with ground fog. The scattered layer was variable 200 to 400 feet. The pilot noted no discrepancies during run-up and read the takeoff check list to the RSO on "hot mike". An afterburner takeoff and initial climb appeared normal to the pilot and all observers. Credible witness statements indicate the aircraft entered low clouds shortly after takeoff. The pilots' statement indicated he "ducked" under a low cloud to remain VFR. A survey of the area about 1½ miles from takeoff showed that the aircraft had clipped a total of 21 trees in four separate groups. The average clipped height of the first group was 115 feet MSL. Six-hundred and ten feet further along the flight path the aircraft encountered the second group of trees with an average clipped height of 85 feet MSL. The average clipped height of the third group of trees struck in this area had an average height of 82 feet MSL and were 223 feet further along the flight path. These figures indicate a descent angle of 2½ degrees between the first and second group of trees, while the path through the remaining trees is nearly horizontal. When these trees were exited at the edge of a creek, aircraft damage was extensive enough to render further flight impossible. Both external tanks had been ripped from the aircraft, pilots' canopy broken (canopy plexiglass and a portion of the pilots' helmet recovered here), fuel cells were ripped open, large sections of both outer wing panels and stabilator were torn off, and the aircraft was burning profusely. However, enough airspeed and airfoil remained at this time for the aircraft to continue clear of all trees for 3000 more feet before again descending through trees at an angle of 30 degrees to its final resting place. The attitude upon impact with the ground was nose high with right wing down. Pilot and RSO successfully ejected almost simultaneously just prior to impact. They landed in the trees 40 yards apart, however most of this separation was lateral rather than along the line of flight. Pilot and RSO remained at the position at which the pilot had landed for the remainder of the night. When light permitted the RSO, who was relatively uninjured except for (b) (6), went in search of help. He successfully contacted a member of the 2nd MAW Survival School who drove him first to a phone and then to Cherry Point. Acting on the information supplied by the RSO the SAR Helicopter launched at 0900, successfully located the pilot, and returned to MCAS, Cherry Point at 1005.

PART VI - DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The forward fuselage (pilot and RSO cockpit area) was burned and completely destroyed. The center fuselage area was destroyed so completely that it was not intact with either forward or aft sections. The aft portion of the fuselage was burned externally but not sufficient as to cause total destruction to all trim, stabilator and rudder actuator cylinders. The wings, both right and left were separated from the main fuselage at the wing roots. The two J-79 engines were close to the aft section of the fuselage and were completely destroyed. One afterburner section was near the port engine, and the starboard afterburner section was separated from the engine and thrown clear of the final impact area. The aircraft sustained strike damage with limited salvage. (For details see PART VII. For historical background see enclosure (2)).

PART VII - THE INVESTIGATION

The AAR Board appointed by the Commanding Officer of VMJ-2, the reporting custodian for the aircraft involved, convened at approximately 0840, 20 July 1967, when an RF-4B, CY-10, Bureau Number 153113 filed as Winsleaf 9-2 was overdue for his approach time. At this time it was pointed out to the board members that 9-2 had an expected approach time of 0655 and that SAR procedures had been effected at about 0810Q by TACC. At 0855 the board was notified through the VMJ-2 duty officer that Lt. (b)(6) had called via telephone reporting the crash of CY-10 and that the pilot was badly burned and had a (b)(6) injury. Lt. (b)(6) established the accident to be about three (3) miles after takeoff from runway 32. The AAR Board began preparations to depart for the scene of the accident when about 0920 Lt. (b)(6) arrived at VMJ-2, having been driven in by Cpl. (b)(6) (Enclosure (3)). Lt. (b)(6) stated that he and Captain (b)(6) had crashed and that Captain (b)(6) was badly burned. The accident occurred about three (3) miles after takeoff. Lt. (b)(6) was dispatched to the base hospital with Captain (b)(6) a squadron pilot. About this same time Cherry Point tower notified the squadron that the SAR helicopter had located the crash site and had rescued Captain (b)(6).

The senior member plus three members of the AAR Board departed for the scene of the accident at about 1050, 20 July 1967. The delay was necessary to permit helicopter servicing. The first items sighted by the board upon arrival at the scene (located 3.15 miles, 322 degrees magnetic from the takeoff end of runway 32, Cherry Point) was the pilot's survival gear (Enclosure (4)). His helmet was blackened by smoke and his oxygen mask had been burned from the inside, (Enclosure (5)). There were also some scorched areas on the pilot's torso harness in the vicinity of the left shoulder (Enclosure (6)). On the parachute which was still hanging in a tree (Enclosure (7)), just adjacent to the pilot's gear, some scorching took place on the left riser near the "D" ring. The pilot's seat, which was located 317 degrees magnetic, 15 yards from his survival gear, evidenced burning

on the top cover of the stabilizing chute housing. The front cockpit canopy framing which was laying 160 degrees magnetic, 25 yards from the pilots chute was badly charred externally (Enclosure (8)). The plexiglass which was 95% missing evidenced more external than internal heat damage.

The aircraft wreckage was located 330 degrees magnetic, 40 yards from the pilots chute (Enclosure (9)). It was identified by engine serial number (0421070 and 0421330) and was generally distributed about four (4) major locations within 90 feet and between 325 and 360 degrees magnetic from final impact point. Smaller debris was scattered throughout (Enclosure (10)). The angle of impact was determined to be 30 degrees (determined by measuring broken trees in relation to point of impact). The location of the various aircraft components indicated that the aircraft struck the ground nose high, right wing down. With the exception of the nose area, the parts and pieces indicated extensive aircraft fire in flight (Enclosures (11), (12), (13) and (14)). The cockpit areas however indicated that the fire and heat level had been lower internally than the areas outward and adjacent to them.

Three of the board members continued their inspections and measurements of the impact area while one member went via helicopter to inspect an area of impact which had been spotted by the SAR crew about noon. Two McDonnell representatives were requested from the squadron to assist the board in identification of parts. Later in the day the RSO's helmet, torso harness and parachute risers were located 205 degrees magnetic about 40 yards from the pilots chute. His seat was about 30 feet 350 degrees magnetic from his helmet and the rear cockpit was 160 degrees magnetic, 190 yards from the pilots chute (Enclosure (9)). The RSO's helmet, seat, torso harness and oxygen mask gave no indication of fire. The rear cockpit canopy was intact and badly blistered externally (Enclosure (15)).

The remainder of the board departed for the first impact area about 1800, 20 July 1967 via vehicle. It was located 320 degrees magnetic, 1.46 nautical miles off of the takeoff end of runway 32, Cherry Point (Enclosure (16)).

In this area aircraft debris was scattered over a distance of about 1000 feet and about 400 feet wide on a course of 321 degrees magnetic (Enclosure (17)). Commencing with the southern most point of contact (recognizable by broken trees) and progressing in the direction of flight, pieces of F-4 drop tank were found, none of which were burned. After progressing 300 feet a piece of the mid leading edge flap (Enclosure (18)) was found on the top of the bunker (Enclosure (17)). This was the first piece that showed signs of fire (lightly charred throughout). After 675 feet the first piece of plexiglass was found. It was clear (no sign of burning). Aircraft debris became progressively more abundant and more charred. The last 100 feet of trees were burned at the top. Within the burned out area, was found both wing tips (2 1/2 feet of starboard, 1 foot of port), the left horizontal stabilizer tip, pieces of radome, door 82L, lower 1/4 port outer duct lip, six (6) pieces of under side internal wing fuel tank wall, 14 feet of fuel lines in various

lengths and numerous pieces of charred plexiglass. Pieces of aircraft were found embedded in trees in the area. Due to the height of the trees and the slope of the land in the area the board decided to procure the assistance of a qualified surveyor to ascertain angle of flight of the aircraft. This was accomplished by the CO of VMJ-2 assigning Lt. (b) (6) a graduate civil engineer to the AAR Board.

Security guards were posted on each crash site and the board returned to the squadron.

As the above portion of the investigation was taking place two members of the board set out to extract statements from witnesses. Captain (b) (6) was not accessible at this time due to a recuperation from surgery. It was however reported by the flight surgeon member of the board that Captain (b) (6) reportedly had seen a Master Caution Light followed directly by what he thought to be an oxygen fire. Lt. (b) (6) stated the takeoff appeared normal followed by Captain (b) (6) calling IFR on the ICS, a huge flash of white light followed by yellow flames and a noise similar to an explosion (Enclosure (19)). Captain (b) (6) who was VMJ-2's operations duty officer during the morning of 20 July 1967 stated he informed TACC, about 0510Q in response to their inquiry, and after checking with the line, that CY-10 (Event 9-2) was airborne or would be getting airborne. Then about 0715Q approach control (RATOC) notified Captain (b) (6) that 9-2 had not made his expected approach time. Captain (b) (6) informed RATOC that he had no contact with 9-2 but suggested that 9-2 could have joined one of the refueling tankers provided for the AAWEX or landed at Beaufort, S.C. or Myrtle Beach, AFB. 9-2's takeoff time was passed by RATOC as 0454Q. At 0740Q Captain (b) (6) (from TACC) inquired into the whereabouts of 9-2. At 0820Q Captain (b) (6) informed Captain (b) (6) that 9-2 had not joined on a tanker or landed at Beaufort and that SAR was being notified (Enclosure (20)). Captain (b) (6) who had been scheduled to fly lead aircraft in Captain (b) (6) flight stated that he observed CY-10 make what appeared to be a normal takeoff at about 0445Q and enter a fog bank at the end of the takeoff end of runway 32 (Enclosure (21)). Captain (b) (6) who was standing duty as MAG-24 Hot Pad coordinator, stated that at about 0450Q he observed two F4 aircraft make what appeared to be normal afterburner takeoffs and within seconds he observed an orange glow of 2-3 seconds duration in the vicinity of the takeoff end of runway 32 (Enclosure (22)). Major (b) (6) who was acting as coordinator for the F-4B aircraft stated that upon over-hearing the above sighting of Captain (b) (6) reported the same to the Cherry Point operations and passed the same information to Major (b) (6) and LtCol (b) (6) at TACC at about 0700Q. He also indicated that Captain LIEBY also had observed the flash (Enclosure (23)). Captain (b) (6) who was flying an F-4B on CAP on the 280 radial of Cherry Point at 40 nautical miles stated a sighting of three distinct flashes of orange light at about 0500Q in vicinity of Cherry Point. The first and third flash were of greater intensity (Enclosure (24)). LtCol (b) (6) and Major (b) (6) provided no significant information (Enclosures (25) and (26)). Lt. (b) (6) who was Senior Air Controller for TACC during the AAWEX stated that CY-10, event 9-2

had been shown on TACC's board as airborne but failed to report in, as a result of Sergeant (b) (6) conversation with VMJ-2 at about 0450Q during which he was told the aircraft was airborne. At about 0740Q, as a result of Captain (b) (6) call to VMJ-2, TACC attempted to locate CY-10 (Event 9-2) through the various agencies and airfields at 0805Q. TACC requested SAR to sweep the airfield (Cherry Point) out to about five miles. At 0817Q TACC was notified by Cherry Point tower their Norfolk SAR had been alerted (Enclosures (27) and (28)). Captain (b) (6) confirmed the information provided by Lt. (b) (6) (Enclosure (29)). Captain (b) (6) who was standing strip alert at the time of the accident reported watching CY-10 takeoff and disappear into the fog followed in about 20 seconds by two large flashes. The second flash occurring prior to the first flash diminishing (Enclosure (30)). Major (b) (6) who was piloting a TA-4F heading 225 degrees on the 040 degree radial of Cherry Point at 35 sighted two large flashes at his one o'clock position at about 0455Q (Enclosure (31)). Captain (b) (6) piloting a C-130 reported entering a cloud layer at 100 feet MSL after takeoff at 0459Q and broke out about 300 feet MSL (Enclosure (32)). Lt. (b) (6) statement (Enclosure (33)) was disregarded by the board because the time was in disagreement with others and the location of the flashes he observed would have established the flashes in the Camp Lejeune artillery range. Lt. (b) (6) flying MEA-14 stated he received a beeper signal at about 0700Q but did not get a bearing or report it until Cherry Point approach control requested a fix which was given at 320 degrees when he was on the 020 degree radial of Cherry Point at 5 miles (Enclosure (34)). Corporal (b) (6) who was flight clearance supervisor at Cherry Point states she received a phone call from a Major at about 0500Q to report he had seen some flashes off of runway 32 and thought they had a crash. She contacted Sergeant (b) (6) in the tower and relayed the Sergeant's answer, it was probably the afterburner of a departing aircraft in the fog. The Major seemed satisfied (Enclosure (35)). Sergeant (b) (6) statement confirms Corporal (b) (6) statement (Enclosure (36)). Mr. FRAME, a civilian IFR room supervisor, stated that Winleaf 9-2 (CY-10) did not report for his block time of 1055Z and a routine communications search was commenced. The IFR room then contacted TACC and VMJ-2 and received the same information that Captain (b) (6) had passed to TACC. VMJ-2 also passed, on request, CY-10's proposed track. At 1100Z Gysgt (b) (6) heard a weak PRT signal and requested MEA-14 for a bearing which was given as 320 degrees (Enclosures (37) and (38)). The SAR pilot and co-pilot stated that they homed on the pilots emergency radio to locate the pilot about three miles out on the 320 radial but due to the fog had to make a number of approaches before the wreckage was sighted. The helicopter was set down in a clearing and Captain (b) (6) was brought to it via litter (Enclosures (39) and (40)). Lt. (b) (6) station crash officer, stated that at about 0845Q, 20 July 1967 he received a phone call from Lt. (b) (6) who told him that he had been in an aircraft crash and needed help for the pilot. Lt. (b) (6) ascertained the approximate position to be 320 degrees, 2-3 miles from Cherry Point (Enclosure (41)). Corporal (b) (6) stated that he came across Lt. (b) (6) about 5 miles west of Cherry Point walking along a dirt road (county road 1105), drove him to a telephone and then proceeded

to VMJ-2 (Enclosure (3)). Excerpts from Cherry Point tower tape established the takeoff time for 9-2 to be 0454Q (Enclosure (42)).

A safety center representative, LCDR (b) (6) was on the scene by 0730Q, 21 July 1967. He joined the AAR Board as they returned to the scene of the final impact to complete inspections of parts and diagrams of the location.

The initial information from the pilot referred to above and previous yellow sheet gripe (Enclosure (43)) caused special attention to be given to oxygen and altimeter systems. On 12 July 1967 the altimeter was reported to be sticky. It was written off as being replaced. This was verified by the maintenance night crew log (Enclosure (44)) and the work center register (Enclosure (45)). On 13 July the same gripe was repeated. The yellow sheet indicated the altimeter had once again been replaced. The work center register and night crew log reflected a switch of front cockpit and rear cockpit altimeters had taken place. The altimeters are interchangeable. The avionics section of the squadron did not however, perform the required functional test on the altimeters after the switch took place (Enclosure (63)). There are no additional altimeter gripe for the remaining seven flights. On 18 July an oxygen leak in the vicinity of the rear seat lower block was reported (Enclosure (43)). Corrective action was shown as replacing the seat pan. On the first flight of 19 July no oxygen problems were shown but on the second flight an oxygen leak was reported. The corrective action this time was replacing the oxygen converter. Preliminary inspection of the oxygen system revealed no malfunction in the system. The RSO's mask, hose, upper and lower blocks showed no signs of fire. The hose leading from the RSO's lower block to middle block had been burned by ground fire after final impact (Enclosure (46)). The pilot's oxygen hose below the mini-reg, the upper block and middle block to the lower block showed no signs of fire. The mask was badly burned inside and partially burned externally near the exhalation outlet (Enclosures (47), (48) and (49)).

The rubber around the mini-reg housing was melted about 80% away. Within the mini-reg the metering orifice, the elastometer and the diaphragm were scorched and burned (Enclosure (50)).

The instrument panels were found near the cockpit, 355 degrees magnetic, 77 feet from final impact point (Enclosure (10)). Significant readings were; TAS front cockpit - 360, rear - 361, GS (rear cockpit only) - 344, altimeter both cockpits - minus 50 feet. IAS front cockpit - 105 knots and accelerometer plus 9 and maximum negative "G". The pilot VSI indicated 120 degree right wing down and 30 degree nose high attitude. HDIR establishes the angle of attack upon stoppage to be 13.1 units.

The left wing, which was located 335 degrees magnetic, 65 feet, evidenced burning from bottom through the wing (Enclosures (51) and (52)). The port intake ramp was scorched in a manner reflecting flame exiting from intake (Enclosure (53)).

The stabilator actuator was in the full aft stick position, while the stabilator trim actuator was in about the 2 1/2 degree nose down position. No preliminary DIR information could be acquired from the fuel controls due to damage. The engine afterburner exhaust nozzle actuators were found in the full open position and the nozzle area control output shafts were in the fully extended positions. Gear and flap actuators were in the up positions. Flaperon position could not be determined due to damage. External observations of the engines indicate the left engine suffered sudden stoppage as a result of impacting a tree causing massive interference to the compressor section. Rotational damage was relatively minor, however, melting and fusing was present (Enclosure (54)). The right engine had extensive damage to the compressor rotor blades but opposite to the direction of rotation. The engine casing suffered heavy scoring and peening indicating the engine was operating prior to impact and that the impact angle of the engine was shallow. Some "log jamming" of the blades was present and metal fusing is apparent on most of the internally visible blades (Enclosure (55)). The tail and center fuselage areas had been charred and scorched throughout (Enclosure (14)). Minor aircraft debris was located scattered from the creek to final impact area (Enclosure (9)).

The AAR Board departed the final impact area at 1600, 21 July after authorizing salvage to begin on Saturday, 22 July 1967.

On 22 July 1967 the Board met to consider the evidence thus far collected. The flight surgeon plus one member were excused to travel to Camp Lejeune to interview Captain (b)(6). At this time the Board requested that the aircraft maintenance section determine the position of all aircraft flight control system actuators and request DIR's on the engines, angle of attack, CADC, altimeters, and oxygen system (Enclosure (56)). Captain (b)(6) on his initial statement (Enclosure (57)), indicated that he arrived at about 0305G for a brief for AANEX. The pre-flight briefs were conducted normally. In the line shack he made a specific verbal note of the previous Aux Air Door Light gripe. Pre-flight and start was normal, after which Captain (b)(6) delayed in the fuel pits awaiting the other aircraft of his flight. He departed the pits after it was ascertained that there would be no other aircraft. On departure control frequency, in long position, Captain (b)(6) cancelled the IPR climb portion of his local instrument clearance, he retained his block time for approach. His engine run-up and pre-takeoff procedure were normal. After receiving clearance he commenced what was described as a normal afterburner takeoff. Following takeoff he raised his flaps at 180 knots, after gear up, and ducked under what he described as a small cloud at about 700 feet indicated altitude just off the end of runway 32. He saw a Master Caution Light. He placed this as happening about a mile from the takeoff end of the runway. He then started to look to the telelight panel when he was distracted by a mass of cockpit fire. In his statement he attributed the fire to the fact that his mini-reg had come loose from his mask. He later, however, points out that he ascertained this after ejection when he felt the loose mini-reg. He did, however, remember seeing an abundance of yellow flames. He made deliberate attempts to

prevent inhalation of the fire. He stated that he remembers seeing the altimeter unwind through 200 feet at this time and felt he had erred and they were going to crash. He then felt a jar and heard an explosion. He thinks he was skidding on the ground at this time and reached up for the ejection face curtain and found one corner of the handle out of the seat housing. He heard the seat cartridge explode, felt the tumble and chute open. He continued to burn in the area around his face throughout the ejection and heard a hissing type sound while something played about his face. He felt a sharp pain (b) (6) upon contact with the ground. He extinguished the fire after releasing himself from the chute and seat pan. He stated that (b) (6) by this time and located his RSO orally. The remainder of his statement dealt with the details of their team work during the survival phase. The pilot was (b) (6) and the RSO had (b) (6). They therefore teamed up to act as one. They made a bed of life rafts for the pilot who complained of being cold. They located the pencil flares and smoke flare. They utilized these when they heard or saw aircraft. When it was light the RSO set out for help. Capt (b) (6) went on to describe the evacuation by the SAR crew. During the interview that followed with Capt (b) (6) and Doctor (b) (6), Capt (b) (6) amplified the following: He pushed over to remain VFR under a patch of fog which was 500-700 feet. He had felt a gust of air prior to the flash. It was similar to air exiting a hose. He stated he had to hold his left eye open with his fingers to find his ejection curtain. He attempted his emergency UHF radio (URC-10) before his PTT-3 and verified operation of them with each other. He verified (b) (6) while in flight.

On 24 July the barometric altimeters and CADC were investigated by MAJF Cherry Point. On a DIR no deficiencies were noted in the altimeter or CADC. The pilots oxygen mask, microphone and lead in wires were evaluated by the squadron avionics section. The microphone was still functional with no signs of shorting out. The lead in wires were intact (good continuity) with the exception of one complete break located about three inches below the mask exit point (Enclosure (49)). One lead-in wire on the hose side of the break showed very slight beading when viewed through a magnifying glass. Test indicated that the aircraft electrical power through this line was only 425 mile amps and could not have caused the beading. The lead-in line is normally wound around the upper portion of the mini-reg (where it enters the mask) and then held in place with plastic tape to keep excessive line secured. The break occurred at a point that would fall on the back (face) side of the mask and which would be under the tape. Analysis of the break indicated that it could have been cut and then burned, or broken and followed by burning.

Ground survey of the point of initial contact with the trees (Enclosure (58)) revealed that the aircrafts flight path was about 2 1/2 degrees of declination and the contact was made at 115 feet MSL and then continued near level making a third contact with the trees 184 feet beyond the second. The fourth point of contact was 223 feet beyond the third after which the aircraft was permitted to exit the trees over a creek enroute to the final impact area. During the survey the piece of plastic slide track utilized in securing the starboard side of the pilots helmet visor cover was found approximately 900 feet from the point of first contact (Enclosure (17)). It showed no signs of fire.

On 24 July, Captain (b) (6) provided the board with the following supplying information:

He was on Hot Mike (ICS) throughout.
He remembered coming out of afterburner.
He clawed at his oxygen mask upon seeing a ball of flame.

On 25 July, Captain (b) (6) provided the board with the following supplemental information. He had started his takeoff roll with the ICS on Hot Mike. The first time he saw the Master Caution Light was right after he passed under the cloud on the end of the runway.

He could hear a push type noise as he first saw flame.
He felt nothing prior to the Master Caution light.
He heard a couple of explosions after he had parachuted to the ground.
He could still feel stick response after the fire occurred.
He was convinced that the aircraft engines were good.
He did not believe his canopy had been broken prior to the fire.
He knew he was level about 500 feet.
He didn't know when or how he received his (b) (6).

On 26 July, Captain (b) (6) added the following information:

He could not remember seeing 500 feet on the altimeter but did remember seeing 300 feet.
He thought he saw the fire with both eyes but he could not remember.
He suggested a possible source of ignition for the fire as being the aircraft portable cockpit flood (Grimes) light which he normally clips on the canopy defog duct just above the hook handle.

PART VIII - ANALYSIS

Pending the results of DIR's the investigation uncovered no evidence of any aircraft system malfunctions. VNCJ-2 deviated in their maintenance procedures by failure to perform a functional check on the altimeters after they switched the forward with the rear cockpit altimeter in CY-10 on 13 July 1967 (Enclosure (6)). There is, however, no indication that the altimeters were functioning improperly during this flight or during the previous seven flights. The FDIR, in fact, indicates the opposite.

The Master Caution Light seen by the pilot could have been illuminated by any combination of more than 65 circuits. The pilot recalls the Master Caution Light as occurring nearly simultaneously with the cockpit fire and further estimated it to have illuminated approximately one mile off of the takeoff end of runway 32. If the Aux Air Door Light which had been gripped on the yellow sheet the previous day had illuminated, it should have caused the light to illuminate earlier in the flight. It is normal for this light

to momentarily illuminate on takeoff during gear raising. Evidence indicates that on the first contact with the trees the aircraft's starboard drop tank was sheared from the aircraft, during which an explosive ignition of fuel occurred. The shearing of this tank and the resulting fire could have illuminated the Master Caution light through the combination of any one of more than eight (8) circuits. This flash would have appeared white in comparison to flame and is probably what the RSO saw in the cockpit mirrors. The high degree of inflight charring that was evidenced on all the aircraft parts in the final impact area and parts such as fuel cell walls, fuel lines, and engine pieces that were located in the second, third and fourth contact points indicated that the aircraft was engulfed in flames when it exited the fourth contact point. The burnt trees in the fourth contact area endorse this.

(b) (6)

indicating that his oxygen mask was not on his face during the oxygen fire. He was burned (b) (6) (b) (6) indicating his helmet had been pushed back prior to the cockpit fire. (b) (6) occurred prior to the cockpit fire (Enclosure (59)). Since the only portion of the aircraft's oxygen system that showed any signs of burning in flight was the pilot's mask and top of mini-reg, indicates that the oxygen fire started at the pilot's mask from an external source. The charring of the pilot's helmet indicates that the visor cover had been sheared from the helmet prior to the fire (Enclosures (60) and (61)). The plastic visor track, discovered prior to the fourth contact point (Enclosures (16) and (17)), agrees with this and establishes the position of detachment of the visor track from the helmet as being prior to the fourth contact point, but after the second. The canopy plexiglass, that was found approximately 50 feet beyond the second contact point establishes that general area as the point where his canopy was broken prior to being charred. Bits of wood embedded in cracks and crevices of shattered plexiglass is considered conclusive in establishing collision with trees as being the cause for the shattered canopy. The badly charred pieces of plexiglass found in the fourth contact area indicates that fire had been present in the vicinity of the canopy in that area. The pilot's own statement indicates detachment of his oxygen mask was performed by him upon sighting fire.

Preliminary inspection of the aircraft's engines and the pilot's statements indicate that they were functioning upon impact. The progress of the aircraft after initial contact with trees is indicative of high momentum, and analysis of the acceleration characteristics of the aircraft point to a high probability that the TAS readings of 360 knots (found on the instruments) was nearly correct for the speed of the aircraft at the first or second contact points.

If an imaginary line is projected from the point of initial contact with the trees, at a 24 degree inclination (Enclosure (58)), to the position of the cloud (located through the pilot's statement and verified by creditable

witnesses) over the end of the runway, the mathematical solution puts the aircraft at 380 feet MSL at push over to remain VFR. This is in agreement with the pilots revised statement of 300 feet as being the altitude he could remember and the meteorological report of the weather (Enclosure (64)). The 200 foot altimeter reading referenced by the pilot probably occurred in the vicinity of the fourth contact point (Enclosure (17)) or later since he states that he had already received eye damage when he saw it. The aircraft radome on which the pitot tube is mounted was sheared off prior to the fourth contact point and any altimeter readings thereafter would be invalid. Also, since the pilot remembers that he felt he had erred when he saw the altimeter unwinding through 200 feet, he could have made that observation prior to the initial contact point and since the accident mentally reversed the sequence.

The fact that the RSO could not recall any cockpit flight indications preceding or during the accident (Enclosure (19)) indicates that he more than likely was not monitoring them. Even though this cannot be categorized as a contributing factor to the accident and does not violate NATOPS specific duties in this area could have conceivably prevented it.

The location of the pilot and RSO's seats and canopies in relation to their parachute landing point and their own statements indicate that the ejection seats functioned normally and that they exited the aircraft, by ejection, at 175 to 200 feet AGL. (Enclosure (65)).

Witnesses statements indicated rescue of the pilot and RSO was delayed by a number of conditions that evolved for this particular flight; The fog bank causing all afterburner takeoffs to glow more than normal resulting in no follow-up action on reported flashes; The more than normal number of aircraft taking off at that particular time of day; The pilot cancelling the IFR climb portion of his flight; An exercise causing shared aircraft control authority; Inadvertant beeper signals over a period of time causing humans to become complacent relative to them.

Analyzing each of the above and singling out error indicates some degree of complacency on the part of each individual or agency that had some responsibility for to aircraft control or safety.

The VMJ-2 operations duty officer displayed complacency in that he accepted the fact that since the aircraft had departed the line it had taken off. Also, after having been alerted of the overdue status of CY-10 he displayed little concern by assuming that the aircraft had joined a tanker or landed at another field.

TACC displayed little concern that the aircraft had not reported in and later that it was late returning.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 series

RATCO picked up a weak beeper within five minutes of the aircraft failing to report for his approach time and did not follow it up after it faded. (Enclosure (37)).

Tower made no follow up on reported flashes. (Enclosure (36)).

Aircrews observed flashes and/or beepers while airborne and elected to dismiss them.

PART IX - CONCLUSIONS

This accident was caused by error in judgement on the part of the pilot. Directly following a night takeoff, he attempted to remain VFR by flying under a cloud of an approximate height of 300 feet AGL. 1.46 miles from the runway, the aircraft collided with trees at 115 feet MSL. This contact sheared (by pieces) the starboard external drop tank and in so doing caused an explosive ignition of fuel prompting the pilot to release his oxygen mask. 610 feet later, the aircraft again contacted trees shattering the front canopy, tearing open one or both internal wing tanks, separating portions of the port leading edge flap and speed brake from the aircraft. After another 184 feet, the aircraft contacted the trees a third time causing loss of portions of flap, the starboard aft engine housing, additional fuel lines, and injuring the pilot from the debris. A fourth group of trees severed both wing tips, and when the aircraft exited the trees it was engulfed in flame. The pilot and RSO successfully ejected between the fourth contact area and the final impact area 3000 feet away. The aircraft struck the ground on final impact in a nose high attitude, right wing down, at approximately 115 to 125 knots.

The weather, that varied between 200 and 400 feet scattered, could be considered as a factor in influencing the pilot's judgement only. It influenced the pilot to cancel the climb portion of his IFR flight plan and further prompted the pilot to remain VFR.

The rescue of the aircrew was delayed because of complacency on the part of all agencies involved, and on the part of the aircrews who failed to report emergency signals and flash sightings. SAR was exemplary.

PART X - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the hazards of VFR night/low visibility departures and let downs be periodically emphasized to all pilots, and they be encouraged to utilize IFR procedures whenever practicable.
2. That NATOPS set forth specific instrument monitoring duties for crew members in dual seated aircraft. These duties are being forwarded as recommended changes in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9 series.
3. That aircraft control personnel and aircrews be made continually aware of the importance of complete follow-up on all distress signals or information concerning them. It must be stressed that an erroneously activated signal cannot be ascertained without full investigation.

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

1. MOR (~~Original only~~)
2. Statement of Aircraft Maintenance Officer
3. Statement of Corporal (b) (6)
4. Photograph of Pilots survival gear
5. Photograph of Pilots Oxygen Mask
6. Photograph of Pilots Torso Harness
7. Photograph of Pilots Parachute
8. Photograph of Front Cockpit Canopy
9. Photographic diagram of ejection area
10. Diagram of Final impact area
11. Photograph of Port intake ramp and fuselage
12. Photograph of Starboard Wing
13. Photograph of Fuselage area
14. Photograph of Tail section
15. Photograph of Rear Cockpit Canopy
16. Photographic diagram of all contact areas
17. Diagram of the initial contact areas
18. Photograph of a piece of leading edge flap
19. Statement of Second Lieutenant (b) (6) (RSO)
20. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
21. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
22. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
23. Statement of MAJOR (b) (6)
24. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
25. Statement of Lieutenant Colonel (b) (6)
26. Statement of Major (b) (6)
27. Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6)
28. Statement of Sergeant (b) (6)
29. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
30. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
31. Statement of Major (b) (6)
32. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
33. Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6)
34. Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6)
35. Statement of Corporal (b) (6)
36. Statement of Sergeant (b) (6)
37. Statement of Mr. J. B. FRAME Jr.
38. Statement of Gunnery Sergeant (b) (6)
39. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
40. Statement of Captain (b) (6)
41. Statement of First Lieutenant (b) (6)
42. Transcript of tape recording of MEAS GUNNERY POINT TOWER
43. Copies of Yellow Sheets for Bureau Number 153113
44. Excerpts from VMJV-2 Night Crew Maintenance log

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

45. Copies of VMCJ-2 organizational Maintenance Control register
46. Photograph of burnt oxygen hose (rear cockpit)
47. Photograph of Pilots oxygen mask (bottom view)
48. Photograph of Pilots oxygen mask retainer
49. Photograph of Pilots oxygen mask (front view)
50. Photograph of Pilots oxygen hose
51. Photograph of left Wing (under side)
52. Photograph of left Wing
53. Photograph of Port intake ramp
54. Photograph of Port engine
55. Photograph of Starboard engine
56. Copies of DIR requests
57. Statement of Captain (b) (6) (Pilot)
58. Plan view of initial contact area
59. MOR conclusions
60. Photograph of Pilots helmet
61. Photograph of Pilots helmet
62. Statement of Survival officer
63. Statement of Sergeant (b) (6)
64. Meteorologist report
65. Resume of Pilots Flight Time
66. Rescue report (OpNAV Form 3750-13)
67. Aircraft Fire/Rescue report (Original only)

ENCLOSURES

1. Narrative: (b) (6), Capt., USMC, Pilot
2. Narrative: (b) (6), 2/Lt., USMCR, NFO
3. Diagram of Estimated Ejection Sequence
4. Photo-Diagram of Crash Site
5. Conclusions
6. Recommendations
7. Captions For Attached Photographs (2 pages)

Photographs

1. (b) (6) - Hands
2. (b) (6) - Hands
3. (b) (6) - Frontal View, Face
4. (b) (6) - Lateral View, Face
5. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask
6. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask
7. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask
8. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask
9. (b) (6) - Flight Suit
10. (b) (6) and (b) (6) - Personal and Survival Equipment
11. (b) (6) - Torso Harness
12. (b) (6) - Miniregulator
13. (b) (6) - Miniregulator, O₂ Hose and Block
14. (b) (6) - Personal Chute
15. (b) (6) - Personal Chute
16. (b) (6) - Hardhat
17. (b) (6) - Hardhat

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT AND INTERVIEWS OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (PILOT) (b) (6) USMC
concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967.

INITIAL STATEMENT AND INTERVIEW MADE ON 22 JULY 1967. PREPARED BY CAPTAIN
MARION H. HALPY, (b) (6) USMC AND LIEUTENANT (b) (6) (MC)
USN. BOTH MEMBERS OF THE AAR BOARD. (TRANSCRIPT OF TAP RECORDING)

The following is my statement about the crash of Marine Charlie Yankee
One Zero an RF-4B at approximately 0452Q at Cherry Point.

I came into work just about five minutes after three o'clock to brief
with Captain (b) (6) who was to fly the A-6 on Wineleaf flight 9-1 and Wine-
leaf flight 9-2. After we briefed the mission we each ran our own individual
crew briefs, which for my hop wound up mostly going over ejection procedures
if we needed them, and what ever crew coordination we were going to use on
radios, etc. After we finished briefing, we hung around the ready room for
about 10 to 15 minutes and walked down to the airplanes at about 10 minutes
to four. Went into flight equipment and put all our gear on. I had all my
gear on that was issued except for the "B" suit because we weren't going
to pull any "B's". And at that time I believe that Lieutenant (b) (6)
had all his gear, however, I found out later he had had his gloves in the
cockpit, but was not wearing them. After we suited up we walked out to
the flight line, signed for the aircraft, and commented on the one gripe,
that on the previous hop Captain (b) (6) had had three ox air door lights and
that it had checked out O.K. on the ground; so we figured we best keep an
eye on it after we brought the gear up. Wandered on out to the airplane
waited around to get started, got started finally; after we got started we
got the word from the A-6 that their aircraft was down and they were going
to try to get an F-10, so we pulled out of the chocks and went out to the
fuel pits and sat in the fuel pits taking on a full bag of gas; we were
about down to 1100, negative 11,000 pounds internal. When, after we finished
topping off in the pits, we got the word over the radio that Charlie Yankee -
I believe it was two three - the A-6 would not be going and there were no
F-10's. So I decided to go on ahead anyway even though we couldn't jam, at
least we could fly the mission track as briefed and I could fly the first
part of track up to the first IP fast in order to get there at the IP on
time. So we called ground control for taxi with our Charlie Yankee number
and found out that the local flight plan had been filed under our Wineleaf
numbers, so we then picked up the call sign even with the field of Wineleaf
9-2. Taxied out after receiving clearance and in the long position we were
switched over to departure control because the field at that time had been
IPR but they said the field's now VFR, and so I rogered and said I would
launch VFR but desired to keep my block time - to keep my clearance, so they
read me off the clearance, clearing me to the Bennett intersection. I believe
the time I had to contact them was 0650Q. No, it was 1050Q. 1050Z. They
gave me Zulu time to contact them to pick up my penetration, and I rogered
it. We then switched back to tower frequency, got back up on tower frequency
and we ran through the pre-takeoff checks. Ran up the right engine first,

Enclosure ()

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read off my oil pressure and my fuel flow on cutoff to the RO, and then I had an idea I was on hot mike - once we started up the engine we went on hot mike. Ran up the left engine, read the oil pressure to the RO and pulled the power back to check the idle flow, idle cutoff fuel flow, and then I turned the three aux tabs on and put the flaps down to one half, and then read through the cockpit takeoff check off list which the controls free, and I wiped the cockpit out with my stick and there was no binding. Then wings down and locked - there were no pins. Insured all the lights were out, told him that my harness, no that the yaw, roll and pitch were on, my harness was locked. Let's see, there was a couple of other things. The hook was up. My safety pin was out. To check his safety pin out, and his alternate ejection handle - where ever he desired it. And he rogered and said yea, he was ready to go - his pin was out. So I called tower and got clearance to roll and went to 30 percent, let go the brakes, pushed up to 100 percent and waited until the temperatures reached set. If I remember right the left engine was reading 630 on reset, and the right one was reading 625. At this time I let go of the nose wheel steering and selected burner on both engines and burners lit normally. Good light off. Good roll. Airplane rolled just about as far as the normally would and we were airborne. Brought the gear up and started the flaps up at 180. And I went - I went and ducked under one small cloud that was sitting on the end of the runway. I was showing about 700 feet indicated, I say after about a mile from the field still exclaiming it. We had come out of burner at this time - if I remember right. We were still exclaiming. The master caution light came on. And so I started to put my head down to look at the telelight panel and as near as I can tell, I was just a bunch of fire in the cockpit. What I think it was - was my oxygen mask at the mini reg might have come loose. And I had a fire, and from then on it is pretty confused. I remember a bunch of yellow light and all that and I remember trying to exhale all the time I couldn't talk to (b)(6) I don't know why. I was trying to exhale to keep the fire out of my lungs. And I saw the altimeter unwind to 200 feet. And so I figured - well I screwed it up this time. It's not, we are going to crash. About then I felt a jar and heard an explosion, and I figured well at least (b)(6) got out of it; then we hit some trees and I don't remember too much more except I reached up - I think after we hit the ground and were skidding, and pulled the face curtain. The reason I say I think it was after I hit the ground because one corner of the face curtain was already out. At this time I could just barely see out of one eye and figured what the hell I've always been late - I might - my Martin-Baker seat might get me out of it anyway might, as, well burn to death in the - get crushed to death on the jump out - as burn to death so I reached up and pulled the handle and I heard all of a sudden a "whoosh". like well - I heard the bang and I went out and I did the normal tumble the pictures show for Martin-Baker and felt the chute open up and could hear a "ssss" like oxygen. And I was still burning pretty good. My face was having something played on it, it felt like, and it was burning and parts of my flight gear were burning and about this time, hell, it couldn't been more than a second, I settled

Enclosure ()

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into what felt like a tree - or something - and hit the ground, (b) (6)
(b) (6). Then I remember a good sharp pain (b) (6) but, that could have been hit or done when I left the seat, cause I probably wasn't in a very good ejection position. I was still burning so I tried to roll it out and I couldn't because I couldn't get all the way down to the ground. So I got my koch fittings - got out of them - and floundered around and got rid of my scott seat pan. After I got rid of that I got the fire out pretty readily. Whatever it was that was feeding it was either on it or could have been - I don't know. After getting the fire out I dragged my scott seat pan over a little bit out of the fire. And I couldn't see anything so I couldn't move very much. But I found out I was still alive and I could yell and had a pretty good set of hands. So I yelled a couple of times to see if (b) (6) had gotten out. I don't remember hearing anything, so I said well "Pretty Wet". So I got the seat pan and opened it and blew up my life raft and flipped it inverted and sat on it so I could be as far out of the air - off the ground as possible, and started yelling for (b) (6) again. And he answered up. He said he was about 100 yards away or so, his voice sounded closer than that, that came out later he was. And he said he was trapped in his gear, and I asked why and he said (b) (6)
(b) (6). And so I started trying to get him out of the koch fittings and finally convinced him that he could get out of them. And he got out of them all right by just using the heel of his hand. And then he was still tangled up and said he couldn't work the rocket jets, so I told him to get out of his harness - to worry away at that buckle - and then he could probably step out of the harness and leave all that crap over there - and he did. While this was going on too, we heard some airplanes going over, we didn't know if they could have seen us or not. We heard a couple of - what sounded like the drop tanks explode, and I yelled each time to go ahead and cover your head in case anything falls this way but nothing did. They were good loud bangs - just like secondary explosions. And I shot off a night flare, then I - then I shot off two pencil rocket flares and nothing happened, and I turned on my little strobe light that I had on my survival vest. And with that (b) (6) could see me and he came over to where I was and we talked things over. See how it was and we realized we were actually not in the worst shape cause, although (b) (6)
(b) (6) so between us we had about the normal equipment for one person. And so we got things kinda squared away; we forgot about the radios, which was a foolish error on our part, and the sun (or bugs) started to come out and so I wanted to go over and get his parachute to try to protect (b) (6) from the dirt and (b) (6) as much from the dirt as possible. And he said it was all tangled up and said we couldn't get it but I told him to lead me over. I held on the - the strap of his flight suit and he walked ahead of me and I kinda buried my face right along side his back and he'd tell me when there was a branch or something in the way. We got over there and I pulled out my survival knife after I got my hands on the canopy and worked down to the shroud lines and cut all the shroud lines off and then I disconnected his harness and everything from the scott seat pan. And then I grabbed on to him again and found I couldn't hold on to both the seat pan and the parachute or the canopy while he was leading me so I left the seat kit there, he said he could kick it over.

And so he took me back over to where the rafts were and we set down the canopy and he went back to bring the seat pan over and he kicked it along through the woods pretty good. We got it over there. We opened it up and I blew up the other life raft - this gave both of us a place to sit - and gave me a real good - the way his was laid was better for me - it was better for me, it was a little more full of CO2 - to blow it up, and it was a little bit of a down grade. So when I started feeling faint I would lay down on it with my head down-hill and my feet in the air. After about five minutes like that I would be able to work pretty good again for a while. About this time (b) wanted to take off and go get help and I said no, probably someone had seen us go in or they had seen the explosion, as it was still pretty foggy out. He could - airplanes were going right overhead and he couldn't see them - that there wasn't much point going wandering for help until we could see a little better. So he helped me - he'd tell me where the flares were. And I got the flares out, so I had a stock of flares, and I already kept my pen gun, I'd put that in my flight suit pocket with my extra pen flares so I wouldn't loose it. And he helped me sort out that. I had all the flares and pen guns and stuff that I needed and it started to get lighter and we saw one F - or I didn't - but he saw one F9 go by overhead but it was still pretty low and we heard what I thought was a C-117 one time, and finally about 0830 I gave (b) permission to go ahead, "and don't get tangled in the swamp, if you hit swamp turn around, come back, but if you could make it otherwise, go ahead". And he took off and I heard him yell about 5 minutes later - he had hit the swamp in the direction he had started in - but he was going to take a little path he had found and veer around, so I figured if he was on a path he was possibly pretty good. So, go ahead be my guest. And I just laid there to wait. I was wrapped up in a parachute part of the time and when the . . . and mosquitos got bad I'd put it over my face and just hold it there till they would go away. I thought I heard a helicopter coming, and so I crawled out from underneath everything, and when it got pretty close I lit off a couple orange smoke bombs and they didn't seem to do any good. So I'd wait till the helicopter - I could hear him going out just about across from me and turn - as he would turn I would fire one of these pencil flares. I think two of them bounced off the trees and came back down, but two or three of them must have got up through, cause, as, that is what the helicopter rescue crewmen said the first thing they saw was that flare. Then I heard the chopper sit down, sounded like - oh - a quarter mile away or so, and shut down. And I started, yelling, and they started yelling back to me, and pretty soon the pilot of the chopper - I think it was (b) (6) was his name - and a couple of his crewmen got there to me and I said I could walk out if they would lead me. They said no, "we're going to stokes you and either lift you out of here or carry you out." We finally decided it was best to carry me out in a stokes stretcher because going up those tree branches would only hurt my face more. And so I laid down on top the poncho, - ah, not the poncho, - on the flight raft for a while and they offered me a smoke but I don't smoke that much, my lips hurt, said "No, I'd like a drink of water", and I got one of those. And then I got to the chopper and we just talked back and forth about - just shooting the breeze until they got the stokes back and they took me out. They cut a small piece of parachute off so I could hold it

over my head and we, I, just got carried out. Pretty smooth ride - the guys that were carrying me really did a good job. Got out to the chopper, two of them dropped off and hit the road - went up and started up the helicopter, and they put me in and gave me a blanket and tried to keep me as warm as they could and flew me on back to Cherry Point. Took only about 4½ to 5 minutes and boy I don't think they even shut the chopper down before they had me in the ambulance. That's about all. I think everybody knows about it from then on. I do know that my helmet - when I took it off on the ground - it felt to me like it was blistered pretty bad. But the thing that I remember the most - it was even while I was airborne - was all the yellow flames. And, I guess it probably distracted me a little bit. That's about all I remember.

INITIAL INTERVIEW

(b) (6) : I got, ah, can you remember out on the long position did you hit your elapse time switch before you started to roll?

No, I did not.

Did not?

Did not.

All right, you say you got a master caution light?

Yea.

Do you remember on the telepanel, anything that came on?

Ah, that's what I was looking for when I got the flames.

Yea.

So, I didn't have time to look I was too busy batting things around.

O.K. You say you pushed over, you were trying to stay VFR, John, is that what you -----?

Yea, there was a patch of fog out there, and I pushed about 5-700 feet and was going to scoot under it. I could see the black and fog where it was clear.

O.K. Did you feel a rush of wind in your face about this time, just before you got the flash?

Yea, Yea it was -----

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

A real gust of wind in your -----

It was like a directional hose - you know when you blow out through it, or the air hose you can pump up your tires of the bike and stuff, you pump it at your face - it felt about like that.

Uh uh. Did you see, ah, you say a yellow light, you think that was flames coming in?

I don't know, it was - it burned I know that - I think it was flames.

Yea.

Cause it closed up, Oh, I wasn't wearing my visor down because I didn't have my F2 helmet, I didn't take the night helmet cause I knew we would be flying about dawn and I'd want that visor for up at altitude to keep the sun out, cause you're flying directly into the sun. But if I'd had the clear visor, (b) (6)

(b) (6) - I was - I don't think I was airborne much after that flame started - then (b) (6), and I couldn't talk to (b) (6) and I couldn't hear him either, so I think my mike or something may have disconnected, or I don't - I don't know. I just tried to fly it as long as I could to give him a fighting chance.

Uh, well you don't have any idea about what altitude you punched out do you?

I'm pretty sure I was on the ground. I remember hearing a lot of cracking and ripping and I don't know, I think I was on the ground when I punched out cause I said the face curtain was partly down, and there was - was so smoky. (b) (6)

(b) (6), and after I reached up I saw the face curtain dangling a little bit, then I reached up and pulled it with both hands and got out of there. I figured I was probably going to die anyway, I might as well go big.

You're too tough to die, (b) (6). Ah, well let me see, you didn't try your radio, UHF radio. They were both - we found them both -----?

Yes, I tried the UHF radio first before I put the FRT-3 on. I used the URC-10 first because I felt the FRT would drown it out. Once I turned it on, but I couldn't raise anybody on it, after about 10 minutes. I said, "Well screw it", and turned on the FRT-3, and I knew that radio was working good cause I could listen to it on the URC-10.

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

You could hear the beeper?

Yea. The rescue people said the beeper helped them a lot getting in there, they homed the beeper.

Well that is something else we can -----

I had (b) (6) put it up in a tree so I could get that antenna up as high as possible.

Yea, (b) (6) as far as I'm concerned that is about all. I don't know if Doctor (b) (6) wants to ask you any questions about your flight gear or anything like that. Go ahead and take it.

O.K.

(b) (6)

O.K. Had your --- You say you had your shaded visor?

(b) (6)

Yes, I had it.

(b) (6)

What Position?

(b) (6)

It was up, you can't see in the dark with it.

(b) (6)

And your mask was on?

(b) (6)

Yes, it was on.

(b) (6)

Was it locked tight, was there any leaks that you know of?

(b) (6)

There were no leaks around it as far as I know. There's one place on it, if you found it, where the sponge - you know, liner in there was a little bent down, but that always bends down on my masks because of the way my nose is shaped. But it didn't leak out of there.

(b) (6)

And you thought at one time after the master caution light came on, when you turned your head to the left, that the hose came off?

(b) (6)

Something came loose.

(b) (6)

Uhuh. Did it seem to come off with the mini regulator?

(b) (6)

I don't know - I don't think the mask came off, but I think the hose came - the thing came off either at the minireg or below it.

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

Was this about the same time you got the gust of wind in your face?

Yea, Yea, and this could have been true too, because I always hook my oxygen mask through my Mark 3C and the top one in the F4, because I don't like a whole bunch of junk just dragging around the cockpit. So it would have stayed with me for awhile.

(b) (6)

You had your gloves on, and you had one small hole in your left forefinger, right forefinger?

(b) (6)

Yea, it was a little slit, and I had the sleeves of my flight suit rolled up one turn, because I had a rip in the flight suit, but I couldn't survey the flight suit - either one of mine - cause they didn't have any that fit and nothing smaller than a 44. And ---

(b) (6)

How much of your arm was exposed?

(b) (6)

I'd say (b) (6) above the gloves, about 2 or 3 inches, (b) (6) what I can feel - like with my hands, that's about how much was exposed. - And the knees, I think the knees probably both ripped out (b) (6) but as I said the flight suits, I have been trying to survey them for about two or three weeks and just don't have any in stock. I've put in a bitch with the Wing and the Group safety officer on it, and they said they were going to do what they can because there are other guys in J flying with unsatisfactory flight suits too.

(b) (6)

You know those flight gloves, you have the new type?

(b) (6)

Yea, they worked real good.

Yea, they sure did. They were scorched a little bit but they're not burned through.

One little slit on this finger (b) (6) and that was the only one.

I think that is where the material came loose from the leather and -----

That could be it. It could have melted it off.

I think we could write up a real good survey on those.

Yea.

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

Oh, when I was on the ground I didn't have a mask (b) (6), I didn't have a mask. But I could feel the stub of my oxygen hose, it felt like a stub, that's when I first figured well maybe that's where that fire came from. Cause I always put the mask on in the P4 tight

(b) (6)

But you didn't tear the mask away after the fire -----?

(b) (6)

No. No, I never did.

(b) (6)

Do you remember injuring (b) (6) being struck by something (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Ah, No, I remember hitting a few things on the way down and stuff, but nothing specific.

Well, (b) (6) that's all I got 'Ole Buddy' I thank ya, I'm sure that the Skipper said he's coming down.

Enclosure ()

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The following questions were submitted to [REDACTED] on 21 July 1967

QUESTION: (b) (6)

ANSWER: [REDACTED]

QUESTION: Was your MK-3C hose through your torso harness chest strap?

ANSWER: Negative.

QUESTION: Were you on hot mike?

ANSWER: We were on hot mike all the time.

QUESTION: Did you look at the mini-rig after you saw the flame?

ANSWER: No I did not.

QUESTION: Do you remember coming out of burner?

ANSWER: Yes I was out of burner and did not go back into burner.

QUESTION: How did you get your oxygen mask off?

ANSWER: I remember seeing a ball of flame and clawing at my mask.

QUESTION: What was the position of your ejection seat?

ANSWER: It was bottomed out.

QUESTION: How do you normally release your oxygen mask?

ANSWER: I normally take of the left side first and then the right.

QUESTION: Do you know how the oxygen ignited?

ANSWER: No, I have no idea. I did not notice any unusual odors.

QUESTION: What did you do when you noticed the master caution light?

ANSWER: Nothing.

QUESTION: Did you see any lights on the teletype panel?

Enclosure ()

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ANSWER: No I did not.

QUESTION: What was your altitude after you saw the flames?

ANSWER: I momentarily opened my eye and saw the altimeter reading 200 feet.

QUESTION: What was your altitude when you went under the clouds?

ANSWER: Between 500 to 700 feet.

QUESTION: Which did you see first, the master caution light or the flames?

ANSWER. I saw the master caution light first.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

Interview made on 25 July 1967. Interview by MAJOR (b) (6)
USMC the ACO member of the AAR Board and LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
(b) (6) USN, a safety center representative. (TRANSCRIPT OF
TAPE RECORDING)

(b) (6) O.K. Then the (garbled) went ahead and called it VFR?

(b) (6) Right, they were calling the field VFR.

(b) (6) You, you take off pretty much normal, (b) (6)

(b) (6) Yea, my standard takeoff, hot mike - well before the roll I run
the engines up.

(b) (6) Yea.

(b) (6) Pretty well, ah—

(b) (6) Gotchya

(b) (6) Turn on the AIX STAR and drop my flaps.

(b) (6) All right.

(b) (6) One half.

(b) (6) Fine.

(b) (6) Then I start at the top of the list on hot mike and read
everything off to the Ro.

(b) (6) Right.

(b) (6) And then of course all three AIX STARS switch on, yaw, pitch
and roll are on, when I can I check my harness locked - checked -
ask RO if he checked his harness and if ready to go. After he
checked those too he says ready. I'll call the tower and ask
for clearance to takeoff. When I got about 80% in each engine,
let go the brakes, come up to 100%. When the engines reset -
you know not overshoot to 700 degrees - come back to about 630 on
one and 625 on the left engine.

(b) (6) Yea.

(b) (6) I go ahead, ah (garbled) come off nose wheel steering at about
66 knots by that time you got rudder control pretty good.

(b) (6) After you picked up your gear did you notice any, ah, ah,
anything at all unusual like wing rock or, ah, ah, explosions or
anything outside the airplane?

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with COMNAVIST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

No, it was just pretty normal. Picked up the gear at 180 knots started my flaps up.

(b) (6)

Sure.

(b) (6)

And then just flattened out a little bit. I had between 5 to 700 feet on the altimeter, there was one little patch of clouds at the end of the runway, you could see underneath the thing. It wasn't very big.

(b) (6)

Uhuh.

(b) (6)

And sometime, just as I passed under that cloud is when that caution light first come on. It is the first time I saw it. It may have come on sooner, I can't say, 'cause I was on night takeoff and paid pretty much attention to airspeed and altitude, keep my wings level, and I don't sweat caution lights too much until I'm well airborne, and-----

(b) (6)

How much underneath this cloud did you, ah, ah,

(b) (6)

I figure we'd flown a couple hundred yards (garbled).

(b) (6)

Below it?

(b) (6)

Quarter mile.

(b) (6)

Under the cloud.

(b) (6)

Yea, just a patch, nothing to worry about because I had a good altimeter - at least I thought - I know I did, and I flew VFR.

(b) (6)

O.K. now do you remember passing the glorum creek?

(b) (6)

No.

(b) (6)

O.K. How soon after you ducked underneath this cloud did you notice the ball of fire?

(b) (6)

When I looked at the master caution light, I started to turn my head to look down - to look down at the telelight panel.

(b) (6)

Right.

(b) (6)

That's on the left side.

(b) (6)

Then all of sudden your cockpit was just full of fire?

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

Well, it was just a flame, just about here coming up, I could hear a "boom" and I didn't even know what it was, and I didn't know. I think what happened, my mini-reg might have come off my damn mask.

(b) (6)

O.K.

(b) (6)

You see I take my hop-----

(b) (6)

But you did look at it, right?

(b) (6)

Well, no, (b) (6)

(b) (6)

O.K. let me ask you this. Then what, ah, did you feel any jolt on the airplane prior to the master caution coming on or the -----

(b) (6)

No.

(b) (6)

O.K.

(b) (6)

We were flying just smooth as could be.

(b) (6)

O.K. now let me go ahead.

(b) (6)

After the flame came up you see (b) (6) I finally got the altimeter sighted and it was still going down it was about 200 feet starting down you know it was unwinding but not very fast at all and I guess I just - I think I tried to zoom it I don't know I just didn't get in fast enough. I was waiting for the guy in back cause I couldn't talk to him to see the fire and get out so I could get out cause I always said I would wait for that guy.

(b) (6)

Well ah, (b) (6) ah, says he saw the flame. He pulled the primary ejection thing. Has somebody told you this before?

(b) (6)

My wife said he saw flames going around my head.

(b) (6)

O.K. he pulled his ejection curtain. The canopy went but then ah, the seat didn't go.

(b) (6)

He didn't pull it far enough, did he?

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

That's right, so he went to his alternate ejection. He had the guard up but couldn't find it. Anyway, went back to the ah, primary pulled it and out he went so his canopy was quite a bit away ah back down the flight path. Now if you'll let me draw you a mental picture if you will you're taking off on three-two right past Lucky Lodge across Slocum. Is the magazine area O.K. Right there in the magazine area you hit the tops of some trees O.K. Ah there's a piece of canopy we picked up, it's either the left forward wind screen or the left side of the canopy O.K. Also in the trees you tore off the right external tank. The right main wing tank exploded also at the same time O.K. This canopy does not have any, ah, scars or anything on it, in other words fire burn or anything like that; your tank was here O.K. At that point and a few other assorted things ah you knocked over, you broke off, a couple pretty good sized trees.

(b) (6)

That figures.

(b) (6)

And ah then the ah fire started after that because there is a burn pattern from this magazine area out, what did you get about a hundred feet. Now every piece of aircraft that's heading to shed half that over to Turner or Tucker Creek -----

(b) (6)

Ha, boy quite a hell of a long ways isn't it!

(b) (6)

Yea, wait a minute were not through. Over to Tucker Creek. The pieces are now burnt, so, somewhere from hitting that tree where the parts are shed we come into the burn area then we go back up again in the air across Tucker Creek. We come back into the trees again, these pieces that are falling off there by the broken trees are burned then we come back up into the air again and you guys must have ejected on top of that third or second bounce because the airplane came back down into the trees again at a thirty degree angle; so apparently, skipped up in the air, caught on fire, skipped into the trees. You guys ejected and landed fairly close to the airplane. Now do you recall seeing your airplane while you were in there?

(b) (6)

Ah we were -----

(b) (6)

Were you around the airplane at all or could you not see at all?

(b) (6)

Heard a couple of explosions about 3 or 4. No it wasn't 10 minutes after I hit the ground from the chute cause I told (b) (6) to cover his head.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

O.K. the one was the right wheel well which the tire finally let go, blew the top of the wing off and you guys were roughly about 75 feet, 100 feet from the airplane. Right. And you and (b) (6) were about what a hundred feet apart?

Pretty close.

Yea, more than that 50 feet.

About that.

Yea. O.K. but both of you were close to the final resting place, final impact point which was quite away from the other side of Tuckers Creek. What is the measured distance from the opposite bank flight path to the final resting place? You recall what the distance of that was (b) (6)?

It's 500 feet.

(b) (6)

Ah, this much I know (b) (6) ah, don't let me interrupt you, from the time I had the fire in the cockpit I know I thought it was the left side of the - I know it hit something with that side and went back up into the air.

(b) (6)

O.K. that's right. It hit a tree.

(b) (6)

I was still waiting for the bang of his ejection seat cause he got the hell out cause I couldn't talk to him and I couldn't get this hand over to push the button.

(b) (6)

O.K. now, does this sound, would this sound logical to you that, ah, the tree knocked off your, ah, left engine cowl, you know the part you preflight right on the outside. Right, you know where the ramp is with the 26 hundred holes are. It knocked off the out rig of that, broke either your left forward windscreen or a piece of the canopy. On this side it came right on through and whapped you in the eye and cut your oxygen mike cords and knocked your oxygen mask off.

(b) (6)

I don't think so.

(b) (6)

O.K. Why not?

(b) (6)

Cause it was, that would have been cold, you see, I think, and this was hot, I know it was hot. Really now I don't know.

(b) (6)

Well, think about that.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

Well, the reason I say I'm sure, I don't think it was anyway cause up until the time. Put it this way, I don't know how high the trees are at Cherry Point, but I had a good solid 500 feet. That's my base at night if I don't break out I'll go IFR and not level off before then. On something like a patch of clouds I leveled off and we were pretty well trimmed up. The plane was flying itself, just accelerating out towards climb speed and now I got the Master Caution and looked down all this stuff when I looked down like this the fire caught me right across here which would be the right side. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

I don't think so because it was some time after that now whether one second or two seconds - ten seconds I don't know that I saw the altimeter unwinding past 200 feet but the plane was still flying cause I could feel it in the stick. I still had stick control.

(b) (6)

Did you have any pressure on the stick?

(b) (6)

Yes, and this is when I felt it tip something for the first time this time right there. That's when I had to figure in a hurry. It hit I knew I had lost the airplane right there. I was just waiting for him to go.

(b) (6)

So, you hit three separate times which you were in it twice you---

(b) (6)

I remember, I remember hitting twice (b) (6) This time then Jezzus, a whole bunch of colorful noisy ones and that's when I punched out. The curtain itself was out about when I (b) (6) to force my hands up there it was hanging, this side was hooked in and this side, this side was hanging down just a little bit loose and flapping and that's the time I got out. I didn't - I thought I was on the ground but I know that - I remember hitting twice and after the second was when I got out cause I heard the bang from the back seat. This is pretty distinctive there

(b) (6)

Well, you guys were actually close enough to the darn airplane to ejected after hitting the third time, but it doesn't quite seem like it. I don't think you rode through the, ah, through the second-way back there.

(b) (6)

Well, I hit twice and the airplane bounced.

(b) (6)

That first strike in the trees there - its very possible that you hit so close to the tops, its very possible that you might have not even known it. Lah, just the tank is gone the right drop and it sort of hung on for a while and gradually more of it came off.

We traced down your oxygen system where its got the motors and all that stuff going over to, ah, this DIR; that we'll get back in here some and -----

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

And the motors were good (b) (6), there was nothing wrong with them.

(b) (6)

Yea.

(b) (6)

I got all four stages of burner, it came out of burner properly (garbled) the motors are good.

(b) (6)

Yea, well of course just for the heck of it you always got to send your engines to DIR I think don't you? What did they tell you at school?

(b) (6)

Well, if they were good you didn't have to.

(b) (6)

Oh, really.

(b) (6)

Both motors were good (garbled).

(b) (6)

Well I didn't think so either, especially the right one.

(b) (6)

It was either me or the or what happened around here. Either my hands gone or my mind's convinced it was pilot error or something like that fire, those are the two reasons.

(b) (6)

Yea, I can't, I can't find a cause (b) (6) and that's why I was getting so anxious to come down and talk to you, I can't figure out the fire, if it happened before you hit the trees. I can put it together, if you hit the trees, caught on fire, bounced up into the air again, cause this-----

(b) (6)

Oh yea, that would fit together.

(b) (6)

This is where the parts are shed, the first parts we have are not even burned. Plus the pieces of canopy are, there isn't a scar on them, and then right afterwards as soon as we get into this burn patch, there are also pieces of canopy in there burned you see, and also everything that's fallen off the airplane has the initial impact of the trees and after the fire has started, are burned. And this is the haunting thing of it.

The canopy, (b) (6) is your canopy and (b) (6), are sooted outside and inside the same amount; also you got to have some kind of fire outside just as well as the one inside.

There was a hell of a fire outside.

(b) (6)

Yea, well I (garbled)

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

But I, the only thing that fits and that's what has got me real concerned, ah, tracked down all sorts of dumb things, ah, I cannot find the cause of the fire; but well, even this, now if the airplane was on fire before it hit the trees, why aren't the parts under the trees burned?

(b) (6)

I don't know. (b) (6) I'm pretty sure what fire there was-until such time as I was too busy-I was preoccupied with the damn thing. I think it fully in my cockpit, it was all with me. I don't know, that's what I think.

(b) (6)

Do you recall how you got your oxygen mask off?

(b) (6)

I remember tearing at the ----- (b) (6) but don't remember how.

(b) (6)

O.K. Do you think your canopy could have had a hole broken in it? You think that could have been the "woosh"?

(b) (6)

No, because this was a distinctive "woosh" I heard the same "woosh" when I was coming down in the chute, a little bit there and on laying on the ground burning while I was getting out of the koch fittings, here, you know, probably the tree caught the chute and it seemed like the cut off end here, and that damned green apple. The bottle from here and that was spraying, and everywhere it sprayed it would catch fire again, and I got rid of that thing. I got the fire out of my suit.

(b) (6)

That's the green snake of the seat pan?

(b) (6)

Yea sir, that's where these burns here came from and it was the same noise-----

(b) (6)

On the ground?

(b) (6)

Yes, it was a soosh.

(b) (6)

Oh.

(b) (6)

I was done, oh, when I made the tumble it was just like the book shows how they teach basic tumbling. I went up in the air tumbled, the chute opened, I got the opening shock and I was done some para jumps I know what a opening shock is and it pulled me up like this and I landed in a tree. That's all the time it takes

(b) (6)

Well that's-----

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

And it just held it up where it could play with me and I've asked myself a couple of questions here too. Number one, why didn't I zoom climb, I don't know, that is the normal thing to do. I should have just pulled that sob up cause that would sure as heck got (b) (6) attention. Pulled it up and hit the burner he'd gone, chances are. This was his first night hop; he hadn't flown quite some time-----

(b) (6)

Well he's in good shape, it is just that he didn't get out of it very fast.

(b) (6)

He didn't wear his gloves either, he had them with him.

(b) (6)

Its kinda hard to see a guys hands when he's tucked in that hole back there.

(b) (6)

But the other thing is, I think I fumbled around here trying to get the oxygen. Why didn't I just pull the yellow apple? Cause that is the thing to do in this airplane, don't screw around with the green thing go for the, disconnect your block, that will cut the oxygen off. You know you can feel it you can find it when you are trying to.

(b) (6)

If you had an oxygen fire (b) (6) how did it start?

(b) (6)

I just don't know (b) (6) I just don't know.

(b) (6)

That's the god damnest thing yet.

(b) (6)

I know I was hot rike, we don't know how it started, I don't smoke in the air. At least in the F4 and at night especially. I will smoke in Willy, I will admit that. I don't know (b) (6) I just don't know.

(b) (6)

We found a lot of the oxygen hose and from what these men in the para loft tell me you know, an oxygen fire when you're hooked up like that this hose just goes real fast. Is the hose burned?

You'll just have a couple of spots of residual, you know, like ground hoses pretty well attached and-----

The hose is good on the inside

Capt (b) (6) had some tests run on your mask you know for, ah, circuitry and OEM meter and like that and it checks out real good, no short

(b) (6)

Were talking about electrical

(b) (6)

It could be I hit the trees I don't know

Enclosure ()

(b) (6)

(b) (6) talking about, you know, were your stuff in those cords and talk on one and listen on the other. There on down, below your mini-reg, all the way to your yellow apple you spoke of, you had no fire inside your oxygen line and you have complete electrical continuity. Now your mask, hell the ~~mask~~ burned out of it; the outside isn't too bad where it was protected by that, ah, thing that says (b) (6) on it. But the inside looks worse than that guy that ate the peanuts out there at El Toro. It's pretty well burned up. You know the canals that run down from those two little plastic things that cover the little discs? Those are all burned completely out and through, and the place where it hooks on to the, ah, the little clamp on top of the mini-reg that holds your rubber on there, that little thing that's all kinda burned off right there looking in the top of the mini-reg. You can see where fire was coming out of that dude. Now when you were laying on the ground, laying on the ground, was fire coming out of the end of that thing or was just the oxygen feeding it?

(b) (6)

Oxygen was coming out, feeding the fire (garbled) terrible time stamping it out, cause I had fire in my suit while I was coming down through the sky.

(b) (6)

Yea, yea, we got your piece of suit.

(b) (6)

(garbled)

(b) (6)

You tried to, ah, get with a -----

(b) (6)

I tried to survey both of those things, in fact the day before I tried the second time.

(b) (6)

Over at Navy ah -----

(b) (6)

Yea, all they had was 44's 46's and 48's.

(b) (6)

That would have saved you -----

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Yea, yea. No question about that. Well.

We got a tough one (b) (6) I wish you were out there with us. They tell me you were number 2 man in safety school and we believe -----

(b) (6)

I would like to help you more.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

You weren't number 1, you were just number 2 ?

(b) (6)

I was just number 2.

A lot of talk back and forth; can't make it all out.

(b) (6)

I really don't know, I do know that I am almost sure in my own mind that I was level above 500 feet when I got the caution light. That much I know because I leveled off. When I trim on airplanes up it's usually pretty well trimmed up. I still keep my hands on it but I (garbled) I try to trim things as I go and it was after I had fire problems that I started going through 200 feet. (b) (6) while I was going through 200 feet. Now this was before I hit anything that I felt and I remember two distinct hits and remember punching out and there was a bunch of noise and stuff. I don't know what it was, I was just (garbled).

(b) (6)

O.K. John, now let me slip you this one.

(b) (6)

Go ahead.

(b) (6)

Where in shit did you get the hit (b) (6), because the wound (b) (6) is not from fire?

(b) (6)

Yes, I know that (b) (6) I don't know.

(b) (6)

Now answer that sob for me.

(b) (6)

If I could I'd have the same question, I don't know.

Talk back and forth about A6 school and going overseas in February.

(b) (6)

From all the indications, ah, it just we've got to have something breaking the canopy and hitting (b) (6). Right. Got to have, we got to have something to ignite something and I can't find anything except, ah, hitting the trees and catching afire. You know, just like we told you. It's bad medicine, the trees aren't too big around there, ah, altitude of them is, ah, I guess total altitude, like altimeter reading, is terrain plus trees maybe 100 and a half, (b) (6) No more than that.

(b) (6)

Well, I remember the first time I hit something was after I got 200 knots and I started pulling the stick back, it was too God damn late, but it started to respond cause I could

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

feel it, you can feel (garbled) on the stabilator - you can feel it fight. And I could feel (garbled) tail surface at that time.

Still got one?

The tail went to the bitter end.

Yea, Well, I could feel the plane start to come up, ah, too damn late - just too damn late.

I wish you would give it some thought about what hit you (b) (6) and, ah -----

I haven't thought about that for a couple of days, (b) (6) cause I've been trying to figure whether I hit (garbled) or what.

No. No, you got hit (b) (6) (b) (6) You didn't - you don't have a burn there, you got a hit on it. These clowns been talking to you at all?

Yea, (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Yea, (garbled) from that.

O.K.

And that's why I'm never going to fly again, That's the problem - (b) (6)

O.K.
(b) (6)

Yea, (garbled)

O.K. Now, that's the only place you're hit. Something, I think -----

I don't think I got all that coming down through the trees, I came right straight down through the trees, I don't think---

O.K. (b) (6)
it just leaves me to believe that something came into the canopy and whacked you.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

What, I don't know.

(b) (6)

So, I, ah, I don't know. (b) (6) you got, ah -----

ALL OF THEM TALKING AT ONCE

(b) (6)

The doctor has some thoughts on the, ah, like the fire in the oxygen system itself. Had you even taken one deep breath you know that -----

(b) (6)

I was exhaling all the way.

(b) (6)

That you would have - you know - lungs (garbled) and something else.

(b) (6)

When I had the fire I was just (blowing out sound). I did a lot of thinking about some of this stuff, ah, before I go flying.

TALK ABOUT HOW HIS WIFE IS TAKING IT

(b) (6)

Just one question. Did you use any trim at all after takeoff?

(b) (6)

I can't say for sure any more, I can't say for sure.

(b) (6)

Any unusual stick pressures?

(b) (6)

No unusual stick pressure, I took off at standard. When I used the takeoff check, I tell the RO that I'm putting in trim for standard stabilator or slotted stabilator airplane so he can check me on it. I went to standard trim down (garbled) I just trim what I need, I don't really pay attention to it - I just trim what I need - I don't - once I get airborne I just fly the airplane, I don't try to fly (garbled) stick (garbled) I just fly the airplane.

(b) (6)

Most of us do.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with ORNAVIR 3750.6 Series

The following information was provided to the AAR Board by Captain
(b) (6) on 26 July 1967.

I can't say for sure that I even visually sighted 500 feet on the barometric altimeter. But I definitely did see 300 feet.

After lift off I held the aircraft 8-10 degrees nose high, bringing up the gear and flaps at 180 knots. When I hit 300 feet, I relaxed a little back pressure to take care of the increased angle of attack caused by pulling up the flaps. Before, this has always leveled me off between 500 feet - 600 feet for acceleration to climb schedule.

I believe I saw the fire with both eyes but I need more time to think about it.

A possible source of ignition may be the grimes light. When I fly at night I normally clip the light to the defogging duct directly above the hook handle, and turned on dim.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT AND INTERVIEW OF SECOND LIEUTENANT (b) (6) (RSO),
(b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 154113 accident on 20 July 1967.

STATEMENT AND INTERVIEW MADE ON 21 JULY 1967. INTERVIEW BY CAPTAIN (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6) USMC (TRANSCRIPT OF TAPE RECORDING)

This is Lieutenant (b) (6) victim of an accident on the 20th of July 1967. To the best of my knowledge this is what occurred.

We started rolling off the runway at 0454 in the morning and we weren't airborne more than one or two minutes when there was a huge flash of white light coming from the front, and after this white light I saw a yellow type fire and I heard what I thought might have been an explosion. The ah, finding out later it might have been the aircraft bouncing off the ground someplace, exactly where I don't know. I don't recall hearing any "eject" "eject" from the pilot, he may have called it to me. I just don't recall cause I was so busy, flailing around with the fire and so forth. I didn't see the eject light come on either. Well, I pulled the curtain and the seat didn't go off right away; I didn't pull far enough but the canopy had jet-tisoned however, and I gave it another tug, at the same time fighting the flames, and next thing I remember is landing on the ground. I don't seem to have been in the air very long at all; it was almost 2 or 3 seconds from the time I ejected to when I touched down. That's the way it seemed to me anyway. I landed about 30 to 40 yards away from Captain (b) (6). I heard him calling, and I answered him, and he told me that (b) (6). He had his strobe light on and asked me if I could see it and I could. I couldn't get out of my torso harness right away, (b) (6). One of the rocket jet fittings had not come apart and I was just stuck in the torso harness and under my canopy, ah, like the parachute etc. I started wiggling around and eventually wiggled my way out of the torso harness and I made my way over to (b) (6) at which time he told me that he was fine except for (b) (6). He had (b) (6) and also that he had, he thought he had, (b) (6), he was moving about when I got there and we went back; we tried to get his canopy out of the trees but not being able to do so, we went over to where I had landed and picked mine up and we went back to (b) (6) position where there were fewer bugs and he wrapped himself up in the canopy cause he was a little cold and was a little shivering. I went back to where I had landed and got the seat kit, the whole pan and of course pushed it and kicked it rolling it over, and over and, with my feet till I finally got to (b) (6) and (b) (6) he - I directed him and we got the seats open and we collected the flares and got the radios out, and he set, I think I seem to recall him setting a flare off right then and there, I'm not sure about this. Well, we got the radios going and we didn't get any results. At around eight o'clock I set out on a trek to try to find some help and after going through a couple places in the swamp I noticed a cabin or building being put up to the right just by the power lines out there and I saw a road and decided to follow it, and it took me

Enclosure (19)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPM/AVINST 3750.6 Series

past a tobacco field and a corn field; and finally to a more or less of a main road I guess, and a Corporal (b) (6) who works in survival, he operates the bulldozer, he came along and I hailed him down and he took me to a phone where I tried to contact VMCJ-2. I got the crash officer on the line and told him of my condition, and of (b) (6) condition and position as well as I knew where it was. Then the corporal drove me to VMCJ-2 where I met Major (b) (6) and he got somebody to take me over to the emergency ward. That's all I got.

(b) (6) O.K. One or two questions. One. On the take-off roll, would you tell me anything that Captain (b) (6) said to you over the ICS if you can remember it?

(b) (6) I don't, ah well, what I remember - he was commenting on the take-off and things seemed to be going normal, I kinda remember him telling me the wheels were up etc., and I believe he's the one that came over the air and said IFR, we had been VFR, and then all the sudden he says IFR and then that's when I saw the flash of light and things happened kinda hurriedly then. That's about all.

(b) (6) O.K. Did, did you hear Captain (b) (6) attempt to make any transmission on the UHF, and also were you still on tower frequency to the best of your knowledge anyhow?

(b) (6) To the best of my knowledge, we were on tower frequency. I don't recall hearing Captain (b) (6) taking any UHF transmissions, he may have, however I just don't recall hearing it.

(b) (6) O.K. In your statement you said that you seen a flash followed by a fire in the front cockpit. How I guess it, did it come back to the back cockpit immediately, or how soon did it get into the back cockpit?

(b) (6) Well, that uh, that brilliant flash of light, that intense white light, that I saw - I don't know; I know it was up front but I don't know whether it was fire or what. And the yellow type flame I saw up front, and I guess it did come back because my (b) (6) when I pulled the face curtain.


(b) (6) Did you start your ejection sequence immediately upon seeing the fire in the front cockpit?

(b) (6) After seeing that brilliant flash of light - I didn't know what it was - and I didn't hear anything from Captain (b) (6), at any rate I don't recall hearing anything. When the yellow flame - yellow type flame - I saw and felt, I did go for the face curtain immediately.

(b) (6) O.K. I think that will be all, thank you.

Enclosure (19)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRAVINST 3750.6 Series



EST. LAUNCH ALTITUDE:
ABOVE TERRAIN - 175'
TERRAIN - 200'

EST. ALTITUDE - 120 KTS

ATTITUDE - LEVEL

SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPERATING 3750.6
SERIES



1. (1) to WMA-2 AAR Serial 1-421
2. Pilot: (b) (6)
3. REMAINS RETURNED in accordance with

M.O.R. CONCLUSIONS concerning RF-4B, Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

Captain (b) (6) statement, his physical findings and the condition of his personal flight equipment lend support to the following conclusions:

- A. That the fire which engulfed (b) (6) O₂ mask and miniregulator was secondary to another fire source and did not originate in the O₂ equipment. Although he sustained (b) (6)

The pilot's O₂ mask showed considerable burn damage as did the superior portion of the minireg but no burn damage could be found below this point in the O₂ system. The O₂ hose was intact.

- B. That the pilot's canopy shattered prior to the cockpit fire. Captain (b) (6) injuries (b) (6) were the result of a striking force and not burn injuries. The (b) (6) would indicate that his hardhat was rotated in a superior direction to expose this area to the fire. Examination of the hardhat reveals that the visor housing had been broken and that the plastic visor housing support on the left side was missing. This was later recovered near the area of initial contact with the trees, and it was found to be free of burn damage or smoke stains. Also Captain (b) (6) indicated in his statement that he had (b) (6) prior to ejection.

Enclosure ()

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

**GENERAL RECOMMENDATION: SEE AAR RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
CRASH ALERT AND RESCUE OPERATIONS**

I do not intend to involve the M.O.R. in a detailed discussion of the complacency surrounding the crash alert phase of this accident. However, I do wish to make one point. Four hours elapsed between ejection and rescue while the crash site was only three miles from M.C.A.S. Cherry Point. Fortunately in this instance the delay in the medical treatment of the survivor's injuries did not appreciably affect their eventual outcome. Should they have been burned more severely, in shock, bleeding, etc., the delay could have been tragic.

Aeromedical recommendations on following page.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Widespread distribution of dual-visor hardhats:

Capt. (b) (6) had the option of choosing either a clear visor or a shaded visor prior to launch. He chose the shaded visor since, although he launched at night, he would have flown the greater part of the mission directly into the sunrise. Consequently, he had to launch with his visor in the up position. It is theorized that the traumatic (b) (6) damage which Capt. Manz incurred could have been prevented with visor protection.

2. Improved availability of flight suits:

Capt. (b) (6) had unsuccessfully attempted to survey his flight suit through squadron, group and wing channels two weeks prior to the accident. His flight suit was worn and frayed at the sleeves and considerably worn through the shoulder areas. His alternate flight suit was also in substandard condition. He subsequently suffered (b) (6) (b) (6)

3. Possible redesign of flight suits to offer more adequate protection of neck area:

Both the pilot and the RIO suffered (b) (6) (b) (6) which could not have been prevented with current design of flight suit.

4. Modification of RSSK-1 seat pan to include automatic activation of ANPR-3 survival radio at time of ejection.

5. Reiteration of hazards resulting from failure to wear protective equipment; i.e., flight gloves:

Although this point has been stressed time and time again, too large a percentage of air crewmen are not convinced of the risks involved. The breakdown in this area does not appear to be in the Training Command but rather after the individual joins an operational squadron where he is exposed to the poor example set by the more "experienced" personnel.

CAPTIONS FOR ATTACHED PHOTOGRAPHS

1. (b) (6) 2nd/Lt., NFO Hands: Although he carried his flight gloves with him, he was not wearing them. (b) (6)
(b) (6) The remainder of his injuries were minor and would not in themselves have required hospitalization.
2. (b) (6) Capt., Pilot Hands: Pilot was wearing his flight gloves. Although pilot was exposed to fire source of greater intensity and greater duration, his hands are virtually free of injury except for (b) (6) which corresponds to location of glove tear which existed prior to flight.
3. (b) (6) Capt., Pilot Right Lateral Frontal View of Face: (b) (6) Pilot had visor in up position and had removed O₂ mask after fire entered cockpit.
4. (b) (6), Capt., Pilot Left Lateral View Face
5. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask: View of interior showing considerable burn damage.
6. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask Retention Cup: Burn damage confined principally to right inferior portion.
7. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask Exterior View: Principal damage to left face flap.
8. (b) (6) - Oxygen Mask Inferior View: Through and through burn damage causing mask to be separated from minireg assembly.
9. (b) (6) - Flight Suit: Both shoulder areas and right knee area burned through. Sleeve and shoulder sections are worn and frayed.
10. (b) (6) and (b) (6) - Personal and Survival Equipment
11. (b) (6) - Torso Harness: Burn holes in collar and left lapel areas.
12. (b) (6) - Miniregulator: Superior aspect of minireg reveals burn damage. O₂ hose and block intact.
13. (b) (6) - Miniregulator, O₂ Hose and Block
14. (b) (6) - Personal and Drouge Controller Chute in Final Resting Position
15. (b) (6) - Personal Chute and Survival Equipment

CAPTIONS, Page 2

16. (b) (6) - Hardhat Charred and Smoke Stained, Visor Housing Broken:
Compared with visor tract which had been torn from hardhat
and exited aircraft prior to cockpit fire.
17. (b) (6) - Hardhat Right Lateral View: Comparison of intact visor
tract on right with left tract which had been dislodged prior
to fire.

PHOTOS NO 1 THRU 4

NOT FILMED DUE

TO NATURE OF SUBJECT

HELD IN LSD DEPT.





6

ENCLOSURE () TO VNCJLT HAN SERIAL 1-181, OCCURRING
20 JULY 1967, RF-4D, BUNC 153113, PILOT (b) (6)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED (ALL OPNAV INST 3750.1, SERIES











FIGURE 1) to VMC-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, KP-12,
153113, Pilot: (b)(6)
ORIGINAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPAVINT 3750.6 series









ENCLOSURE () to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-684 occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)
"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 series



Person () to WGS-2 AAR serial 1-624 occurring 22 May 1967, EF-43,
165119, Pilot; (b) (6)
Person () to WGS-2 AAR serial 1-624 occurring 22 May 1967, EF-43,
165119, Pilot; (b) (6)



EXC () to VMCJ-2 MAN () 1-5-76 () July 1977, PP-4B,
Bu 13, Pilot: MAN.
"SP. L HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OFKAVINST 3750.6 series



ENCLOSURE
BANG 10000000
"SPECIAL HANDLING"

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - 1

OPNAV FORM 3750-6 (REV. 3-65)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity) VMCJ-2, MAG 14, 2nd MAW, USMCAS Cherry Pt., N.C.		2. MOR NUMBER 1-68A	3. LEAVE BLANK
4. TYPE OF MISHAP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT	5. TIME & ZONE 0455 EST	6. DATE 20 Jul 67	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION 4.5 miles NW, Cherry Pt.
8. MODEL A/C RF4-B	9. BUONO 153113	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS 2	11. DAMAGE CODE Alpha
12. UNIT OPERATING A/C VMCJ-2			

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)		14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/ RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPO- SITION
A. (b) (6)		VMCJ-2	Capt	(b) (6)	Pilot	19 Jun 1967	Yes	USMC	B	G
B. (b) (6)		VMCJ-2	2nd Lt.	(b) (6)	NFO	29 Mar 1967	Yes	USMC	B	G
C.										
D.										

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY

24. MODEL OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED N.A.	25. BUONO N.A.	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS N.A.	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C N.A.	28. DAMAGE CODE N.A.	29. MOR NO. N.A.
--	--------------------------	-------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--------------------------------	----------------------------

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Use additional 8 x 10 1/2 sheets if required.)

See Addendum. This accident narrative includes a chronological account of the injuries sustained and thus differs from the AAR narrative

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD Pilot error	
32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD None	
33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD None	
34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	
35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PREPARED BY MEDICAL OFFICER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S TITLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S GRADE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S BRANCH <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S DATE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S TITLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S GRADE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S BRANCH <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER'S DATE	
36. REPORT FILED BY (Name & signature of medical officer) (b) (6)	37. FORWARDED (Name & signature of appointing authority) (b) (6)
9 Aug 1967 Lt. MC USNR	9 Aug 1967 Lt. Col., USMC

ADDENDUM SECTION A NO. 30 NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP

At 0454, 20 July 1967, aircraft RF-4B, BU No. 153113 departed MCAS Cherry Point, N.C. on a scheduled bogey track for an anti-warfare exercise of Second Marine Aircraft Wing with Capt. (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC as pilot and 2ndLt. (b) (6) (b) (6), USMCR as Reconnaissance Systems Operator. Capt. (b) (6) was launching as a single aircraft following the in chocks abort of his flight leader, in an EA6A aircraft.

The flight had been filed as a Local Instrument Clearance but was modified to a VFR departure/IFR recovery by the pilot upon notification of VFR conditions by Cherry Point Departure Control. The weather at the time was 300 variable scattered 4 miles visibility.

The pilot noted no discrepancies during run-up and read the takeoff list to the RSO on "Hot Mike." An afterburner take-off and initial climb appeared normal to the pilot and all observers. The aircraft entered low clouds shortly after takeoff. Between 300-400 feet MSL over the end of the runway, the pilot pushed over in order to "duck" under a low cloud to remain VFR. At a point one and a half miles from the end of the duty runway 320 on the same heading, the aircraft struck trees at an altitude 115 MSL and approximate air speed of 360 Knts. and a flight path of 2.5 degrees below the horizontal. The aircraft continued on this flight path for approximately 640 Ft. then assumed a more nearly horizontal flight path for the next 545 Ft. During this period the aircraft made contact with four groups of trees (a total of 21 trees altogether). At the initial contact with the first group of trees, the right wing tank was torn from the aircraft and exploded. At this instant the pilot observed a Master Caution Light. The RSO noted a brilliant white flash of light coming from the right front cockpit area which is theorized to have been a reflection of the right wing tank explosion in the pilot's right rear view mirror. Immediately the aircraft struck the second group of trees shattering the pilot's canopy. The canopy fragments struck the pilot's hardhat and face, breaking the visor housing and (b) (6) (b) (6) (his visor was in the up position). A part of the visor housing exited the aircraft at this time. He also suffered (b) (6) Fire then entered the front cockpit. The pilot tore his O2 mask off and the fire attacked the mask. The RSO in the rear cockpit suffered (b) (6) (b) (6) at this time. The aircraft exited the trees at the South bank of a creek (Tucker Creek). At this point both external tanks were gone, fuel cells were ripped open, large sections of both outer wing panels and stabilators were torn

ADDENDUM SECTION A NO. 30, Page 2

off and the aircraft was burning profusely. However, enough airspeed and air foil remained for the aircraft to cross the creek and clear the trees on the North bank. It continued above the trees to an estimated altitude of 200 Ft. and traversed a distance of 3000 Ft. During this period the RSO and then the pilot ejected successfully. The aircraft then descended again through the trees, nose high, right wing down, its flight path at an angle of 30° with the horizontal to its final resting place.

PILOT ERROR - Accident Phase.

The primary cause for this accident as agreed to and assigned by all members of the accident board was Pilot Error (Error in Judgement). As of the date of this report no evidence to support material failure played a part of this accident. This decision has been commented upon in further detail in the VMJ-2 AAR 1-68A.

PERSONALITY STRUCTURE - Accident Phase.

I feel that Captain (b)(6)'s basic personality structure was an integral factor in this accident. I have known Captain (b)(6) for approximately one year during which time he served as NATOPS Officer, Test Pilot, and then following his graduation from safety school, as Safety Officer. Captain (b)(6) was regarded as an above average pilot and his rigid adherence to NATOPS Regulations was well known throughout the squadron. He was highly critical of even the most minor procedural deviations. Captain (b)(6) was a perfectionist with an inordinate capacity for work. He constantly strived to improve his aviation capabilities although his flying achievements were already clearly outstanding. He usually led the squadron in monthly flight time, launching cross country flights nearly every other week. Also he was assigned a good percentage of missions because of his willingness to accept at times when the weather might impose limitations on less experienced aviators. His overconscientiousness is manifest in his desire to return to Vietnam for his second tour of duty earlier than would have been necessary and his disappointment over the fact that during his first tour he was forced to spend most of his time in Japan, rather in the actual war zone.

The above qualities taken together constitute [REDACTED]

(b)(6) Captain (b)(6) to the decision he made, which was to "Duck Under" the low altitude clouds and thus avoid a flight violation of a VFR Clearance. Also his preoccupation with maintaining the exact prescribed climb schedule was probably a contributing distraction.

PHYSICAL INCAPACITATION - Survival Phase.

Although Captain (b)(6) functioned remarkably well in the survival situation, he was considerably restricted by (b)(6)

NOTE: Although an Aircraft Accident which is preceded by a rapid transition from VFR to IFR conditions might seem to be the perfect situation for spacial disorientation, I can find no evidence to support "Vertigo" in this instance. The flight path of the aircraft was straight and level and was not involved in angular or rotary acceleration. Captain (b)(6) denies any rapid movements of his head in any direction during the linear acceleration. Also the pilot has experienced "Vertigo" in other type aircraft (RF-8) and feels he is able to recognize it as such. He has never experienced vertigo while flying the RF-4B.

1-68A

RF-4B

153113

Pilot

(b)(6)

Special Handling Required in Accordance With OPMV Inst. P3750.6F

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP (List in order in accordance with Section B of Inst.)

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right)				PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT E - ESCAPE/EGRESS S - SURVIVAL R - RESCUE	FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR C - CONTRIBUTING Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE
	A	E	S	R		
Crew responsibility	Q				REMARKS SEE ADDENDUM	
Physical Incapacitation			M			

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS					11.4
(All models)					
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS					0
(All models)					
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS					1
(Include present flight)					
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT					0
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS					96.7
FLIGHT TIME	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS	
THIS MODEL	11.4	11.4	11.4	11.4	
10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR					1
11. NO. DAYS GROUND PAST YEAR					3
12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS					

13. NO. HRS. ON A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	none
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	forward
15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	Aft seat aircraft

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)

AGE 28 yr

HEIGHT (b) (6)

WEIGHT

A. SITTING HEIGHT

B. TRUNK HEIGHT

C. FUNCTIONAL REACH

D. BUTTOCK - KNEE

E. LEG LENGTH

F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOD)

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS *due to patient's injuries*

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1. (b) (6)		TISSUE: CNS:		
	2.		MUSCLE		
	3.		ORGANS		
URINE			OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT					

17. 2-DAY REMARKS (b) (6)

280 NO.	MODEL A/C	3800	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68A	RPL-B	153113	NFO

18. NAME OF PROVIDER (b) (6)

ADDENDUM to Page 2, Section B-1: NFO: (b) (6)

CREW RESPONSIBILITY - Accident Phase.

It is possible that a more experienced NFO would have been alerted to the low level flight path by his conditioned instrument scan. LT. (b) (6) had only eleven (11) hours in this type of aircraft and was making his first night launch. He admits that he was preoccupied with concern over the proper operation of the aircraft systems.

PHYSICAL INCAPACITATION - Survival Phase.

LT. (b) (6) prevented him from removing his parachute fitting in the prescribed fashion. He was also unable to participate, except by visually directing Captain (b) (6) in the deployment of his survival equipment.

1-68A

NF-4B

153113

NFO

(b) (6)

Special Handling Required in accordance with OPMV Inst. P3750.6F

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - 3

OPNAV REPORT 2750-7

OPNAV FORM 2750-58 (REV. 2-82)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 2750.6E for instructions.

SECTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION

TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

TUE 18 JUL 48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP			
TIME		TIME	
0645	Awoke.		
0715	Breakfast-Carnation Instant.		
0730	EA-6 Class, MAG-14 Ground School.		
1130	Lunch.		
1300	EA-6 Class, MAG-14 Ground School.		
1700	Home.		
1730	To local restruant with wife for dinner.		
2200	To bed.		
WED 19 JUL			
0645	Awoke.		
0715	Breakfast, Carnation Instant.		
0730	Squadron, EA-6 Class.		
1130	Lunch, 2 sandwiches & Pepsi.	0455	Impact with trees.
1605	Commence F-10 Hop.	ACCIDENT PHASE	Fire in Cockpit.
1802	End F-10 Hop.		
1900	Dinner at Home, Chicken Chow Mein.	0455	Ejected.
1930	Read Hand Book.	ESCAPE PHASE	
1950	To bed.	Survival Phase	
THUR 20 JUL		Est 0500	Removed harness fittings. Inflated PK-2. Made verbal contact with RIO. Set off night flares and turned on strobe light. Fired pencil flares.
0250	Awoke - Instant Breakfast.	Est 0525	Worked with RIO in arranging remainder of survival gear.
0305	Arrived at Squadron.	Est 0600	Activated survival radios. RIO departed.
0310	Briefing.	0800	SAH H-34 overhead.
0454	Take-off.	0830	Fired remaining pencil flares.
		0905	

TIME OF RESCUE 0915 carried out by H-34.

REQ NO. 1-68A	MODEL & C RF-4B	SERIAL 153113	IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL PILOT
------------------	--------------------	------------------	-------------------------------------

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - 3

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-68 (REV. 3-83)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION E

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 3 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

TUE 18 JUL

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME

0700 Awoke.
0715 Breakfast - Cookies & Milk.
0730 A.O.M. at Squadron.
0830 Attended duties as Asst. Legal officer.
1130 Lunch, Sausage & Eggs.
1200 Changed to Utilities.
1300 Returned to Squadron to burn secret documents.
Cancelled because of rain.
1530 1st brief on AMEX.
1700 Home.
1730 Dinner, Ham & Beans.
1830 Visit neighbors.
2115 Returned home.
2145 Went to bed.

WED 19 JUL

0700 Awoke.
0715 Breakfast, Pie & Milk.
0740 Squadron A.O.M.
0830 Attended Legal Matters.
1200 Lunch, Sandwiches.
1300 Wing Legal Office.
1330 Return to Squadron, Legal work there.
1530 Changed to flight gear for possible hop but was replaced.
1700 Home.
1830 Dinner, Western, French Fries & Milk.
2130 Went to bed.

THUR 20 JUL

0200 Awoke.
0215 Breakfast, Pie & Milk.
0235 Arrived at Squadron.
0310 Briefing.
0454 Take-off.

TIME

0455
ACCIDENT
PHASE

Impact with trees, noticed white flash of light and fire in front cockpit.

0455
ESCAPE PHASE

Ejected.

Survival
Phase.

Est 0530
Est 0600

Free of Torso Harness.
Worked with Pilot arranging survival gear.
Activated survival radios.
Departed crash site.
Met CPL MINZ.
Called crash crew officer.

0800
0830
0845
0855

RESCUE

0915
0920

Arrived at Squadron.
Taken to Hospital.

TIME OF RESCUE

FORM NO.	MODEL A/C	DATE	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68A	RF-4B	153113	NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (NFO)

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - 4

OPNAV FORM 5750-SC (REV. 3-65)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 5750.5E for Instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 5750-7

SECTION F

PATHOLOGICAL DATA

(Refer to Section F of Instructions.)

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION WB# GC#		2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS NONE
--	--	--

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES DURATION:		
--	--	--

4. DROWNED <input type="checkbox"/>	5. ASPHYXIATED <input type="checkbox"/>	6. SHOCK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MILD <input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE <input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE	7. EXPOSURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MILD <input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE <input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE	8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION
--	--	--	---	----------------------------

9. ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL - GIVE DIAGNOSIS (b) (6)	10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION USNH, Camp LeJeune, N.C.
---	--

11. GROUNDING? IF YES, GIVE REASON <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES Same as #9	12. DURATION (See Instructions) Probably Permanent
---	---

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH NA	14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NA
----------------------------------	------------------------------------

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: <input type="checkbox"/> PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT <input type="checkbox"/> PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT <input type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER	16. <input type="checkbox"/> PROTOCOL ATTACHED <input type="checkbox"/> WILL BE FORWARDED
---	--

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO NA	18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON NA
--	--

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A E S R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM (If unknown, theorize)
--------------	-------------------------------------	--

1. (b) (6)	X				Fragments of Broken Canopy.
2. (b) (6)	X				Fragments of Broken Canopy.
3. (b) (6)	X				Fragments of Broken Canopy.
4. (b) (6)	X				Fire in Cockpit.
5. (b) (6)		X			Decelerative forces on Torso Harness.
6. (b) (6)	X	X			Canopy fragments versus Egress thru trees.
7. (b) (6)		X			Egress thru trees.
8. (b) (6)		X			Flammable rubber fittings on Knee Board.

20. REMARKS
Patient was originally admitted to Station Hospital, MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C., until an evaluation of the extent of his injuries could be made. He was then transferred to USNH, Camp LeJeune, N.C.

21. NO. 1-68A	22. MODEL A/C RF-4B	23. SNO 153113	24. IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PILOT
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25. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6)

SECTION F (Continued)

SURFACE INJURIES



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS
RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW MINOR

(b) (6)

DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.

1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE (Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.) 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.

NONE



REF NO. 1-68A	MODEL A/C RF-4B	SERIAL 153113	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PILOT
------------------	--------------------	------------------	---------------------------------------

(b) (6)

SECTION F (Continued)

SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS

RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED

(b) (6)

DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.

1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE (Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.) 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.

(b) (6)

DATE

1-68A

MODEL A/C

RF-4B

SURO

153113

IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (RIO)


NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)


SECTION F (Continued)

SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
 ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.



NONE



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
 2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

NONE



FORM NO.	MODEL A/B	NUM	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68A	RF-4B	153113	PILOT


NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)


SECTION F (Continued)

SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
 ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.



NONE



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
 2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

NONE



DATE 1-68A	MODEL A/E RF-4B	SN 153113	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (RIO)
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NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND INCIDENT -- PAGE 5

OPNAV REPORT 5780-7

OPNAV FORM 5780-8F (REV. 2-82)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 5730.6E for instructions

SECTION G

ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION:

PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE
S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10 1/2 plain paper if needed.)
1. Hard Hat APH-6A	AC-SEB No.1-60	X	AESR	AE	AE		
2. Visor-Med-Neutral 32H1297-1		X	AESR	AE			2. See Addendum Section G-8
3. Visor-Med-Clear 32H1297-2		X	NO	AE			3. See Addendum Section G-8
4. O2 Mask, A13A, Med.		X	AESR	A	A		4. See Addendum Section G-8
5. Mini-Regulator, RSF 226-20004-2 Ser.#226		X	AESR	A	A		
6. O2 Hose, A.R.D.C. 12107-113-375		X	AESR	A	A		17. See Addendum Section G-8
7. Cable Assembly, ASF-H-13137-390		X	AESR	A	A		18. See Addendum Section G-8
8. Intermediate Block Type 2. 21009-7 Ser.#2080		X	AESR	A	A		19. See Addendum Section G-8
9. Retention Cup, 33D-1104-2 (Adapter, Harness Assy)		X	AESR	A	A		25. See Addendum Section G-8
10. Suit, Integrated Torso Harness, MIL-S-19089 (AER) Medium-Reg.	Harley Buckle EAL MOD only Koch Fittings (ACSE #41) Helo Lift (CAGEC #4)	X	AESR	AE	AE		29. See Addendum Section G-8

SECTION H

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

See Addendum Section H.

DESIGN NO.	MODEL A/E	BURO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68A	RF-4B	153113	PILOT

(b) (6)

1. Equipment	2. Modification	3. Req.	4. Avail.	5. Need	6. Used	7. Val
11. Survival Vest, SV-1.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
12. DSA-4 Survival Knife-Sheath 5"		X	AESR	SR	SR	
13. Shroud Cutter, GS-005 61944.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
14. Strobe Light, SD-U, 5-E, 17988.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
15. Signal Kit, Illumination Gun, 7 Flares, Mark-79, MOD-0.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
16. Mark 3-C, Ser#16374/N383-7999-1A, 40-57A ACSB, Flare, MK-13, MOD-0. (2 dye 15-60, 4-62, markers, 2 flares, 1 whistle). 5-53, #21-CSEC.		X	AESR			
17. Coverall, Anti-G Suit, Z-4, W.H.		X	NO			
18. Gloves, Summer, Flying, B-3A, Polyamide/Leather.		X	AESR	AESR	AESR	
19. Coverall, Summer, Flying, Man's, Tan. MIL-C-5390G (WEPS).		X	AESR	AESR	AESR	AE
20. Boots, Flying, Safety, Steel Toe.		X	AESR	AESR	AESR	
21. Parachute, MBEU 5000 PA, Ser#418169	ACSC #41, C- SEC#5, Var.A.	X	AESR	E	E	
22. Back Pad.	ACSC#76, BAC- Ser#24-59.	X	AESR	E	E	
23. Seat Cushion, 1", 800239.		X	AESR	E	E	
24. Survival Kit Assembly, RSSK- 1A, Ser#158.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
25. PK-2 Raft, Ser#12135.	IACSC#101, ACSC#55, C-SEC#13.	X	AESR	S	S	
26. Mark-13, MOD-0, Day/Night Distress Flare, Lot#19-960.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
27. Desalter Kit, Mark II, Type II.		X	AESR			
28. Emergency Beacon, AN PRT-3, Ser#1261.		X	AESR	SR	SR	
29. 2 Dye Markers, Sponge, Signal Mirror.		X	AESR			

ADDENDUM to Page 5, Section G, #8: A/C Accident 1-68A, PILOT: MAWZ, John W.

2. VISOR-Med-Neutral: Pilot had this shaded visor in hard hat, although not in down position. EXPLANATION: It was a night hop and he could not see with visor down. He suffered (b) (6) which theoretical may have been prevented.

3. VISOR-Med-Clear: Left behind at Paraleft although it would seem to have been the appropriate visor for a night launch. The pilot explains he chose the shaded visor because he would have been flying into the sun during the major portion of the mission.

4. O2 MASK: This was removed by the pilot immediately after he was aware of the fire in the cockpit. The mask was attacked by cockpit fire and showed considerable burn damage.

17. COVERALL, ANTI-G SUIT: Left at squadron. Pilot states he did not anticipate G Maneuvers.

18. GLOVES, Summer Flying: Pilot suffered small (b) (6) (b) (6) which corresponded in location to small tear in right glove which existed prior to launch. His hands were otherwise unremarkable.

19. COVERALL, Man's Flying, Summer: Sleeves of flight suit worn and frayed and were subsequently rolled up. Because of this, the pilot suffered (b) (6) (b) (6) Also, shoulders of the suit were worn and were subsequently burned through causing (b) (6) Pilot states he attempted to survey the suit for two (2) weeks but was unable to do so because the supply system had none available in his size. Suit had been washed and fireproofed in the prescribed manner.

25. PK-2 RAFT: Used by pilot for elevation from wet ground. Also used in the Trendelenberg fashion as a preventive measure against and to ward off shock.

29. AMPRT-3: There are no current modifications for automatic activation of this survival radio in the Scott Seat Pan.

1-68A

EX-43

159113

PILOT

(b) (6)

The pilot reached to pull the face curtain as the aircraft was making its second contact with the trees. Actual ejection was accomplished after the second contact with trees.

[REDACTED] He opened his left eye with his hand and located face curtain. He then ejected, felt forward tumble and opening shock. During his descent he felt as if something hot was being played on his face. This is theorized to be his burning O₂ mask, fed by the Emergency Bailout O₂ system. It is uncertain whether the mask was still affixed to the right side of his helmet or whether it was laying against his anterior chest. He arrested in a sitting position with his feet touching the ground. The drogue controller chute had hung up on a tree limb supporting him in this position. He felt [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at the moment of arrest. He was still burning at this time and the source of the fire is theorized to be his O₂ mask. After releasing his parachute fittings and rolling on the ground, the fire was readily extinguished. He removed his scott seat pan and inflated his PK-2 raft to elevate himself from the wet ground. He then called to the NPO who was about 30 yards away and instructed him to remove his torso harness since the NPO's [REDACTED] and he could not release one of his rocket jet fittings.

They then heard several secondary explosions which are attributed to the explosion of the wheel wells and the pilot instructed the NPO to cover his head. He then set off a night flare and two pencil flares and turned on his strobe light, which enabled the NPO to more easily find the pilot. They realized then that although the pilot's [REDACTED] and the NPO's [REDACTED] that they could work together effectively. They were unable to remove the pilot's chute from the trees so

they walked over to the location of the NPO's chute. The pilot cut the shroud lines with his survival knife and carried the chute to the location of his gear. The NPO returned and managed to kick his seat pan pack to the same position. The pilot then inflated the other PK-2 raft in the manner of a trundleberg table to elevate his lower extremities. They heard several aircraft going overhead but could not see them because of the fog. They heard a C-117 and later the NPO visually sighted an F-9. At 0830 the pilot gave the NPO permission to depart the landing site to seek help. They had activated both the AN PRT-49A and the AN PRT-3 beacon radios at about 0800. The pilot then wrapped himself in the parachute canopy. The SAR helicopter launched at about 0900 and picked up the crash site as indicated by the No. 1 needle in the aircraft. The crew chief spotted the wreckage and the H-34 landed nearby. After the pilot heard the H-34 overhead, he lit some orange smoke flares and began to fire his pencil flares. These were not observed by the SAR crew. It is thought that most of these bounced off the overhead trees.

After he heard the H-34 land, he established verbal communication with the crewmember. The crewman reached him and carried him out on a Stokes stretcher. They covered his face with a piece of parachute canopy and the remainder of his body with a blanket. He was then evacuated to the tower where a waiting ambulance transported him to the Station Hospital Emergency Room.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND INCIDENT - PAGE 5

OPNAV REPORT 5750-7

OPNAV FORM 5750-07 (REV. 2-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.05 for instructions

SECTION G

ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION:

PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE
S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. RE-REQUIRED	4. AVAIL-ABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10 1/2 plain paper if needed.)
1. Hard hat, APH-6A	AC Ser#1-60	X	AESR	AE	AE		
2. Visor-Med-Neutral, 32H1297-1.		X	AESR	AE			#2.
3. Visor-Med-Clear, 32H1297-2		X	NO	AE			See Addendum Section G-8
4. #2 Mask, A-13A, Small, MS-22001.		X	AESR	AE	AE		#3.
5. Mimi-regulator, RSF, 226-20004-3.		X	AESR	AE	AE		See addendum Section G-8
6. #2 Hose, A.R.D.C. 12107-113-375.		X	AESR	AE	AE		#11.
7. Cable Assembly, ASF-H-13137-390.		X	AESR	AE	AE		See addendum section G-8
8. Intermediate Block, Type 2-21009-7, Ser#893.		X	AESR	AE	AE		#12.
9. Retention Cup, 7194-1 (Adapter & Harness Assy)	C-SEB#18	X	AESR	AE	AE		See addendum section G-8
10. Suit, Integrated Harness, Torso, Large-Regular. MIL-S-19089 (AER).	Koch fit. ACSC#41 HeloLift C6SEC#4	X	AESR	AE	AE		#13.
							See addendum section G-8

Continued;

SECTION H

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SEE ADDENDUM SECTION H

MOD NO. 1-68A	MODEL A/C RF-4B	SUND 153113	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (RIO)
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NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

1. Equipment	2. Modification	3. Req.	4. Avail.	5. Need	6. Used
11. Mark 3-C, SerNo-11207, N383-67736A, Flares, MK-13 MOD-0. 2 Dye Markers, 1 Whistle.	AC&SEC 40-57A, 15-60, 4-62, 5-63/C&SEC#21.	X	AESR		
12. Survival Vest, SV-1: 2 SEEK-2 Kits; Light, Marker, Distress; MK-79 MOD-0 Signal Kit Illumination; Knife, Shroud Cutter, Pocket; Knife, Survival, 5" Blade and Sheath.		X	NO	S	
13. Gloves, Leather, Work type. Type B-3A, Sheepskin.		X	AESR	AESR	
14. Coverall, Anti-G Suit, Z-4, W.H.		X	AESR		AESR
15. Coveralls, Flying, Men's Summer, MIL-C-5390G(WEPS) Orange.		X	AESR	AESR	AESR
16. Boots, Flying Safety, Steel Toe, DSA100-663.		X	AESR	AESR	AESR

ADDENDUM to Page 5, Section G, #8: A/C Accident 1-68A, NFO: (b) (6)

2. VISOR-Med-Neutral: NFO had this shaded visor in hard hat although not in down position. EXPLANATION: It was a night hop and he could not see with visor down. He suffered (b) (6) which could have been prevented.
3. VISOR-Med-Clear: Left behind at paraloft although this would seem to have been the appropriate visor.
11. MARK-3C: Used as a means of elevating NFO from wet ground.
12. SURVIVAL VEST & CONTENTS: Left behind at squadron.
13. GLOVES-Leather: These were carried on his person but not worn. (b) (6)
(b) (6)
14. PARACHUTE: NFO's chute was used to cover the pilot to prevent exposure.

NFO pulled face curtain to the point of jettisoning canopy but not far enough to activate the seat. He then reached for the alternate ejection handles with one hand but felt intense heat in that area and returned with both hands to face curtain and pulled again thus initiating ejection sequence. He does not remember forward tumble or opening shock. He describes landing very smoothly and the entire sequence appeared to last only two or three seconds. Personnel chute was partially covering the NFO. He was able to release his Koch fittings but his left rocket jet fitting was stuck and with his (b) (6) could not open it. He explained his situation to the pilot who instructed him to remove his torso harness. The pilot had his strobe light on by which the NFO located him. He estimated they were approximately 30 yards apart. He found the pilot with his (b) (6). (b) (6). The pilot was free of his parachute and moving about. They attempted to remove the pilot's personnel chute from tree but were unable to do so. They then returned to location of NFO's chute and removed it to use to keep insects from their (b) (6). The NFO then returned to location of his seat pan and kicked the seat pan back to location of pilot with his feet. Acting as the pilot's eyes, he then directed the pilot in his attempt to open the seat pan and remove survival equipment. They then activated both radios. About 0830 the NFO set out to find help. He found some power lines and followed these to a road which took him through a tobacco field and corn field to another road. There he met a CPL (b) (6) who took him to the nearest phone where he called the crash officer and told him of their position. CPL (b) (6) then drove the NFO to MCAS. VMCJ-2 Squadron building where he met MAJOR (b) (6) who arranged to have him transported to the Emergency Room at the Station Hospital.

ADDENDUM to Page 5 for EJECTION SEATS utilized in A/C Accident case of (b) (6)
& (b) (6) in A/C BuNo. 153113 on 20 July 1967 at MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.

EJECTION SEAT - FRONT. PILOT: MANZ. MK H5A/A1
#2117 Martin-Baker Modifications
Main Gun 1034, 1084, 1233, 1373, 1403, 1703.
Seat Component 1177, 1742.
Drogue Gun 1244, 2365, 2366, 2479, 1528.
Time Release 1489, 2363, 2391, 2411, 2430, 2648, 1717, 2670.
Seat Raising Actuator 1194, 1728, 1746.

EJECTION SEAT - REAR. NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER: (b) (6) MK H5A/A1
#2106 Martin-Baker Modifications
Main Gun 1034, 1084, 1233, 1373, 1403, 1705.
Seat Component 1777, 1742.
Drogue Gun 1244, 2365, 2366, 2479, 1528.
Time Release 1489, 2363, 2391, 2411, 2430, 2648, 1717, 2670.
Seat Raising Actuator 1194, 1728, 1746.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND EVENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 5750-1

OPNAV FORM 5750-66 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 5750.6E for instructions

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER Dense Wooded Area

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

☒ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER (State type)

S	E	REMARKS
		3. NOT ATTEMPTED
		4. ATTEMPTED
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	5. ACCOMPLISHED
		6. THRU CANOPY
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	8. DURING EGRESS
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS See Addendum to Page 6, Section I, #9.

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

Martin-Baker MBEU MKH-5A

☒ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

2-1

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION

☐ UP ☒ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT

15. AIRSPEED

Estimated Level Attitude

120 kts. Estimated

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET)

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING

18. WEIGHT

ABOVE SEA LEVEL 200' Est. ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 175' Est.

Estimated 285'

178

19. TIME IN WATER

20. TIME IN RAFT

21. WIND VELOCITY

22. WAVE HEIGHT

NA

NA

CALM (LESS 4 KNOTS)

NA

23. WAVE INTERVAL

24. AIR TEMPERATURE

25. WATER TEMPERATURE

26. VISIBILITY

NA

65 degrees F.

NA

1 mile

27. ALERTING FACTORS

1. Aircraft overdue for approach time.
2. Various reports of an explosion.
3. Crash Officer notified by NFO(RIO).

28. PK-2 Raft used to elevate pilot from wet ground; also to elevate extremities to ward off shock.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE

1. Approximate location called in by NFO(RIO).
2. SAR H-34 homed in on UHF Survival Radio.
3. Visual sighting of wreckage by H-34 Crewchief.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR

1. Verbal communication with survivor after H-34 had set down near wreckage.

30. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE?

(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

☒ NO ☐ YES

SECTION J TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC FEB 67

EJECTION TOWER FEB 67

EJECTION SEAT FEB 67

SURVIVAL

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (If yes, explain)

☒ NO ☐ YES

MON NO. 1-68A	MODEL A/E RF-4B	SUNO 153113	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PILOT
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NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND INCIDENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-80 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER Dense Wooded Area

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

☒ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER (State type)

S	E	REMARKS
		3 NOT ATTEMPTED
		4 ATTEMPTED
	X	5 ACCOMPLISHED
		6 THRU CANOPY
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
X		7 PRIOR TO EGRESS See Addendum to Page 6, Section I, #7.
	X	8 DURING EGRESS
X		9 SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS See Addendum to Page 6, Section I, #9.

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

Martin-Baker MBEU MKH5-A

☒ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

2-1

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION

☐ UP ☒ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT

15. AIRSPEED

Estimated Level Attitude

Est. 120 kts.

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET)

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING

18. WEIGHT

ABOVE SEA LEVEL Est. 200' ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY Est. 175'

Estimated 285'

198

19. TIME IN WATER

20. TIME IN RAFT

21. WIND VELOCITY

22. WAVE HEIGHT

NA

NA

CALM (LESS 4 KNOTS)

NA

23. WAVE INTERVAL

24. AIR TEMPERATURE

25. WATER TEMPERATURE

26. VISIBILITY

NA

65 degrees F.

NA

1 mile

27. ALERTING FACTORS

28

1. A/C overdue for approach time.
2. Various reports of an explosion.
3. Crash officer notified by NFO.

NA

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE

29

1. Approx. location called in by NFO.
2. SAR h-34 homed in on UHF Survival Radio.
3. Visual sighting of wreckage by H-34 Crewchief.

NA

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR

30

1. NFO walked out of crash site, met a CPL (b) who drove him to the nearest phone and then he was drive to squadron.

NA

NA

30. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE?

(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

See Narrative Section H Page 5

☐ NO ☒ YES

SECTION J

TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC SEPT 66

EJECTION TOWER

EJECTION SEAT

SEPT 66

SURVIVAL MAY 67

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (If yes, explain)

☒ NO ☐ YES

BOA NO. 1-66A	MODEL A/C RF-4B	SERIAL 153113	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER
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NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

ADDENDUM to MOR Page 6, Section I in the case of A/C Accident 1-68A, BuNo. 153113,
PILOT: (b) (6), NFO: (b) (6)

(b) (6) Section I, #9; SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS.

(b) (6) were included in Page 4, Section F, No. 19. (6)
of this report. Theorized to be sustained during egress through trees.

(b) (6) Section I, #7; PRIOR TO EGRESS.

NFO pulled face curtain to point of jettisoning canopy but not far enough to initiate ejection. He then decided to try the alternate eject handle. While holding the face curtain with one hand to attempt the alternate method, he was met with intense heat in that area. He returned to the face curtain with both hands and pulled again, thus attaining ejection sequence.

(b) (6) Section I, #9; SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS.

Unable to release Koch Fittings because of (b) (6).

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6)
Officer

(b) (6) VMCJ-2 Aircraft Maintenance

1. RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 Modex CY-10 was accepted into the Navy Inventory by the Naval Plant Representative Officer St. Louis, on 27 Dec 1966. The aircraft was assigned to and accepted by VMCJ-2 on 11 Jan 1967. The aircraft had not been overhauled at the time of the accident and had 265.7 hours since acceptance. During July prior to the accident, the aircraft flew 14.2 hours with 33 landings. The aircraft entered its first calendar even inspection on 28 Apr 1967 and completed it on 3 Jun 1967. Between the calendar inspection and the accident the aircraft flew 70.5 hours.
2. The Port engine J79GE8B ser no 421070 was accepted 15 Feb 1963 by AFPR Evendale Ohio. The engine had two overhauls, the second completed at O & R Noris on 6 Jun 1966. Total time since new was 1354.8 hours with 272.8 hours since overhaul and original installation, in CY-10, at McDonnell Corporation. The engine entered calendar major inspection on 28 Apr 1967 and was completed 5 May 1967 at HEMS-24, MAG-24. Flight time since calendar inspection was 70.5 hours.
3. Starboard engine J79GE8B ser no 421330 was accepted by AFPR Evendale Ohio on 9 Sep 1963. The engine had one overhaul at O & R NAS Noris on 5-27-66. Total time since new was 1046.3 hours with 273.0 hours since overhaul and original installation, in CY-10, at McDonnell Corporation. The engine entered calendar major inspection on 28 Apr 1967 and was completed on 5 May 1967 at HEMS-24, MAG-24. Flight time since calendar inspection was 70.5 hours.
4. The following technical directives had not been complied with in the aircraft.
 - a. AFC-235, Replacement of front engine mount bolts.
 - b. AFC-244, Inc. of engine fuel shut off valves safety provisions.
 - c. AFC-261, Rework of NLG steering system.
 - d. AFC-282, External centerline tank disconnect assembly fuel and air addition to.
 - e. GAFC-8, Aircraft throttle control system replacement of castellated nuts.
 - f. AFC-300, Modification of bleed air check valve clamp.
 - g. AFC-304, Cabin pressure regulator protective screen.

- h. AFC-311, Interim throttle link installation.
- i. AFC-328, Modification of pressurization system electrical circuitry.
- j. AFC-349, Inspection for stress corrosion cracks in cat tow hook fittings.
- k. AFB-92, Inspection of stab hinge bolt assembly.
- l. AFB-91, Ground test lever cabin pressure regulator
- m. AFB-77, Inspection of suspension lugs 600 gal external fuel tank.
- n. AFB-89, Engine slide brace upper fitting.
- o. AFB-97, Inspection of blanket assembly.
- p. AFB-63, Inspection of wing hinge fold.
- q. AFB-98, Am 1, Inspection of front cockpit control spring.
- r. AvC-624, Removal and installation of amplifiers.
- s. ASC-55, (both seats) Installation of drogue gun cocking indicator.
- t. ASC-49, (both seats) Installation of preflight ejection seat check list.

5. The following technical directives had not been complied with on the port engine ser no 421070.

- a. PPB-106, Rework of machine ring turbine frame.
- b. PPB-145, Modification of compressor rotor.
- c. PPB-171, Modification of compressor rear frame.
- d. PPC-13, Transfer gearbox gasket.
- e. PPC-38, Scavenge filter to cooler nose.
- f. PPC-53, Conversion of AB assembly.
- g. PPC-62, Two point oil indication system.
- h. PPC-74, Power lever control spline shaft.

6. The following technical directives had not been complied with on the starboard engine ser no 421330.

- a. PPB-192, Inlet and transfer gearboxes.
- b. PPB-156, Rev A, turbines.
- c. PPC-9, Replacement of main spark plug.
- d. PPC-13, Modification of transfer gearbox.
- e. PPC-53, Conversion of AB assembly.
- f. PPC-62, Two point oil indication system.
- g. PPC-74, Power lever control spline shaft.

7. Listed Discrepancies and corrective action taken.

11 July 1967

- a. Water in viewfinder. Cleared water out of viewfinder.
- b. Trailing edge flap indicator sticks when full flaps down. Not corrected or subsequently gripped.

- c. No radar altimeter. Not repaired, system awaiting parts.
 - d. FLR receiver computer fail light. Not repaired.
 - e. Yaw kicks left to right at altitude. Trimmed autopilot.
- 12 July, First flight, no discrepancies.
- 12 July, Second Flight.
- a. Altimeter sticks even with less than 500 ft/min descent. Replaced pressure altimeter.
 - b. FLR down. Removed repaired and replaced FLR transmitter.
 - c. Knob on flap switch loose. Tightened knob.
- 13 July
- a. Barometric altimeter front cockpit sticks badly, lags 3-400'. Replaced altimeter with rear seat altimeter.
- 15 July
- a. FLR fail light. Not corrected.
 - b. FLR camera circuit breaker pops each time FLR camera turned on. Not corrected.
 - c. I-R film fail light. Checked OK.
- 17 July
- a. Camera defog wet. Not corrected.
 - b. Generator failed during flight, recycled on after 5 mins. Ran aircraft one hour could not get generator to malfunction.
- 18 July
- a. Station one photo camera and film fail. Not corrected.
 - b. Suspect station two shutter broken. Not corrected.
 - c. Rudder kicks at altitudes. Trimmed autopilot.
- 18 July, second flight, no discrepancies.
- 18 July, third flight,
- a. ICS control panel in front cockpit loose. Secured control pannel.
 - b. YAW stab kicks. Trimmed autopilot.
 - c. Bad oxygen leak near seat, middle block, check front seat too. Changed rear seat pan. Pressure checked OK, both front and rear.
- 19 July
- a. No UHF transmit in front seat, rear OK. Repositioned UHF switch from SSB. Checked OK.
 - b. Rear seat pan loose. Put left sticker clip in.
- 19 July, second flight
- a. Left aux air door remained open when gear raised. Cycled door ten times and checked good.
 - b. Oxygen leak, used oxygen down to 3/4 liter in 40 minutes. Replaced LOX converter, pressure checked system.
8. The aircraft was preflighted in accordance with existing directives, and carried 12,200 lbs of JP-5 with two full external tanks, LOX and lube oil were full, Pilot signed yellow sheet and indicated he examined the last 10 discrepancy reports.

9. The following items were submitted for DIR.

<u>Nomenclature,</u>	<u>VMCJ-2 Msg. DTG requesting DIR</u>	<u>Cont. No.</u>
a. Angle Attack Transmitter	271325Z July 1967	F4-67-67
b. Angle Attack Indicator	271332Z July 1967	F4-67-67
c. Auto Pilot Amplifier	271335Z July 1967	F4-67-67
d. Central Air Data Computer	271330Z July 1967	F4-67-67
e. Oxygen Mask	241735Z July 1967	F4-67-67
f. J79GE8B Engine ser/no 421070	261250Z July 1967	F4-67-67
g. J79GE8B Engine ser/no 421330	261250Z July 1967	F4-67-67

10. The above information is true to the best of my knowledge.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Certified true copy

Page 4 of 4 Pages

4 - Enclosure (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750C6 Series

STATEMENT OF CORPORAL (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

I was going to work the morning of 20 July 1967 at the wing survival school about 5 miles west on highway 70. I turned down the dirt road going towards survival school when I noticed a man walking along the road about a mile up the highway at about 0845. I picked him up and we went to the nearest house to use the phone and call in. The lieutenant got crash crew and finally reached his outfit. He asked to be brought to his outfit to tell them what had happened. We reached J-2 about 0920 and he was brought to the hospital. From conversation with the lieutenant I learned about the pilot, Captain (b) (6) being in the field yet. From this conversation I could make out approximately where the Captain was at because I had been working out there with some heavy equipment on a road. About 0945 I was told to report to the flight line to a helicopter to search for the Captain. Just as we were about to lift off, about 1000, the Captain was brought in by helicopter and taken to the hospital.


(b) (6)

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series








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1-68A

1-4B,
ber








VERY-2 AAR serial 1-6A counter

(b) (6)


in accordance with


DIAGRAM OF IMPACT AREA



ENCLOSURE (10) to WEL-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B, D-153113, Pilot: (b) (6)


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OSHA 3750.6 Series











11-10-57

CONTACT (4)

CONTACT (3)

CONTACT (1)

CONTACT (2)

ENCLOSURE
No 1500
1/2/58

TUCKER CREEK

x Left Wing Tip

Right Wing Tip

CONTACT (4)

Piece of Plastic from Pilot's Helmet

x Large parts of Canopy Plexiglass

223'

Portion of a Flap x

CONTACT (3)

Canopy Plexiglass

Pieces of Speed Brake x

184'

CONTACT (2)

x Fuel Hose from External Tank
x Small pieces of Canopy Plexiglass

Aft Tip of Right Drop Tank x

610'

x Front Tip of Right Drop Tank

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PATH

AMMO BUNKER
x

Burned piece of Leading Edge Flap

x Right Pylon and parts of Right Drop Tank

CONTACT (1)

ENCLOSURE (17) to WFO-2 AIR serial 1-44 occurring 20 July 1967, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-19, 20-21, 22-23, 24-25, 26-27, 28-29, 30-31, 32-33, 34-35, 36-37, 38-39, 40-41, 42-43, 44-45, 46-47, 48-49, 50-51, 52-53, 54-55, 56-57, 58-59, 60-61, 62-63, 64-65, 66-67, 68-69, 70-71, 72-73, 74-75, 76-77, 78-79, 80-81, 82-83, 84-85, 86-87, 88-89, 90-91, 92-93, 94-95, 96-97, 98-99, 100-101, 102-103, 104-105, 106-107, 108-109, 110-111, 112-113, 114-115, 116-117, 118-119, 120-121, 122-123, 124-125, 126-127, 128-129, 130-131, 132-133, 134-135, 136-137, 138-139, 140-141, 142-143, 144-145, 146-147, 148-149, 150-151, 152-153, 154-155, 156-157, 158-159, 160-161, 162-163, 164-165, 166-167, 168-169, 170-171, 172-173, 174-175, 176-177, 178-179, 180-181, 182-183, 184-185, 186-187, 188-189, 190-191, 192-193, 194-195, 196-197, 198-199, 200-201, 202-203, 204-205, 206-207, 208-209, 210-211, 212-213, 214-215, 216-217, 218-219, 220-221, 222-223, 224-225, 226-227, 228-229, 230-231, 232-233, 234-235, 236-237, 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2012-2013, 2014-2015, 2016-2017, 2018-2019, 2020-2021, 2022-2023, 2024-2025, 2026-2027, 2028-2029, 2030-2031, 2032-2033, 2034-2035, 2036-2037, 2038-2039, 2040-2041, 2042-2043, 2044-2045, 2046-2047, 2048-2049, 2050-2051, 2052-2053, 2054-2055, 2056-2057, 2058-2059, 2060-2061, 2062-2063, 2064-2065, 2066-2067, 2068-2069, 2070-2071, 2072-2073, 2074-2075, 2076-2077, 2078-2079, 2080-2081, 2082-2083, 2084-2085, 2086-2087, 2088-2089, 2090-2091, 2092-2093, 2094-2095, 2096-2097, 2098-2099, 2100-2101, 2102-2103, 2104-2105, 2106-2107, 2108-2109, 2110-2111, 2112-2113, 2114-2115, 2116-2117, 2118-2119, 2120-2121, 2122-2123, 2124-2125, 2126-2127, 2128-2129, 2130-2131, 2132-2133, 2134-2135, 2136-2137, 2138-2139, 2140-2141, 2142-2143, 2144-2145, 2146-2147, 2148-2149, 2150-2151, 2152-2153, 2154-2155, 2156-2157, 2158-2159, 2160-2161, 2162-2163, 2164-2165, 2166-2167, 2168-2169, 2170-2171, 2172-2173, 2174-2175, 2176-2177, 2178-2179, 2180-2181, 2182-2183, 2184-2185, 2186-2187, 2188-2189, 2190-2191, 2192-2193, 2194-2195, 2196-2197, 2198-2199, 2200-2201, 2202-2203, 2204-2205, 2206-2207, 2208-2209, 2210-2211, 2212-2213, 2214-2215, 2216-2217, 2218-2219, 2220-2221, 2222-2223, 2224-2225, 2226-2227, 2228-2229, 2230-2231, 2232-2233, 2234-2235, 2236-2237, 2238-2239, 2240-2241, 2242-2243, 2244-2245, 2246-2247, 2248-2249, 2250-2251, 2252-2253, 2254-2255, 2256-2257, 2258-2259, 2260-2261, 2262-2263, 2264-2265, 2266-2267, 2268-2269, 2270-2271, 2272-2273, 2274-2275, 2276-2277, 2278-2279, 2280-2281, 2282-2283, 2284-2285, 2286-2287, 2288-2289, 2290-2291, 2292-2293, 2294-2295

NO PUSH

UNLESS FLAP IS

NO STEEL

STATEMENT AND INTERVIEW OF SECOND LIEUTENANT (b) (6) (RSO),
(b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 154113 accident on 20 July 1967.

STATEMENT AND INTERVIEW MADE ON 21 JULY 1967. INTERVIEW BY CAPTAIN (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (6) USMC (TRANSCRIPT OF TAPE RECORDING)

This is Lieutenant (b) (6) victim of an accident on the
20th of July 1967. To the best of my knowledge this is what occurred.

We started rolling off the runway at 0454 in the morning and we weren't airborne more than one or two minutes when there was a huge flash of white light coming from the front, and after this white light I saw a yellow type fire and I heard what I thought might have been an explosion. The ah, finding out later it might have been the aircraft bouncing off the ground someplace, exactly where I don't know. I don't recall hearing any "eject" "eject" from the pilot, he may have called it to me. I just don't recall cause I was so busy, flailing around with the fire and so forth. I didn't see the eject light come on either. Well, I pulled the curtain and the seat didn't go off right away; I didn't pull far enough but the canopy had jet-tisoned however, and I gave it another tug, at the same time fighting the flames, and next thing I remember is landing on the ground. I don't seem to have been in the air very long at all; it was almost 2 or 3 seconds from the time I ejected to when I touched down. That's the way it seemed to me anyway. I landed about 30 to 40 yards away from Captain (b) (6). I heard him calling, and I answered him, and he told me that (b) (6). He had his strobe light on and asked me if I could see it and I could. I couldn't get out of my torso harness right away, (b) (6). One of the rocket jet fittings had not come apart and I was just stuck in the torso harness and under my canopy, ah, like the parachute etc. I started wiggling around and eventually wiggled my way out of the torso harness and I made my way over to (b) (6) at which time he told me that he was fine except for (b) (6). He had (b) (6) and also that he had, he thought he had, (b) (6). He was moving about when I got there and we went back; we tried to get his canopy out of the trees but not being able to do so, we went over to where I had landed and picked mine up and we went back to (b) (6) position where there were fewer bugs and he wrapped himself up in the canopy cause he was a little cold and was a little shivering. I went back to where I had landed and got the seat kit, the whole pan and of course pushed it and kicked it rolling it over, end over end, with my feet till I finally got to (b) (6) and since (b) (6), he - I directed him and we got the seats open and we collected the flares and got the radios out, and he set, I think I seem to recall him setting a flare off right then and there, I'm not sure about this. Well, we got the radios going and we didn't get any results. At around eight o'clock I set out on a trek to try to find some help and after going through a couple places in the swamp I noticed a cabin or building being put up to the right just by the power lines out there and I saw a road and decided to follow it, and it took me

/ Enclosure (/9)

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past a tobacco field and a corn field; and finally got to a more or less of a main road I guess, and a Corporal (b) (6) who works in survival, he operates the bulldozer, he came along and I hailed him down and he took me to a phone where I tried to contact VMCJ-2. I got the crash officer on the line and told him of my condition, and of (b) (6) condition and position as well as I knew where it was. Then the corporal drove me to VMCJ-2 where I met Major (b) (6) and he got somebody to take me over to the emergency ward. That's all I got.

(b) (6)

O.K. One or two questions. One. On the take-off roll, would you tell me anything that Captain (b) (6) said to you over the ICS if you can remember it?

(b) (6)

I don't, ah well, what I remember - he was commenting on the take-off and things seemed to be going normal, I kinda remember him telling me the wheels were up etc., and I believe he's the one that came over the air and said IFR, we had been VFR, and then all the sudden he says IFR and then that's when I saw the flash of light and things happened kinda hurriedly then. That's about all.

(b) (6)

O.K. Did, did you hear Captain (b) (6) attempt to make any transmission on the UHF, and also were you still on tower frequency to the best of your knowledge anyhow?

(b) (6)

To the best of my knowledge, we were on tower frequency. I don't recall hearing Captain (b) (6) making any UHF transmissions, he may have, however I just don't recall hearing it.

(b) (6)

O.K. In your statement you said that you seen a flash followed by a fire in the front cockpit. How I guess it, did it come back to the back cockpit immediately, or how soon did it get into the back cockpit?

(b) (6)

Well, that uh, that brilliant flash of light, that intense white light, that I saw - I don't know; I know it was up front but I don't know whether it was fire or what. And the yellow type flame I saw up front, and I guess it did come back because my (b) (6) when I pulled the face curtain.

(b) (6)

Did you start your ejection sequence immediately upon seeing the fire in the front cockpit?

(b) (6)

After seeing that brilliant flash of light - I didn't know what it was - and I didn't hear anything from Captain (b) (6) at any rate I don't recall hearing anything. When the yellow flame - yellow type flame - I saw and felt, I did go for the face curtain immediately.

(b) (6)

O.K. I think that will be all, thank you.

2 Enclosure (19)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMETHOD 3750.6 Series

(b) (6)

Certified true copy

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

I was the VMCJ-2 Operations Duty Officer the morning of 20 July 1967. About 0445Q TACC called and asked if Event 9 was airborne. I checked with the flight line and reported that 9-1, an EA-6A, was having trouble getting started and the flight would be late getting airborne. About 0510Q TACC again requested the status of Event 9. I checked with the flight line and reported that event 9-1 could not get started and was cancelling, and that 9-2, an RF-4B, was either airborne or should be getting airborne.

About 0715Q Approach Control called to advise that 9-2 had not made his expected approach time of 0655Q and to see if I knew his location. I told them that I had no contact with 9-2 but that he could possibly have joined a tanker for refueling, or landed at Beaufort or Myrtle Beach. I asked for 9-2's take-off time and it was passed as about 0455Q.

About 0740Q Captain (b) (6) from TACC called checking on 9-2. I informed him that 9-2 had not returned to VMCJ-2 and that I did not know his whereabouts. I asked him if TACC could contact the two tankers to see if 9-2 had possibly joined them for refueling. I also asked him to check Beaufort for a possible landing there.

About 0802Q Captain (b) (6) called and reported that 9-2 had not joined the tanker or landed at Beaufort. I told him that 9-2 had between 3 hours and 3 hours 10 minutes fuel on board and would be out at this time. I asked what the last radio contact had been with 9-2 and he reported that TACC had never established radio contact. Captain (b) (6) then advised that search and rescue was being notified.

I advised the Commanding Officer of VMCJ-2 of the above events and then notified MAG-14 S-3 of the same.

About 0855Q Staff Sergeant (b) (6) from the Crash Crew called and said that Lieutenant (b) (6) had called in by telephone reporting the crash, and advising that the pilot was still at the crash site, and badly burned.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (20)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPHAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6)
Number 153113 accident on July 19, 1962

(b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau

At approximately 0315, I arrived at the squadron for a 0300 brief. The briefing was normal with all crew members present. Captain (b) (6) and I talked quite a while on alternates and fuel planning because of the two different types of aircraft involved in the flight.

At 0350 the crews of both aircraft went to the line shack and then the aircraft. After repeated tries I was unable to get my aircraft started. At approximately 0425 I turned on my radio and contacted Captain (b) (6) informing him of my aircraft status. I also told Captain (b) (6) that I had a maintenance crew working on the aircraft and that he was to use our local 200 flight clearance if he wanted to take-off. It was decided that Captain (b) (6) would take-off and if I could get my aircraft started I would meet him at the first CP on the track. Captain (b) (6) taxied to the fuel pits to refuel. At approximately 0445 I observed Captain (b) (6) aircraft taxiing outbound. At approximately 0450 I observed two F-4's taking off runway 32 at about one minute intervals. Both aircraft went through a fog bank at the take off end of the runway. Both take-offs appeared to be normal. I was able to see the first aircraft much longer than the second because he stayed in burner for quite a while. The second aircraft came out of burner soon after hitting the fog bank then lost sight of it. I did not see any explosion or ejections. At approximately 0530 we decided to abort our mission and returned to the ready room and informed Captain (b) (6) (ODO) that we were unable to get the aircraft started.

I was designated a Naval Aviator on May 23, 1962. I have approximately 1880 hours total flight time.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau
Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

Thursday morning July 20, 1967 I was assigned as MAG-24 Hot Pad coordinating officer. At about 0445 we received a scramble at EO-06 with Major WAUNCH from 531 started and taxied out. He got airborne at 0450 however due to darkness I mistakenly believed another F4 to be the aircraft I was monitoring. I watched this F4 perform his engine run-ups (2) and then delay about 10 seconds during which time I assumed he was dropping his flaps and completing the take off check list. He started his roll, got two good burner lights and lifted off at a normal distance down the runway. I watched until he was about 500 feet and then walked over to tell the taxi director to shut down the spare aircraft we had started for back up. As I was talking to the taxi director an orange glow of about two seconds duration lit up the sky of the end of runway 32, the duty runway. It was of about 2-3 seconds duration, similar to after burner glow in clouds but of much greater magnitude. I called the C.D.O. on my radio and asked him to check it out as I was afraid our aircraft had crashed, however I got the word that Major (b) (6) had checked in with MACS as briefed and was flying intercepts. Further word from the tower indicated no aircraft missing.

In checking with the hot pad crew I found that our aircraft did not do run-ups and had actually taken off six minutes earlier.

I have approximately 1400 hours flight time, 525 in the F-4 and was designated on 17 April 1962.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (22)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF MAJOR (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

On the morning of 20 July 1967, I was acting as the MAG-24 coordinator for the employment of F-4B aircraft in the Anti Air Warfare Exercise which commenced at 0400Q on 20 July. Included in the communications equipment available for my use was a Motorola Handie-Talkie FM Radiophone. This radiophone was not included in the normal complement of communications available but was loaned to me by the MAG-24 Maintenance Control Center to allow monitoring of the movement of F-4B aircraft onto the "Hot Pad".

At 0450Q one F-4B was scrambled from the "HotPad". Shortly after this F-4B was launched I overheard a call from the "Hot Pad" to the VMFA-513 Operations Duty Officer, on the Radiophone, stating that several personnel on the "Hot Pad" had observed a flash off the take-off end of runway 32. Upon hearing this I immediately called the Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, Operations Duty Officer and informed the person that answered of the flash and inquired whether any emergencies were in progress. Shortly after this I spoke with the Tactical Air Control Center (Major (b) (6)) and ascertained that all the airborne MAG-24 F-4Bs had checked in and were accomplishing their assigned missions.

At approximately 0700 I received a routine call from the MAG-24 Liaison Officer at the Tactical Air Control Center (Major (b) (6)) and he mentioned that a VMCJ-2 RF-4B was overdue. I mentioned the flash off the end of runway 32 to him. A few minutes later I spoke to LtCol (b) (6) at the Tactical Air Control Center and relayed the same information to him that I had to the Station Operations Duty Officers representative. LtCol (b) (6) asked if I could get any more details. I made several calls and learned that Captain (b) (6) of VMFA-513 and Captain (b) (6) had both observed the flash. I called LtCol (b) (6) and gave him the information I had at this time and he indicated that the SAR helicopter would search this area.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (23)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6), (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

On the morning of 20 July I was participating in the 2dMAW AAWEX exercise.

While under Velvet Pod control and established in a CAP on the 280/40 of Cherry Point TACAN I mentioned to my RIO that what appeared to be a series of flares had just gone off in the vicinity of Cherry Point.

Around 0500 I saw three distinct flashes of orange light partially obscured by the fog. One large and one smaller flash was immediately followed by a third large flash. I estimate that the entire duration was less than three seconds in that my RIO did not see any unusual light when he looked.

The three flashes gave the appearance of a gas flare that did not ignite.

(b) (6)

It has been certified that Captain (b) (6) was designated a NAVAL AVIATOR on 15 April 1965, and has 481 flight hours.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (29)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPHAVIST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL (b) (6), USAF concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113; accident on 20 July 1967

To Whom it May Concern: During AFMEX 2-69 (20 July 1967) I was the
senior representative from WING G-3 present at the TACC.

Event 9 scheduled to be 2 - EA6 was delayed and one RF-4B was replaced
by an RF-4B and the other EA6 did not take off.

Upon checking as to the status of Event 9, I was told that no one
took off to fly it.

Later in the morning I became aware that Event 9 did have one aircraft
become airborne which was an RF-4B but it did not check in with the TACC.

The SAP wheels were put into motion and the aircraft was found to have
crashed shortly after take-off without chance to check in with the TACC.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (15)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF MAJOR (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau
Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

On the morning of 20 July 1967 I was in the TACC as the MAG-24 coordinator for the AAWEX. During the course of operations I heard a Lieutenant in the center briefing Colonel (b) (6) and LtCol (b) (6) on the possibility of an F4 aircraft, a CY 9-1 or 9-2 belonging to VMFJ being down. That he had not checked in, was overdue and that calls were being made to determine if anyone or agency knew of his whereabouts. The Lieutenant also stated that tower had confirmed CY's take-off. But no contact after that.

At this time the weather went to minimums for the exercise and in view of the probable emergency, aircraft airborne were ordered to recover and a hold was put on take-offs. I called Major (b) (6) at the MAG-24 Headquarters and informed him of the situation and he related to me that he had heard an explosion after an F4 take-off which was about the time of the aircraft in question, and that others in MAG-24 had also either heard or seen it and that the tower had been informed, but that the tower had nothing to report. I immediately passed this information to Colonel (b) (6) and LtCol (b) (6). This was the first word they had received on any such incident. Both wanted more details ~~and about the explosion~~ So I called Major (b) (6) on the phone again and let LtCol (b) (6) talk to him.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (26)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINE 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF FIRST LIEUTENANT (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

On 20 July 1967 I was assigned duties of Senior Air Controller in the
Tactical Air Control Center for the 2nd MAW AAWEX.

At approximately 0450 Sergeant (b) (6) the Crew Chief, called VMCJ-2 to
check on aggressor event 9 who would be CY 9-1, the Flight Schedule indi-
cated he was due to take-off at 0435Q. Sergeant (b) (6) was informed by the
duty officer that 9-1 had aborted but 9-2 was airborne and should return
about 0730Q. At this time event #9, CY 9-2 was indicated airborne as a
failed to RIO (Radio in, Out) with an unknown ETR (Estimated Time of Return)
on the TATC log and status board.

At 0740 when CY 9-2 had not returned, Captain (b) (6) who was working
with me called VMCJ-2 to inquire if 9-2 was on the deck and was informed
that he was not, but that he may have gone to work with the tanker. At
this time the TACC contacted the tanker at Cherry Point and had MACS-9
check with the tanker at Beaufort, S.C. also requested MACS-9 to check
with MATCU-69 who was controlling aggressor events in the Beaufort area.
MACS-9 reported no one in the Beaufort area had any contact with CY 9-2.
When contacted, MACS-5, who was aggressor control for Cherry Point area,
informed TACC that CY 9-2 had not checked in with them either. I called
the tower and was informed CY 9-2 had not checked in with them, at this
time TACC attempted to contact CY 9-2 on guard frequency. No Joy, also
requested MACS-9 attempt to establish contact on guard, No Joy.

At 0805Q TACC requested the SAR helicopter to sweep the Air Field Area
to about 5 miles out. Tower will send out the helicopter.

At 0806Q TACC requested a ramp check at Cherry Point and Beaufort, S.C.
for CY 9-2 or aircraft with CY-10 side number. The aircraft is not on the
deck at either location. Requested RATCC to check Myrtle Beach and other
alternate fields, they had already began. At 0817Q the tower reported that
Norfolk Rescue had been alerted at 201209Z, this was reported when TACC ask
that they be alerted. At 0835Q TACC requested the last contact the tower
had with CY 9-2 (CY-10) and was informed, 0854Z VFR on a local 200 flight
plan.

At 0915 Colonel (b) (6) reported to Colonel (b) (6) that the wreckage
had been located by the SAR helicopter off the end of the runway.

The above statement is true to the best of my knowledge.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPHAVIBET 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF SERGEANT (b) (6) USMC, concerning RF-4B
BuNo 153113 accident on 20 July 1967.

On the morning of 20 July 1967 I was on duty at TACC. I noted that I had an aircraft overdue to be launched according to the VMJ-2 flight schedule. I called the VMJ-2 duty officer. He said that the aircraft was airborne. About 15 minutes later I called MACS-6 regarding that aircraft. They said that they didn't have the aircraft. I then called tower. They said that the aircraft was airborne and had a block time. I called the controlling agency but they had no joy. I called VMJ-2 again and was told that they had one aircraft not going up but one was airborne. I then called MACS-9 and asked them to contact all controlling agencies. They had no joy. I called tower again and was told that his block time was overdue. I then called Myrtle Beach, his secondary airfield. With no joy there I called the other nearby fields with no joy.

I was directed by Col. (b) (6) to alert SAR. SAR said that they had no helicopters in the air at that time. Col. (b) (6) ordered SAR to launch a helicopter to investigate the report of an explosion at the end of runway 22.

During this time I had requested a visual check of the fields by all East Coast Air Bases for possible locating of the missing aircraft, with negative results.

To the best of my knowledge this is what happened on the morning of 20 July 1967.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (2P)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) JR. (b) (6) USMC, concerning
RF-4B Bu No 153113 accident on 20 July 1967.

CY 9-2 failed to check out (RIO) with Hickory when airborne. VMJ-2 was called and they reported 9-2 had been airborne since approximately 0415Q, and had not yet returned. Time of the above call was approximately 0710Q.

The Marine Air Control Squadrons Five and Nine were called and reported that CY-9-2 had not checked in with them.

At approximately 0805Q the SAE helicopter was requested to be dispatched to make a sweep of the area three to five miles from the field to look for the missing aircraft. It was about this time that VMJ-2 was again called and asked to make a physical ramp check for the missing aircraft.

During the above interim several calls had been made to the VMJ STD. Times and substance of those calls were not recorded, but generally we were discussing possibilities as to where the missing aircraft might be; fuel remaining; refuel possibilities; and/or alternate fields that might have been used.

At 1817Q we were informed by the Cherry Point Tower that Norfolk Rescue was alerted at 201209Z for CY 9-2.

At 0810Q the TACC requested a ramp check be made at Beaufort, S. C. No joy at Beaufort.

At 0915Q Colonel (b) (6) called LT. COLONEL (b) (6) and informed him the wreckage of CY 9-2 had been located.

During the times noted above I was working in the TACC as an assistant to LIEUTENANT (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Enclosure (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

At approximately 0510 20 July while sitting in my aircraft on the "Hot Pad" for the AAWEX I saw a VMJ-2 aircraft take-off and disappear into the fog. Approximately 20 seconds later, after the plane was far enough away not to be able to hear the engines I saw two large flashes through the fog. The second flash occurred before the first one died out, and then a third flash followed about 1 second later.

Captain (b) (6), 513, was working on the "Hot Pad" also saw the flashes. He called in what he saw on the maintenance control walkie talkie.

Approximately 1 hour later I asked him if a plane had crashed and he said the tower had relayed a negative. I therefore assumed we saw an explosion of a oil tank, butane tank, not an aircraft as all planes were under positive radio control of tower, Departure Control, and TACC Center.

I was scrambled at 0650, right after take-off. I heard a faint "Beeper" in the vicinity of the runway 14 initial. I discounted this Beeper as we often hear the ones in our seat, and tower had not advised a plane was down.

(b) (6)

It has been certified that Captain (b) (6) was designated a
NAVAL AVIATOR on 18 October 1965, and has 442 flight hours.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (30)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF MAJOR (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

On 20 July 1967 at 0410 I launched in a TA-4F as a bogey aircraft for the scheduled AAWEX. At the center mat at Cherry Point the weather was good but as I approached the upwind end of runway 32 I went into IFR conditions at approximately 50 feet of altitude. At approximately 1500 feet I entered VFR conditions and cancelled my departure instruments.

I flew the scheduled route and at the last check point (MT 040/95) I started the track for NKT. Heading approximately 225 degrees magnetic on 040 degrees radial NKT and approximately 35 miles out at 8500 feet I saw two large flashes of lights, resembling explosions or bomb flashes. Relative to my altitude and heading, they were low and about 1:00 O'clock position. I had not heard any transmission on guard channel so I rechecked to ensure that the ARC-51 was set on TR+G. It was set up properly. Also the time was approximately 0455.

Dr. BRASSEL, my rear seat passenger, and I made comment to the fact that no transmission was received on our guard channel, if for some reason it had been an aircraft crash.

After passing NKT TACAN, we made a right hand turn to track out bound to the last check point again. During this turn we looked for some indication of fire or smoke but could not see any signs.

I returned and landed at 0535 and was informed at 0830 that there had been a crash at approximately the time that the flashes of fire was seen.

(b) (6)

It has been certified that Major (b) (6) was designated a NAVAL AVIATOR on 1 October 1958, and has 3415 flight hours.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (3/)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau
Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

I am a P.C. in VMIR-252. I was designated a Naval Aviator on 4 September 1964 and have a total of 2005 flight hours.

On the morning of 20 July at approximately 0450 while proceeding out around from the VMIR-252 line I observed an F4B on take-off roll. The flame pattern of the after burners appeared normal in all respects and the aircraft appeared to have a normal take-off roll and acceleration as it passed my position.

After proceeding to the long position I was cleared for take-off. The field conditions were VFR as stated by the tower to an aircraft that had requested this information. We commenced take-off roll at 0459.

After take-off at approximately 100 feet MSL we entered what appeared to be a cloud layer at 300 feet MSL we were on top and the visibility was unlimited. Because of the low overcast I nor any member of my crew, observed any portion of the accident, neither did we hear any radio transmissions or emergency "Beepers".

(b) (6)

Enclosure (71)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPHAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF FIRST LIEUTENANT (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

(b) (5), (b) (6)



(b) (6)



It has been certified that Lieutenant (b) (6) was designated a
NAVAL AVIATOR on 30 November 1966, and has 391 flight hours.

(b) (6)



Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPHAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF FIRST LIEUTENANT (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

I, (b) (6), was flying EA-16 in the AAWEX exercise of 20 July 1967. A normal take off was performed at 0555Q and the aircraft was established on the proper course. Soon after being established on a heading of 005 degrees and 7500 feet MSL, I began receiving an intermittent BEEPER signal on guard frequency. At approximately 0645Q while inbound to the field on the 080 degrees radial/INT, I received the signal continuously. I was then occupied with making my target time of 0700Q and did not report the signal. After passing the station at 0700Q, I switched to approach control frequency and requested a TACAN approach. While enroute to the Bennett Pix, I was asked by approach control to obtain a "cut" on the Beeper. I complied and gave a "cut" of 320 degrees while wings level. I was approximately 5 miles on the 020 radial/INT at the time of the reading.

(b) (6)

It has been certified that Lieutenant (b) (6) was designated a
NAVAL AVIATOR on 2 November 1966, and has 466 flight hours.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (34)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with COMNAVIST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CORPORAL (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau
Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

On the 20th of July 1967 at approximately 0500G while acting as Flight Clearance Supervisor, I received a phone call from a Major. I do not recall his name nor his unit. He requested to know if we had had a crash because he had seen a flash or a fire off the end of runway 32. I then called the tower and referred the question to them. I received an answer from Sergeant (b) (6) in the tower that what the Major had probably seen was the afterburner of a departing aircraft as it was foggy at the end of the runway and that this would look like a flash or fire. I then related this to the Major. He seemed satisfied with this explanation and had no further questions.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (15)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF SERGEANT (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

At or about 0500G, 20 July 1967, I received a call in the tower from Corporal (b) (6) of the Flight Clearance Section. She said someone had called her to report a flash of light in the air, and wondered if an airplane had crashed. All night long we had heavy fog and low hanging clouds in the area. Due to this weather I had noticed that all afterburner aircraft departing were creating bright flashes of light caused by their afterburners in the fog. I informed Corporal (b) (6) that this was probably what the caller had seen and told her I knew nothing about a crash.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (36)


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPIAVINET 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF MISTER J. S. FRAME, CIVILIAN, IFR ROOM SUPERVISOR, concerning
RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

At 0854Z on 7-20-67, Wineleaf 9-2 departed NKT VFR on a local 200 clearance with a block time of 1055Z. Wineleaf 9-2 did not report in for his block time and a routine communications search was commenced. Calls were made on guard channel (243.0 uhf). T.A.C.C. was contacted. They advised that they had not heard from the aircraft and would check on him. VMCJ-2 was contacted to find the pilots intended flight path and to insure that the aircraft was not there. VMCJ-2 advised that the aircraft should be with a tanker and later advised that he might have landed at Myrtle Beach AFB. Intended routing given at this time was North for 15 minutes, then East to the Outer Banks, then back over NKT, then to the NBC area to cross NBC from the West then back to Cherry Point.

At about 1100Z a weak PRT signal was heard by approach control (see statement of QySgt (b)(6)). Several attempts were made on 243.0 and 121.5 to contact the BH tanker on station with no results. Myrtle Beach AFB was called and they gave a negative report. Norfolk Search and Rescue was given all available information and requested to check all airports within landing distance of Wineleaf 9-2's route. By about 1150Z all reports were in and negative and T.A.C.C. had further advised that the pilot had not made any of his scheduled radio contacts and that a low level search had been requested within a 5 mile radius of NKT. All information was forwarded to Cherry Point Search and Rescue who advised that they would conduct this search.

During the time from 0854Z to 1200Z, 28 arriving and departing aircraft were under the control of Cherry Point approach/departure control and other than as stated by QySgt (b)(6) no reports of fire, smoke, PRT signals, or any other unusual occurrence was received. At about 1200Z myself and all controllers were relieved by a new section.


JOHN S. FRAME, JR.

Enclosure (37)

STATEMENT OF GUNNERY SERGEANT (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

At about 1100Z, 7-20-67, I heard a PRT signal on 243.0 uhf. Attempts were made to get a bearing on this signal using our URD-4 direction finder, but the signal was too weak to give any indication. At about 1105Z, I asked the pilot of MEA-14, who was holding at the NCU 015 radial 10 mile fix, if he was hearing this signal and if so would he give a bearing. He said he was hearing it and gave a bearing of 320 degrees. Shortly thereafter the signal faded out altogether.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B Bureau
Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

At approximately 0840 I was alerted by the IFR room that a F-4B was overdue and a search north of the field was requested. Due to the fog I was unable to go out by myself so Captain (b) (6) was called in to fly co-pilot. One attempt was made to search the area off the approach end of one four but due to fog search was called off by myself. Upon returning to the tower we were informed that the F-4 had crashed on the 320 degree radial approximately 5 miles out and the pilot was still at the crash site and needed help. We were also told that the pilot had an emergency radio with him. We launched immediately and entered the fog bank off the approach end 14. Approximately 2 miles out an emergency signal was picked up and homed in on. Due to the heavy fog we flew over the source of the signal 3 times without sighting the pilot or wreckage. On the fourth pass one of the crew chiefs thought he saw the wreckage and an open field near by. I landed in the open field and sent the crew members into the woods where the #1 needle of the UHF/DF homer was pointing. I proceeded to shut down the helicopter and the co-pilot and myself followed the crew members into the woods. Sergeant (b) (6) and Corporal (b) (6) had located the pilot and directed us to him by voice signals. After seeing the pilot and talking to him it was decided to carry him out instead of using the hoist. Sergeant (b) (6) and Corporal (b) (6) were sent back to the helicopter to get the stretcher. Upon their return the pilot was put in the stretcher and carried out to the helicopter. The pilot was transferred to an ambulance after landing at the tower.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (39)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINEET 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

I am a U.S. Naval Aviator with approximately 1450 flight hours. On 20 July 1967 I was called to duty to fly as co-pilot for an LFR search for a missing aircraft one hour overdue. Two reports of flashes to the north of the airfield was all the available information to us as we manned the aircraft. While in the cockpit the Crash Crew Officer, Lt. (b) (6) approached the aircraft and informed us that the RIO had called Crash Crew and stated that the aircraft was down in the wooded area off of Runway 32. The pilot was suffering from burns and was still at the scene of the crash. He also informed us the pilot had a UHF survival radio with him and it was in operation.

After takeoff at approximately 0905 search pattern at 200 feet, at the end of runway 32 we picked up the first signal from the pilots radio and started homing in on it. Maintaining 200 feet the trees were barely visible sometimes completely obscured, visibility being 0 to 70 feet. After following the signal for approximately 5 minutes the number 1 needle indicated we had passed the crash site, however because of the weather no wreckage or chutes were seen. Commencing a 360 degree turn the number 1 needle continued to point to the left wing of the aircraft, due to the visibility all we could see were the trees.

The Crew Chief, Corporal (b) (6), then sighted the aircraft wreckage to our right, turning right a farmers field was sighted, due to the weather a hoist pickup was impossible. We landed in the field and sent the crewman in the direction of the number 1 needle. Receiving clearance to shut the aircraft down the pilot, Captain (b) (6) and myself joined the two crewmen in the search for the pilot. After 5 minutes Captain (b) (6) and myself arrived at the crash site and our crewmen were calling to us that they were with the pilot. We arrived a minute or so later at the pilot who was in good spirits and after talking with him he indicated he wanted to walk out if we would keep the branches out of his face as (b) (6). We sent the crewmen back to the aircraft for the Stokes litter because the pilot mentioned a (b) (6) injury. While awaiting for the crewmen to return, the pilot expressed concern over moving any gear in the area and particularly his oxygen mask as he seemed to think that it may have malfunctioned, the crewmen arrived and the pilot eased himself into the litter. We carried the pilot to the aircraft stopping often to cut our way to the aircraft, we then flew him to the tower where he was transferred to an awaiting ambulance.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (40)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF FIRST LIEUTENANT (b) (6), USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

At approximately 0845 on 20 July 1967, the Base Telephone Operator rang Crash Crew telephone extension #3420 and asked for the Crash Officer. I took the call and was connected with a Marine who identified himself as (b) (6) the RIO of CY-10. The phone connection wasn't very good, and it was difficult to hear what he was saying due to departing jet aircraft on the center-mat. (b) (6) informed me that he was at a Survival Camp near CROATAN with a Marine Corporal and needed help for Captain (b) (6). He stated that (b) (6) was (b) (6). (I was aware that there existed some concern for a missing VMCJ-2 aircraft, but, at this time, was not certain that a crash had actually occurred) I asked (b) (6) where Captain (b) (6) was located, but he wasn't sure. I then asked him what heading the aircraft had been on; if they had turned right or left; and how long they had been in flight prior to ejecting. He answered my questions and I jotted down notes reading, "Lt--VMCJ-2--3 miles on 320°--(b) (6) in woods--CROATAN Area-3". While I was talking to (b) (6), I noticed the SAR helicopter taxiing inbound past the Tower to the SAR Heliport. Just prior to terminating the conversation, I asked (b) (6) if he was OK and could the Marine Corporal get him into the Base. He replied in the affirmative and stated that he wanted to get to the hospital right away. I then hung the telephone up and ran outside to the SAR heliport and passed my information to Captain (b) (6), the SAR pilot. The helicopter departed immediately. Following this, I passed all information to the Operations Duty Officer and to the Airfield Operations Officer.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (4/)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPIAVIST 3750.6 Series

TRANSCRIPT OF TAPE RECORDING OF TOWER LOCAL CONTROL TRANSMISSIONS, 20Jul67

QUEBEC TAPE

TIME TIME

0439	0276	BE-13:	Cherry Tower, BE-13, long position.
		Tower:	BE-13, Tower, cleared long position runway 32.
		BE-13:	Roger.
		Tower:	13 when in position, contact Departure 278.8.
		BE-13:	Roger.
0440	0277	EC-12:	Tower, EC-12, when are we cleared for high power run up, over?
		Tower:	EC-12 standby one please.
		Tower:	EC-12, taxi in long position runway 32 and make a high power turn up.
		EC-12:	Roger, 32. Thank you.
		Tower:	12 there is an TA-4 in long position, in position for takeoff now.
0441	0278	EC-12:	Roger.
		EC-12:	Tower, EC-12 will be taxiing inbound this time.
		Tower:	Roger, cleared inbound--the A-4 is cleared for takeoff.
0443	0280	Tower:	BE-13, Tower. Cleared for takeoff runway 32.
		BE-13:	BE-13, Roger.
0445	0282	EC-12:	EC-12, Tower, scramble an F-4.
		Tower:	Cherry Point VFR, duty runway 32, altimeter 30.16, Cherry Point is VFR.
		Chieftain 2-1:	Cherry Tower, Chieftain 2-1 for scramble.
		Tower:	Chieftain 2-1 taxi runway 32, wind is calm, altimeter 30.16, time 0847. When airborne, fly a heading of 330 degrees at 10,000 feet, contact Velvet Pod on Red frequency, if unable, secondary frequency Maroon.
		Chieftain 2-1:	Roger 330. 330, 10,000, Velvet Pod on Red or secondary Maroon.
0447	0284	Tower:	Chieftain 2-1, roger.
		Chieftain 2-1:	This is Chieftain 2-1.
		Tower:	Chieftain 2-1, roger.
0448	0285	Wineleaf 9-2:	Cherry Tower, Wineleaf 9-2, long position.
		Tower:	Wineleaf 9-2 hold short the centermat.
		Wineleaf 9-2:	Roger, hold short.
		Tower:	Chieftain 2-1, you're cleared for takeoff, runway 32.
		Chieftain 2-1:	Roger, thank you.
		Wineleaf 9-2:	Continue taxi please.
0449	0286	Tower:	Roger, continue into long position runway 32, field is VFR at this time.
		Wineleaf 9-2:	This is 9-2, say again, you were cut out by afterburner.

Enclosure (1/2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with CPHAVINST 3750.6 Series

Tower: Wineleaf 9-2 continue into long position, the field is VFR at this time.

Wineleaf 9-2: Tower, roger, I'm leaving VFR and would like to hold my block time good, please.

Tower: Wineleaf 9-2, understand you are going to depart VFR and hold your block time.

????? Tower, there is a fire by 531 hangar.

Wineleaf 9-2: That's affirmative.

0450 0287 Tower: F-4 scrambling, request your call sign.

Tower: Wineleaf 9-2 contact Departure 278.8.

Wineleaf 9-2: Roger, 278.8, switching.

0453 0290 Wineleaf 9-2: Cherry Point Tower, Wineleaf 9-2 for take off one, over.

Tower: Wineleaf 9-2, Tower, cleared for takeoff, runway 32.

Wineleaf 9-2: 9-2 on the roll.

BH-897: Cherry Tower, BH-897, long position.

Tower: BH-897, Tower, cleared to long position, runway 32.

EA-17: Tower, EA-17, long position.

Tower: EA-17, Tower, cleared to long position, runway 32, caution the C-130 taxiing into position.

0455 0292 EA-17: 17, wilco.

Tower: EA-17, when in long position and ready for takeoff, switch to base frequency please.

Tower: EA-17, Tower, did you copy?

EA-17: This is 17, did you say switch to approach?

Tower: EA-17, negative, switch to base frequency.

EA-17: EA-17, roger, base frequency.

EA-17: Tower, this is 17, are we VFR now?

0456 0293 Tower: EA-17, Tower, roger, VFR.

BH-897: Cherry Tower, BH-897 for takeoff.

Tower: BH-897, Tower, cleared for takeoff, runway 32.

0459 0296 BH-897: 897.

EA-17: Tower, 17's back up.

Tower: EA-17, roger.

EA-17: Tower, EA-17, clearance for takeoff.

Tower: EA-17, Tower, cleared for takeoff.

EC-05: Cherry Tower, EC-05, over.

0504 0301 Tower: Aircraft calling Cherry Point, say again please.

EC-05: This is EC-05, unable to contact Ground Control, request permission to taxi into long position for turnup and then into the hot pad area.

Tower: EC-05 cleared to long position runway 32.

EC-05: Roger.

CE-02: Tower, CE-02, clearance to long.

Tower: CE-02, taxi into long position, runway 32, caution the F-4 taxiing into long position.

CE-02: Roger.

0507 0304 Tower: CE-02, Tower, when in position, contact Departure 278.8.

Enclosure (72)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

A/C NO.	Bu. NO.	A/C TIME	DATE	A/C CONDITION IS.
RF4B	153113	41	19 JUL 1967	(Circle UP or DOWN) UP

B MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")

NO	DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED - PILOT FILL IN	START	F	S
1	X 6 AUX AIR DR. REMAINED OPEN WHEN OR RAISED AFTER T/O. CYCLED 6R 3 TIMES, NO EFFECT.		550	570
2	X O ₂ LEAK. USED O ₂ DOWN TO 3/4 LITER IN 40 MIN OF USAGE.			
		A/B		
		OIL QUANT	48	51
		F FLOWN-----Sec		
		O CONSUMED---Qts		

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PART

PRG (b) (6)

UNIT VMCJ-2

NO	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED - MAINTENANCE FILL IN	BY	TIME AND DATE
1	7200 - 057 Cycled Door 10 times & checked. Check Good with 4C turned up.		RAK/945/7200
2	7200 - 058 Replaced O ₂ Converter Pressure checked system.		2315 7200

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PART

INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE

ENCLOSURE (3) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)

*SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRAVINST 3750.6 series

A/C MODEL	S/N NO.	A/C TIME THIS FLIGHT	DATE	A/C CONDITION NO.
RF-4B	153113	2.0	19 July 67	(Circle UP or DOWN)
B MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")				
DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED—PILOT FILL IN				
1	X	No UHF TRANS in front cockpit OK in rear		START 542 540
2		Rear seat seat pan loose		RDT
				A/B
				OIL QUANT 54 95
				OIL CONSUM--Cts
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PART		PILOT'S SIGNATURE		UNIT
				J-8
NO	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED—MAINTENANCE FILL IN			BY TIME AND DATE
1	7200-024 Found UHF HF sw. in HF pos. Re-positioned to good			7200/7200
2	7200-025 Ant left stick clip in shroud			7230/7200
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PART		(b) (6)		(b) (6)

2 ENCLOSURE (3) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B.
BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)
*SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRVINST 3750.6 series

A/C NO.	Bu. NO.	A/C TIME THIS FLIGHT	DATE	A/C CONDITION IS:
RF-4B	153113		18 July 67	(Circle UP or DOWN) UP

B MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")

NO	DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED - PILOT FILL IN	START	STOP	OIL, OIL QUANT	RUN DOWN	OIL CONSUMPTION
1	ICS Control Panel in front Cockpit / Loose At / INEARD EDGE	6:30	6:50			
2	YAW STAB CONTINUED TO "KICK" FROM LEFT RUM AT ALTITUDE			49	50	
3	BAD OXYGEN LEAK - REAR SEAT, MIDDLE BLOCK. CHECK FUEL TANK					

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE

NO	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED - MAINTENANCE FILL IN	BY	TIME AND DATE
1	7199-046 - Secured Control Panel. Gold Brown		7/19/67
2	7199-047 TRIMMED Auto Pilot. V. Green		2100 / 7/19
3	7199-048 CHANGED REAR SEAT PAN. PRESS CHECKED OK BOTH FRONT & REAR.	SIM	2200 / 7/19

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE

INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE

3 ENCLOSURE (X) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B
BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b)(6)
*SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRVINST 3750.6 series

ENCLOSURE (4P) to VMC-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B, Name 13 July, Pilot: (b) (6)
*SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRVINST 3750.6 series

A/C MODEL RF-10		BU NO. 153113	A/C TIME THIS FLIGHT 2.3	DATE 18 JULY 67	A/C CONDITION IS: (Circle UP or DOWN) ↑
B MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")					
NO	I	DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED - PILOT FILL IN			P
1		STA 1 FOTO CAMERA FAIL AND FILM FAIL AFTER 5 EXP/IMID OPERATION			560 550
2		SUSPECT STAT #2 SHUTTER BROKEN			
3		RUDDER (YAW STAB KICKS AT ALT.			0 51 52 IN DOWN --- Soo IN UP --- Qts
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE					UNIT J-2
NO	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED - MAINTENANCE FILL IN			BY	TIME AND DATE
1	7199-044				
2	7199-045				
3	Repts to TCN 7199-047				
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE					INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE

5 ENCLOSURE (43) to WFL-2 AAR serial 1-682 occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B, BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)
 "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMINT 3750.6 series

A/C MODEL RF90	S/N NO. 153100	A/C TIME THIS FLIGHT 2.3	DATE 17 July 67	A/C CONDITION IS: (Circle UP or DOWN) UP
B MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")				
DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED - PILOT FILL IN				
1	CAMERA De Fog - WET			START 5:50:56
2	Gen Fail During Flight Recycled ON AFTER 5 MIN.			ROD
				OIL CONSUMPT 49 52
				RUNDOWN-----Sec
				OIL CONSUMPT-----Qts
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE				PILOT (b) (6) UNIT 11M53
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED - MAINTENANCE FILL IN				BY TIME AND DATE
1	7199-042			
2	7199-043 RAN A/c FOR 1HR. COULD NOT GET GEN TO MAKE FUNCTION			7199/21
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE				INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE

6 ENCLOSURE (13) to VJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
 Bufile 153113, Pilot: **(b) (6)**
 *SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMETHOD 3750.6 series

A/C NO. **RF-4E** BU NO. **153110** A/C TIME THIS FLIGHT **1.4** DATE **1-5 July** A/C CONDITION IS: **(UP)**
(Circle UP or DOWN)

B - MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")

NO	DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED - PILOT FILL IN	P	S
1	FLR - FAIL LIGHT REVR COMPT POSITION All other modes test good. However, NO GROUND RETURN IN A-7 POSITION - GMP or GME.	START	
2	FLR CAMERA - CAMERA WARN + GO BUS CIRCUIT BREAKER POPS EACH TIME FLR CAMERA TURNED ON		50 52
3	IR - FILM FAIL LIGHT BITS - 1-6 28.		

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PART

PILOT'S SIGNATURE

(b) (6)

UNIT **VMCJ**

NO	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED - MAINTENANCE FILL IN	TIME AND DATE
1	010	
	011	
	012 CHECKED ACCORDING TO NAVJAG INST. SYS. CHECKED OK.	0730/7128

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PART

INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE

7 ENCLOSURE (K) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)
"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRINST 3750.6 series

A/C NUMBER: 153113 A/C TIME THIS FLIGHT: 2.2 DATE: 12 July 67 A/C CONDITION: (Circle UP or DOWN) ☒ UP ☐ DOWN

B - MAINTENANCE (Mark GROUNDING discrepancies with an "X")

NO.	DISCREPANCY DESCRIPTION AND ITEMS TO BE CHECKED - PILOT FILL IN	START	STOP
1	X Altitude sticks even with legs show 500 ft/min decrease	550	520
2	Knob on floor switch loose		
3	FLR ↓		
		48	51

FUEL CONSUMPTION --- See
OIL CONSUMPTION --- Qts

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE

(b) (6)

Vinc-2

NO.	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED - MAINTENANCE FILL IN	BY	TIME AND DATE
1	7193-042 (210) installed per alt.		2309/7/73
2	7193-043 (220) tightened knob		0100/7/74
3	7193-044 (211) REMOVED, REPAIRED REINSTALLED RADIO TRANSMITTER		1620/7/74

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE OF THIS PAGE

INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE

10 ENCLOSURE (8) to VINC-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B, Bufile 157113, Pilot: (b) (6)

*SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMETHOD 3750.6 series

EXCERPTS FROM THE MAINTENANCE NIGHT CREW LOG BOOK - 6615 - WC-220 OPENED 7027

7193

CY-10 WENT OUT AACP FOR ALT FWD C/P REQ #6095
CY-10 AACP CAME IN 7193-042. INSTALLED SAME.

7194

CY-10 J. P. WOOD SWITCHES ALPS IN CY-10 BUT DID NOT SIGN IT OFF IN ANY
OF THE BOOKS. PLUS DID NOT MAKE UP MAFF. WE SIGNED IT OFF.
7194-048

ENCLOSURE (4) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RP-43,
BdNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OFFAVINUT 3750.6 Series

ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE CONTROL REGISTER
MMPC TEST FORM 16 (Rev. 11/64) 0140-001-0010

A. STATUS ①↓	B. JCN FAS 787 022	H. LOCATION	K. DISCREPANCY Dial Knob for INS comes off	L. CORRECTIVE ACTION Tightened Knob C3R	M. APP	N. DATE/TIME 1157 787
C. PRI 1 ② 3	D. BUONO/SIDE NO. 153113	I. WORK CENTERS 1 2 3				
E. DISC. D	F. EQUIP. AFPL	G. MAINT. B	J. TIME REPORTED			
A. STATUS ①↓	B. JCN PASH 192 010	H. LOCATION	K. DISCREPANCY Trailing Edge Flap Inod sticks when Flaps full down Checks good in 1/2 full up.	L. CORRECTIVE ACTION		
C. PRI 1 ② 3	D. BUONO/SIDE NO. 153113	I. WORK CENTERS 1 2 3				
E. DISC. D	F. EQUIP. AFPL	G. MAINT. B	J. TIME REPORTED			
A. STATUS ①↓	B. JCN FAS 7192 066	H. LOCATION	K. DISCREPANCY Yaw Kicks left to right at 30,000 ft .86 mach when stab Aug selected.	L. CORRECTIVE ACTION Trimmed Yaw w A/P. Kick out C3R		
C. PRI ① 2 3	D. BUONO/SIDE NO. 153113	I. WORK CENTERS 1 2 3				
E. DISC.	F. EQUIP. AFPL	G. MAINT. B	J. TIME REPORTED			
A. STATUS ①↓	B. JCN 7193 042	H. LOCATION	K. DISCREPANCY Alt F/C sticks at less than 500' decent per min.	L. CORRECTIVE ACTION w/press alt.		
C. PRI ① 2 3	D. BUONO/SIDE NO.	I. WORK CENTERS 1 2 3				
E. DISC.	F. EQUIP.	G. MAINT.	J. TIME REPORTED			
A. STATUS ①↓	B. JCN 7193 043	H. LOCATION	K. DISCREPANCY Flap Sw. Knob loose	L. CORRECTIVE ACTION Tightened Knob w/RB		
C. PRI 1 ② 3	D. BUONO/SIDE NO.	I. WORK CENTERS 1 2 3				
E. DISC.	F. EQUIP.	G. MAINT.	J. TIME REPORTED			

1. MAINTENANCE (57) TO WING-2 AIR SERIAL 1-684 OCCURRING 20 JULY 1967, 20-46,
20-153113, PILOT: NAME

ORIGINAL MAINTENANCE REGISTER IS ACCORDANCE WITH ORIGINATOR 3750.6 SERIAL

MMPC TEST FORM #7 (Rev. 11/64) 0140-001-0020

MMPC TEST FORM #7 (Rev. 11/64) 0140-001-0020

2. WILLIAM (G) to WV-2 AIR serial 1-22A covering 20 July 1967, 12-30, 1968-1969, Pilot: WV

FOOD, FUEL AND FIBER WITH EMPHASIS ON DOMESTIC RESOURCES

ENCLOSURE

NOV 13

1952

2

2

2

20 July

1952


1952






ENCLOSURE (4) TO WGC-2 PAR SERIAL T-88, OCCURRING
JULY 1967, AF-40, BUHQ 153113, PILOT (b)







WV-2 AIR 101-1-612

(b) (6)




ENCLOSURE () VMCJ-2 AAR series
BuNo 163113, Pilot: (b) (6)
"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED" in accordance with OPRV



RECOVERED () to VMEJ-2 AAR 10-12, 1000, occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
113, Pilot: (b) (6)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with 105-1050.6 series





HAS L... SENT

OG	DPO	PBO	MAG-8
CB	DEP	PBO	MAG-8
3S	INST	RPO	MAG-27
			MAG-14 W
22	1.2	TRK	MAG-24
38	MA	WPN	
24 W	WPN	FAH	OKS
ADJ	NAM	IK	DTST "B"
480	CB W		WPN
45	WPN	WPN	WPN

VZCZCAWA623
 RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA 601 2081335-EEEE--RUCILWA RUCILMA RUCILSA RUEBHB
 RUEOHA
 ZNY EEEE
 R 271335Z JUL 67
 FM MARCOMP RECON TWO
 TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
 INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
 ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
 RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
 RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
 RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
 RUEOHA/NATSF
 ZEN/MAR AIRGRU ONE FOUR
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O
 FAILURE / MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
 A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A
 B. BUWPS INST 4730.6
 1. REQ PDIR
 A. RF-4B 153113
 B. AUTO PILOT AMPLIFIER, SER NO UNKNOWN
 C. UNKNOWN
 D. AUTO PILOT AMPLIFIER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA 601 UNCLAS E F T O
 E. 2RG-6615-709-8395-BFXX/230E420G-1/UNK
 F. 89954
 G. NA
 H. AUTO PILOT AMPLIFIER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
 I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
 J. REQUEST INFO AS TO WHETHER AUTO PILOT WAS ENGAGED
 K. VMCJ-2

BT

JUL 27 7 45 PM



/ ENCLOSURE (56) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
 BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRAVINST 3700.6 Series

MAIN
HAS BEEN SENT

VZCZCANA622
RTTEZYIM RUEOAWA 600 208 1332-EEEE-RUCIL
RUEOHA.
ZNY EEEEE

R 271332Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMP CONRON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFDEN
RUEOHA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A
B. BUWPS INST 4730.6
1. REQ PDIR
A. RF-4B 153113
B. ANGLE OF ATTACK INDICATOR, SER. NO. UNKNOWN
C. UNKNOWN
D. ANGLE OF ATTACK INDICATOR SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA 600 UNCLAS E F T O
E. 2RH-6610-816-4998-BFCJ/SLZ-908 VUNK
F. 78423
G. NA
H. ANGLE OF ATTACK INDICATOR SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
J. REQUEST READING AT IMPACT
K. VMCJ-2

CG	DPO	PBO	MACB-8
CB	DEPT	PMO SA	HAES-8
3S	INST	RPO	WNSC-27
GJ	ISI	SA	MAG-14 W
G2	LR	TRIN	MAG-24
38	MA	WPN	
24 W	WPA	FAH	CFR-5
ADJ	NAM	YNE	DIST B
ABO	CBW		SUPO
45	NORMAL	SPECIAL	15

JUL 27 7 45 PM



2 ENCLOSURE (5) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
Bno 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRAVINIST 3750.6 Series

HAS BEEN SENT

CG	DPO	PPO	MAG-8
CS	DEPT	PPO	MAG-8
SSW	INST	RPO	MAG-27
GJ	4-2-6	SA	MAG-14W
G2	LA	TRK	MAG-24
G3	MA	WPN	
GA (W)	ME	RAH	WRS
ADJ	NAM	UB	DTST B
ASO	CBW		SUPD
45	NORMAL	SPECIAL	15

VZCZCWA624
RTTZYUW RUEOAWA 602 2081338-EEEE RUEOAWA
RUEOAWA
ZNY :EEEE
R 271330Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMP CON TWO
TO RUEILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUEILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBIB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUEILSA/NAVAIRNSAFCE
RUEOAWA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A

B. RUWLP INST 4730.6

1. REQ PDIR

A. RF-4B 153113

B. CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER SER NO 6

C. 7NOV66, OVERHAUL ACTIVITY UNKNOWN

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA 602 UNCLAS E F T O

D. CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER SUFFERED CRASH DNG

E. UNK/42400-101-1/7210

F. GARRETT CORP.

G. NA

H. CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67

J. NONE

K. VMCJ-2

BT



3 ENCLOSURE (56) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b)(6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMNAVINST 3750.6 Series

HAS BEEN SENT

OG	DPO	PBO	MAG-8
CB	DSP	PMD	HMS-2
SSU	UNSTB R	RPG	WISC-27
G1		SA	MAG-14 W
G2	LE	TRK	MAG-24
38	MA	WPN	
(W)	ME	RAH	QTR(S)
ADJ	NAM	50%	DIST "B"
ABC	CEW		SUPO
43	NORMAL	SPECIAL	45

3
17 7 41 PM

VZCZCWA625
 RTEZYUW RUEOAWA 603 2081327-EEEE- RUEOAWA
 RUEOAWA
 ZNY EEEEE
 R 271327Z JUL 67
 FM MAR COMPRECON TWO
 TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
 INFO ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
 ZEN/NAF CHERPT
 RUCILWA/COMNAVAIRLANT
 RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
 RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
 RUEOAWA/NATSF
 ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
 BT
 UNCLAS E F T O
 FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
 A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A
 B. BUWPS INST 4730.6
 1 REQ PDIR
 A. RF-4B 153113
 B. PILOTS ALTIMETER, SER NO UNKNOWN
 C. UNKNOWN
 D. PILOTS ALTIMETER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA 603 UNCLAS E F T O
 L. 2RQ-6610-895-3854-VAPX/MS25450-VUNK
 F. 97424
 G. NA
 H. PILOTS ALTIMETER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
 I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
 J. REQUEST ALTITUDE AT IMPACT AND ANY POSSIBILITY OF ERRORS
 K. VMCJ-2
 BT



4 ENCLOSURE (56) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
 BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b) (6)
 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

HAS BEEN SENT

08	DPO	PBO	MAG-8
08	DEP	PBO	MAG-8
88	INST	BPO	MAG-27
03	SE	S&C	MAG-14W
02	PLUM	PLUM	MAG-84
08	MA	WPN	
04	ME	BAR	QIR (S)
ADJ	NAM	SUE	DIST "B"
ABO	CEK W		SUPO
45	NORMAL	SPECIAL	15

3

VZCZ CAAW627
 RTT2 YUW RUEOAWA 604 2081325-EEEE--RUCIL
 RUEOAWA
 ZNY FLEE
 K 271325Z JUL 67
 FM MAR COMPRE CONRON TWO
 TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
 INFO ZEN/NARF CHER PT
 ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
 RUCILMA/COMNAVIARLANT
 RUEDBIB/NAVAIRYSYCOMHQ
 RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
 RUEOAWA/NATSF
 ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O
 FAILURE/MAL FUNCTION INVESTIGATION
 A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A
 B. BUWPS INST 4730.6
 C. REQ PDIR
 A. RU-40 153113
 B. ANGLE OF ATTACK TRANSMITTER, SER. 1, HLG 107
 C. OVERHAUL TAG ILLEGIBLE
 D. ANGLE OF ATTACK TRANSMITTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

JUL 17 8 01 PM

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA 604 UNCLAS E F T O

- E. UNK/SLZ91708/BGL-107
- F. 10639/UNK
- G. NA
- H. ANGLE OF ATTACK TRANSMITTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
- I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
- J. REQUEST INFO AS TO POSITION OF TRANSMITTER ANGLE AT IMP
- K. VMCJ-2



5 ENCLOSURE (6) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
 BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b)(6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPRVINST 3750.6 Series

Manit

15 JUL 67 20 28 13Z

VZCZCAWAS 04

RTTLZYUW RUEOAWA 490 2071250-EEEE--RUCILWA RUCILMA RUEDBHB RUEOAWA

RUEOAWA

ZNY EEEEE

2 261250Z JULY 67

FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO

TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT

NFO ZEN/CG SECOND MAW

ZEN/NARF CHLRPT

RUCILWA/COMNAVAIRLANT

RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ

RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE

RUEOAWA/NATSF

ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

ZEN/MARHAMRON ONE FOUR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. BWFRLANT INST 4730.17A

B. BUWEP5 INST 4730.6

1. REQ PDIR

A. RF-4B 153113

B. J79GE88, PORT #421070 J79GE88, STB #421330

C. 283, NAS NORIS 283, NAS NORIS

D. ENGINES SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

E. NA

CG	DPO	FWD	MAG-2
CS	DEPT	FWD	HAMS-2
SS U U	INST	WPO	WWSG-27
G2	ISG	300	MAG-14 W
G2	LEA	TRNG	MAG-24
G3 W	MAI	WPN	NARF S
G4 W	MEI	RAHS	
ADJ	NAM	300	DIST "B"
ABO W	CHC		SUPO
53	NOMM	SPECIAL	8 15

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA

F. GENERAL ELECTRIC

G. NA

H. ENGINES SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE AND HAVE F.O.D.

I. VMCJ-2 MSG 20 1530Z JULY 67

J. DESIRE INFO AS TO WHAT CAUSED F.O.D., WHAT POWER SETTINGS WERE UTILIZED AT IMPACT, AND DID ENGINES HAVE COMPRESSOR STALL PRIOR TO IMPACT

K. VMCJ-2/HMS-24

BT

JUL 20 77 28 13Z

WEAT
F.C.A.S

2012 1508

ENCLOSURE (5) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B, BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b)(6).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with COMNAVANT 3750.6 Series

VZCZCWA116

PTTEZYUW RUEOAWA 232 2851735-EEEE--RUCILWA RUCILMA RUCILBA RUCILCA RUCILDA RUCILE RUCILF RUCILG RUCILH RUCILJ RUCILK RUCILM RUCILN RUCILO RUCILP RUCILQ RUCILR RUCILS RUCILT RUCILU RUCILV RUCILW RUCILX RUCILY RUCILZ

RUEOHRA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 24 1735Z JUL 67

FM MAR COMPRECONRON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT

INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT

ZEN/CG SECOND MAW

RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT

RUCILMA/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ

RUCILSA/NAVAIRSAFCEN

RUEOHRA/NATSF

ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. BWFRRLANT INST 4738.17A

B. BUWPS INST 4738.6

1. REQ CHEM ANAL

A. RF-4B 153113

B. NA

C. NA

D. OXYGEN MASK

CS	DPO	PBO	MAG-8
CS	DPO	PBO	MAG-8
SS	NS	RPO	MAG-27
GJ		SA	MAG-14 W
GZ		SA	MAG-24
G3 W	MA	WPN	MAG-24 (S)
QW	WPN	BAR	
ADJ	NAM	DE	0187 "B"
ABW	CB		9000
82	W	SPECIAL	15

1

JUN 74 4 29 PM

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA

UNCLAS E F T O

E. RM1668-761-1613-LA28, MS22881, NA

F. 96986, N383-98721A

G. NA

H. MASK WORN BY PILOT IN ACFT ACCIDENT

I. VMCJ-2 MSG 281538Z JUL 67

J. MASK CONTAINS FOREIGN MATTER

K. VMCJ-2

BT

241735Z

7 ENCLOSURE (56) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B, BuNo 153113, Pilot: (b)(6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT AND INTERVIEWS OF CAPTAIN (b) (6) (PILOT), (b) (6) USMC
concerning RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967.

INITIAL STATEMENT AND INTERVIEW MADE ON 22 JULY 1967. INTERVIEW BY CAPTAIN
(b) (6) USMC AND LIEUTENANT (b) (6) (MC)
USN. BOTH MEMBERS OF THE AAR BOARD. (TRANSCRIPT OF TAPES RECORDING)

The following is my statement about the crash of Marine Charlie Yankee
One Zero an RF-4B at approximately 0452G at Cherry Point.

I came into work just about five minutes after three o'clock to brief
with Captain (b) (6) who was to fly the A-6 on Wineleaf flight 9-1 and Wine-
leaf flight 9-2. After we briefed the mission we each ran our own individual
crew briefs, which for my hop wound up mostly going over ejection procedures
if we needed them, and what ever crew coordination we were going to use on
radios, etc. After we finished briefing, we hung around the ready room for
about 10 to 15 minutes and walked down to the airplane at about 10 minutes
to four. Went into flight equipment and put all our gear on, I had all my
gear on that was issued except for the "G" suit because we weren't going
to pull any "G's". And at that time I believe that Lieutenant (b) (6)
had all his gear, however, I found out later he had had his gloves in the
cockpit, but was not wearing them. After we suited up we walked out to
the flight line, signed for the aircraft, and commented on the one gripe,
that on the previous hop Captain (b) (6) had had three ox air door lights and
that it had checked out O.K. on the ground; so we figured we best keep an
eye on it after we brought the gear up. Wandered on out to the airplane
waited around to get started, got started finally, after we got started we
got the word from the A-6 that their aircraft was down and they were going
to try to get an F-10, so we pulled out of the chocks and went out to the
fuel pits and sat in the fuel pits taking on a full bag of gas; we were
about down to 1100, negative 11,000 pounds internal. When, after we finished
topping off in the pits, we got the word over the radio that Charlie Yankee -
I believe it was two three - the A-6 would not be going and there were no
F-10's. So I decided to go on ahead anyway even though we couldn't jam, at
least we could fly the mission track as briefed and I could fly the first
part of track up to the first IP fast in order to get there at the IP on
time. So we called ground control for taxi with our Charlie Yankee number
and found out that the local flight plan had been filed under our Wineleaf
numbers, so we then picked up the call sign even with the field of Wineleaf
9-2. Taxied out after receiving clearance and in the long position we were
switched over to departure control because the field at that time had been
IFR but they said the field's now VFR, and so I rogered and said I would
launch VFR but desired to keep my block time - to keep my clearance, so they
read me off the clearance, clearing me to the Bennett intersection. I believe
the time I had to contact them was 0650G. No, it was 1050G. 1050Z. They
gave me Zulu time to contact them to pick up my penetration, and I rogered
it. We then switched back to tower frequency, got back up on tower frequency
and we ran through the pre-takeoff checks. Ran up the right engine first,

1 Enclosure (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVINST 3750.6 Series

read off my oil pressure and my fuel flow on cutback to the RO, and then I had an idea I was hot mike - once we started up the engine we went on hot mike. Ran up the left engine, read the oil pressure to the RO and pulled the power back to check the idle flow, idle cutoff fuel flow, and then I turned the three aux tabs on and put the flaps down to one half, and then read through the cockpit takeoff check off list with the controls free, and I wiped the cockpit out with my stick and there was no binding. Then wings down and locked - there were no pins. Insured all the lights were out, told him that my harness, no that the yaw, roll and pitch were on, my harness was locked. Let's see, there was a couple of other things. The hook was up. My safety pin was out. To check his safety pin out, and his alternate ejection handle - where ever he desired it. And he rogered and said yes, he was ready to go - his pin was out. So I called tower and got clearance to roll and went to 30 percent, let go the brakes, pushed up to 100 percent and waited until the temperatures reached set. If I remember right the left engine was reading 630 on reset, and the right one was reading 625. At this time I let go of the nose wheel steering and selected burner on both engines and burners lit normally. Good light off. Good roll. Airplane rolled just about as far as she normally would and we were airborne. Brought the gear up and started the flaps up at 180. And I went - I went and ducked under one small cloud that was sitting on the end of the runway. I was showing about 700 feet indicated, I say after about a mile from the field still exclaiming it. We had come out of burner at this time - if I remember right. We were still exclaiming. The master caution light came on. And so I started to put my head down to look at the telelight panel and as near as I can tell, I was just a bunch of fire in the cockpit. What I think it was - was my oxygen mask at the mini reg might have come loose. And I had a fire, and from then on it is pretty confused. I remember a bunch of yellow light and all that and I remember trying to exhale all the time I couldn't talk to (b) (6), I don't know why. I was trying to exhale to keep the fire out of my lungs. And I saw the altimeter unwind 200 feet. And so I figured - well I screwed it up this time. It's not, we are going to crash. About then I felt a jar and heard an explosion, and I figured well at least (b) (6) got out of it; then we hit some trees and I don't remember too much more except I reached up - I think after we hit the ground and were skidding, and pulled the face curtain. The reason I say I think it was after I hit the ground because one corner of the face curtain was already out. At this time I could just barely see out of one eye and figured what the hell I've always been late - I might - my Martin-Baker seat might get me out of it anyway might, as, well burn to death in the - get crushed to death on the jump out - as burn to death so I reached up and pulled the handle and I heard all of a sudden a "whoosh". like well - I heard the bang and I went out and I did the normal tumble the pictures show for Martin Baker and felt the chute open up and could hear a "ssss" like oxygen. And I was still burning pretty good. My face was having something played on it, it felt like, and it was burning and parts of my flight gear were burning and about this time, hell, it couldn't been more than a second, I settled

2 Enclosure (7)

into what felt like a tree - or something - and hit the ground, (b) (6)

(b) (6). Then I remember a good sharp pain (b) (6) but, that could have been hit or done when I left the seat, cause I probably wasn't in a very good ejection position. I was still burning so I tried to roll it out and I couldn't because I couldn't get all the way down to the ground. So I got my koch fittings - got out of them - and floundered around and got rid of my scott seat pan. After I got rid of that I got the fire out pretty readily. Whatever it was that was feeding it was either on it or could have been - I don't know. After getting the fire out I dragged my scott seat pan over a little bit out of the fire. And I couldn't see anything so I couldn't move very much. But I found out I was still alive and I could yell and had a pretty good set of hands. So I yelled a couple of times to see if (b) (6) had gotten out. I don't remember hearing anything, so I said well "Pretty Wet". So I got the seat pan and opened it and blew up my life raft and flipped it inverted and sat on it so I could be as far out of the air - off the ground as possible, and started yelling for (b) (6) again. And he answered up. He said he was about 100 yards away or so, his voice sounded closer than that, that came out later he was. And he said he was trapped in his gear, and I asked why and he said (b) (6)

(b) (6). And so I started giving him a hand. It is about getting out of the koch fittings and finally convinced him that he could get out of them. And he got out of them all right by just using the heel of his hand. And then he was still tangled up and said he couldn't work the rocket jets, so I told him to get out of his harness - to worry away at that buckle - and then he could probably step out of the harness and leave all that crap over there - and he did. While this was going on too, we heard some airplanes going over, we didn't know if they could have seen us or not. We heard a couple of - what sounded like the drop tanks explode, and I yelled each time to go ahead and cover your head in case anything falls this way but nothing did. They were good loud bangs - just like secondary explosions. And I shot off a night flare, then I - then I shot off two pencil rocket flares and nothing happened, and I turned on my little strobe light that I had on my survival vest. And with that (b) (6) could see me and he came over to where I was and we talked things over. See how it was and we realized we were actually not in the worst shape cause, although (b) (6)

(b) (6), so between us we had about the normal equipment for one person. And so we got things kinda squared away; we forgot about the radios, which was a foolish error on our part, and the sun (or bugs) started to come out and so I wanted to go over and get his parachute to try to protect (b) (6) from the dirt and (b) (6) as much from the dirt as possible. And he said it was all tangled up and said we couldn't get it but I told him to lead me over. I held on the - the strap of his flight suit and he walked ahead of me and I kinda buried my face right along side his back and he'd tell me when there was a branch or something in the way. We got over there and I pulled out my survival knife after I got my hands on the canopy and worked down to the shroud lines and cut all the shroud lines off and then I disconnected his harness and everything from the scott seat pan. And then I grabbed on to him again and found I couldn't hold on to both the seat pan and the parachute or the canopy while he was leading me so I left the seat kit there, he said he could kick it over.

2

J Enclosure (57)

And so he took me back over to where the rafts were and we set down the canopy and he went back to bring the seat pan over and he kicked it along through the woods pretty good. We got it over there. We opened it up and I blew up the other life raft - this gave both of us a place to sit - and gave me a real good - the way his was laid was better for me - it was better for me, it was a little more full of CO2 - to blow it up, and it was a little bit of a down grade. So when I started feeling faint I would lay down on it with my head down-hill and my feet in the air. After about five minutes like that I would be able to work pretty good again for a while. About this time (b) (6) wanted to take off and go get help and I said no, probably someone had seen us go in or they had seen the explosion, as it was still pretty foggy out. He could - airplanes were going right overhead and he couldn't see them - that there wasn't much point going wandering for help until we could see a little better. So he helped me - he'd tell me where the flares were. And I got the flares out, so I had a stock of flares, and I already kept my pen gun, I'd put that in my flight suit pocket with my extra pen flares so I wouldn't lose it. And he helped me sort out that. I had all the flares and pen guns and stuff that I needed and it started to get lighter and we saw one F - or I didn't - but he saw one F9 go by overhead but it was still pretty low and we heard what I thought was a C-117 one time, and finally about 0830 I gave (b) (6) permission to go ahead, "and don't get tangled in the swamp, if you hit swamp turn around, come back, but if you could make it otherwise, go ahead". And he took off and I heard him yell about 5 minutes later - he had hit the swamp in the direction he had started in - but he was going to take a little path he had found and veer around, so I figured if he was on a path he was possibly pretty good. So, go ahead be my guest. And I just laid there to wait. I was wrapped up in a parachute part of the time and when the - and mosquitos got bad I'd put it over my face and just hold it there till they would go away. I thought I heard a helicopter coming, and so I crawled out from underneath everything, and when it got pretty close I lit off a couple orange smoke bombs and they didn't seem to do any good. So I'd wait till the helicopter - I could hear him going out just about across from me and turn - as he would turn I would fire one of these pencil flares. I think two of them bounced off the trees and came back down, but two or three of them must have got up through, cause, as, that is what the helicopter rescue crewmen said the first thing they saw was that flare. Then I heard the chopper sit down, sounded like - oh - a quarter mile away or so, and shut down. And I started, yelling, and they started yelling back to me, and pretty soon the pilot of the chopper - I think it was (b) (6) was his name - and a couple of his crewmen got there to me and I said I could walk out if they would lead me. They said no, "We're going to Stokes you and either lift you out of here or carry you out." We finally decided to go out to carry me out in a Stokes stretcher because going up those tree branches would only hurt my face more. And so I laid down on top the poncho, - ah, not the poncho, - on the flight raft for a while and they offered me a smoke but I don't smoke that much, my lips hurt, said "No, I'd like a drink of water", and I got one of those. And then I got to the chopper and we just talked back and forth about - just shooting the breeze until they got the Stokes back and they took me out. They cut a small piece of parachute off so I could hold it

3

Enclosure (57)

over my head and we, I, just got carried out. Pretty smooth ride - the guys that were carrying me really did a good job. Got out to the chopper, two of them dropped off and hit the road - went up and started up the helicopter, and they put me in and gave me a blanket and tried to keep me as warm as they could and flew me on back to Cherry Point. Took only about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 minutes and boy I don't think they even shut the chopper down before they had me in the ambulance. That's about all. I think everybody knows about it from then on. I do know that my helmet - when I took it off on the ground - it felt to me like it was blistered pretty bad. But the thing that I remember the most - it was even while I was airborne - was all the yellow flames. And, I guess it probably distracted me a little bit. That's about all I remember.

INITIAL INTERVIEW

(b) (6)

I got, ah, can you remember out on the long position did you hit your elapse time switch before you started to roll?

No, I did not.

Did not?

Did not.

All right, you say you got a master caution light?

Yea.

Do you remember on the telepanel, anything that came on?

Ah, that's what I was looking for when I got the flames.

Yea.

So, I didn't have time to look I was too busy battling things around.

O.K. You say you pushed over, you were trying to stay VFR, John, is that what you -----?

Yea, there was a patch of fog out there, and I pushed about 5-700 feet and was going to scoot under it. I could see the black and fog where it was clear.

O.K. Did you feel a rush of wind in your face about this time, just before you got the flash?

Yea, Yea it was -----

6 Enclosure (67)

(b) (6)

A real gust of wind in your -----

It was like a directional hose - you know when you blow out through it, or the air hose you can pump up your tires of the bike and stuff, you pump it at your face - it felt about like that.

Uh uh. Did you see, ah, you say a yellow light, you think that was flames coming in?

I don't know, it was - it burned I know that - I think it was flames.

Yea.

Cause it closed up, Oh, I wasn't wearing my visor down because I didn't have my F2 helmet, I didn't take the night helmet cause I knew we would be flying about dawn and I'd want that visor for up at altitude to keep the sun out, cause you're flying directly into the sun. But if I'd had the clear visor, (b) (6)

(b) (6) - I was - I don't think I was airborne much after that flame started - then (b) (6), and I couldn't talk to (b) (6) and I couldn't hear him either, so I think my mike or something may have disconnected, or I don't - I don't know. I just tried to fly it as long as I could to give him a fighting chance.

Uh, well you don't have any idea about what altitude you punched out do you?

I'm pretty sure I was on the ground. I remember hearing a lot of cracking and ripping and I don't know. I think I was on the ground when I punched out cause I said the face curtain was partly down, and there was - was so smoky. (b) (6)

(b) (6), and after I reached up I saw the face curtain dangling a little bit, then I reached up and pulled it with both hands and got out of there. I figured I was probably going to die anyway, I might as well go big.

You're too tough to die, (b) (6). Ah, well let me see, you didn't try your radio, UHF radio. They were both - we found them both -----?

Yes, I tried the UHF radio first before I put the PRT-3 on. I used the URC-10 first because I felt the PRT would drown it out. Once I turned it on, but I couldn't raise anybody on it, after about 10 minutes. I said, "Well screw it", and turned on the PRT-3, and I knew that radio was working good cause I could listen to it on the URC-10.

6 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

You could hear the beeper?

Yea. The rescue people said the beeper helped them a lot getting in there, they honed the beeper.

Well that is something else we can -----

I had (b) (6) put it up in a tree so I could get that antenna up as high as possible.

Yea, (b) (6) as far as I'm concerned that is about all. I don't know if Doctor (b) (6) wants to ask you any questions about your flight gear or anything like that. Go ahead and take it.

O.K.

O.K. Had your --- You say you had your shaded visor?

Yes, I had it.

What Position?

It was up, you can't see in the dark with it.

And your mask was on?

Yes, it was on.

Was it locked tight, was there any leaks that you know of?

There were no leaks around it as far as I know. There's one place on it, if you found it, where the sponge - you know, liner in there was a little bent down, but that always bends down on my masks because of the way my nose is shaped. But it didn't leak out of there.

And you thought at one time after the master caution light came on, when you turned your head to the left, that the hose came off?

Something came loose.

Uhuh. Did it seem to come off with the mini reg. air hose?

I don't know - I don't think the mask came off, but I think the hose came - the thing came off either at the minireg or below it.

7 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

Was this about the same time you got the gust of wind in your face?

Yea, Yea, and this could have been true too, because I always hook my oxygen mask through my Mark 30 and the top one in the F4, because I don't like a whole bunch of junk just dragging around the cockpit. So it would have stayed with me for awhile.

You had your gloves on, and you had one small hole in your left forefinger, right forefinger?

Yea, it was a little slit, and I had the sleeves of my flight suit rolled up one turn, because I had a rip in the flight suit, but I couldn't survey the flight suit - either one of mine - cause they didn't have any that fit and nothing smaller than a 44. And ---

How much of your arm was exposed?

I'd say (b) (6) above the gloves, about 2 or 3 inches, (b) (6) (b) (6), what I can feel - like with my hands, that's about how much was exposed. - And the knees, I think the knees probably both ripped out (b) (6), but as I said the flight suits, I have been trying to survey them for about two or three weeks and just don't have any in stock. I've put in a bitch with the Wing and the Group safety officer on it, and they said they were going to do what they can because there are other guys in J flying with unsatisfactory flight suits too.

You know those flight gloves, you have the new type?

Yea, they worked real good.

Yea, they sure did. They were scorched a little bit but they're not burned through.

One little slit on this finger (b) (6) and that was the only one.

I think that is where the material came loose from the leather and -----

That could be it. It could have melted it off.

I think we could write up a real good survey on those.

Yea.

f Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

Good study.

Remember -----

Yea, I was real happy beca-- just to put in something else, those gloves, I think they were a lot better than the leather ones, cause they are always skin tight so you don't have anything extra to grab on when you got a fire; they didn't begin to shrink they just stayed the same size so I had full use of my hands all the time.

Do you remember the initial injury (b) (6)

(b) (6) do you remember being struck by anything?

No (b) (6), I remember being able to (b) (6)

(b) (6) and I saw the ejection face handle-----

This your (b) (6)

The (b) (6) I don't know - (b) (6)
before I ----- and I just remember doing the tumble in the air and saying well I got a bunch of parachute jumps. It should open about now and by God it did. That's about all. And once I got to the ground.

When did you originally -----?

I don't remember.

(b) (6), er, when did your (b) (6)

While I was in the air.

Yea. I know, but was this right after the master caution light came on

I can't say for sure (b) (6). I just remember I looked for it, and I didn't get a full scan going on it, because I had this flame, it seemed to be flame, and yellow light in the cockpit and from then on I was working so much other things than the master caution light. if I could have yelled eject I probably - I would have done it and then gone out too but -----

But you can't remember anything on the telepanel coming on with the master -----?

No, No I can't

Did your mask remain on? - until -----

Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

Oh, when I was on the ground I didn't have a mask (b) (6), I didn't have a mask. But I could feel the stub of my oxygen hose, it felt like a stub, that's when I first figured well maybe that's where that fire came from. Cause I always put the mask on in the P4 tight

But you didn't tear the mask away after the fire -----?

No. No, I never did.

Do you remember injuring (b) (6), being struck by something (b) (6)?

Ah, No, I remember hitting a few things on the way down and stuff, but nothing specific.

Well, (b) (6) that's all I got 'Ole Buddy' I thank ya, I'm sure that the Skipper said he's coming down.

10 Enclosure (57)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

The following questions were submitted to the AMB on 21 July 1967
by (b) (6)

QUESTION:

(b) (6)

ANSWER:

QUESTION: Was your MK-3C hose through your torso harness chest strap?

ANSWER: Negative.

QUESTION: Were you on hot mike?

ANSWER: We were on hot mike all the time.

QUESTION: Did you look at the mini-rig after you saw the flame?

ANSWER: No I did not.

QUESTION: Do you remember coming out of burner?

ANSWER: Yes I was out of burner and did not go back into burner.

QUESTION: How did you get your oxygen mask off?

ANSWER: I remember seeing a ball of flame and clawing at my mask.

QUESTION: What was the position of your ejection seat?

ANSWER: It was bottomed out.

QUESTION: How do you normally release your oxygen mask?

ANSWER: I normally take of the left side first and then the right.

QUESTION: Do you know how the oxygen ignited?

ANSWER: No, I have no idea. I did not notice any unusual odors.

QUESTION: What did you do when you noticed the master caution light?

ANSWER: Nothing.

QUESTION: Did you see any lights on the teletype panel?

//Enclosure (57)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPM/AVIANT 3750.6 Series

ANSWER: No I did not.

QUESTION: What was your altitude after you saw the flames?

ANSWER: I momentarily opened my eye and saw the altimeter reading 200 feet.

QUESTION: What was your altitude when you went under the clouds?

ANSWER: Between 500 to 700 feet.

QUESTION: Which did you see first, the master caution light or the flames?

ANSWER. I saw the master caution light first.

12 Enclosure (57)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

Interview made on 25 July 1967. Interview by MAJOR (b) (6)
(b) (6) USMC the ACO member of the AAR Board and LIUTENANT COMMANDER
(b) (6) USN, a safety center representative. (TRANSCRIPT OF
TAPE RECORDING)

(b) (6) O.K. Then the (garbled) went ahead and called it VFR?

Right, they were calling the field VFR.

You, you take off pretty much normal, (b) (6)?

Yea, my standard takeoff, hot mike - well before the roll I run the engines up.

Yea.

Pretty well, ah—

Gotcha

Turn on the AUX STAR and drop my flaps.

All right.

One half.

Fine.

Then I start at the top of the list on hot mike and read everything off to the Ro.

Right.

And then of course all three AUX STARS switch on, yaw, pitch and roll are on, when I can I check my harness locked - checked - ask RO if he checked his harness and if ready to go. After he checked those too he says ready. I'll call the tower and ask for clearance to takeoff. When I get about 80% in each engine, let go the brakes, come up to 100%. When the engines reset - you know not overshift to 700 degrees - come back to about 630 on one and 625 on the left engine.

Yea.

I go ahead, ah (garbled) come off nose wheel steering at about 68 knots by that time you got rudder control pretty good.

After you picked up your gear did you notice any, ah, ah, anything at all unusual like wing rock or, ah, ah, explosions or anything outside the airplane?

13 Enclosure (2)

No, it was just pretty normal. Picked up the gear at 180 knots started my flaps up.

Sure.

And then just flattened out a little bit. I had between 5 to 700 feet on the altimeter, there was one little patch of clouds at the end of the runway, you could see underneath the thing. It wasn't very big.

Uhuh.

And sometime, just as I passed under that cloud is when that caution light first come on. It is the first time I saw it. It may have come on sooner, I can't say, cause I was on night takeoff and paid pretty much attention to airspeed and altitude, keep my wings level, and I don't sweat caution lights too much until I'm well airborne, and-----

How much underneath this cloud did you, ah, ah,

I figure we'd flown a couple hundred yards (garbled).

Below it?

Quarter mile.

Under the cloud.

Yea, just a patch, nothing to worry about because I had a good altimeter - at least I thought - I know I did, and I flew VFR.

O.K. now do you remember passing the glaucum creek?

No.

O.K. How soon after you ducked underneath this cloud did you notice the ball of fire?

When I looked at the master caution light, I started to turn my head to look down - to look down at the telelight panel.

Right.

That's on the left side.

Then all of sudden your cockpit was just full of fire?

14 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

Well, it was just a flame, just about here coming up, I could hear a "pood" and I didn't even know what it was, and I didn't know. I think what happened, my mini-reg might have come off my damn mask.

O.K.

You see I take my hop-----

But you did look at it, right?

Well, no, (b) (6)

O.K. let me ask you this. Then what, ah, did you feel any jolt on the airplane prior to the master caution coming on or the -----

No.

O.K.

We were flying just smooth as could be.

O.K. now let me go ahead.

After the flame came up you see (b) (6) I finally got the altimeter sighted and it was still going down it was about 200 feet starting down you know it was unwinding but not very fast at all and I guess I just - I think I tried to zoom it I don't know I just didn't get in fast enough. I was waiting for the guy in back cause I couldn't talk to him to see the fire and get out so I could get out cause I always said I would wait for that guy.

Well ah, (b) (6) ah, says he saw the flame. He pulled the primary ejection thing. Has somebody told you this before?

My wife said he saw flames going around my head.

O.K. he pulled his ejection curtain. The canopy went but then ah, the seat didn't go.

He didn't pull it far enough, did he?

/5Enclosure (57)

(b) (5)

That's right, so he went to his alternate ejection. He had the guard up but couldn't find it. Anyway, went back to the ah, primary pulled it and out he went so his canopy was quite a bit away ah back down the flight path. Now if you'll let me draw you a mental picture if you will you're taking off on three-two right past Lucky Lodge across Slocum. Is the magazine area, O.K. Right there in the magazine area you hit the tops of some trees O.K. Ah, there's a piece of canopy we picked up, it's either the left forward wind screen or the left side of the canopy, O.K. Also in the trees you tore off the right external tank. The right main wing tank exploded also at the same time O.K. This canopy does not have any, ah, scars or anything on it, in other words fire burn or anything like that; your nose cone is there O.K. At that point and a few other assorted things ah you knocked over, you broke off, a couple pretty good sized trees.

That figures.

And ah then the ah fire started after that because there is a burn pattern from this magazine area out, what did you get about a hundred feet. Now every piece of aircraft that's beginning to shed half that over to Turner or Tucker Creek-----

Ha, boy quite a hell of a long ways isn't it!

Yea, wait a minute were not through. Over towards Tucker Creek. The pieces are now burnt, so, somewhere from hitting that tree where the parts are shed we come into the burn area then we go back up again in the air across Tucker Creek. We come back into the trees again, these pieces that are falling off there by the broken trees are burned then we come back up into the air again and you guys must have ejected on top of that third or second bounce because the airplane came back down into the trees again at a thirty degree angle; so apparently, skipped up in the air, caught on fire, skipped into the trees. You guys ejected and landed fairly close to the airplane. How do you recall seeing your airplane while you were in there?

Ah we were-----

Were you around the airplane at all or could you not see at all?

Heard a couple of explosions about 3 or 4. No it wasn't 10 minutes after I hit the ground from the chute cause I told (b) (6) to cover his head.

16 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

O.K. the one was the right wheel well which the tire finally let go, blew the top of the wing off and you guys were roughly about 75 feet, 100 feet from the airplane. Right. And you and (b) (6) were about what a hundred feet apart?

Pretty close.

Yea, more than that 50 feet.

About that.

Yea. O.K. but both of you were close to the final resting place, final impact point which was quite away from the other side of Tuckers Creek. What is the measured distance from the opposite bank flight path to the final resting place? You recall what the distance of that was (b) (6)?

It's 500 feet.

Ah, this much I know (b) (6) ah, don't let me interrupt you, from the time I had the fire in the cockpit I know I thought it was the left side of the - I know it hit something with that side and went back up into the air.

O.K. that's right. It hit a tree.

I was still waiting for the bang of his ejection seat cause he got the hell out cause I couldn't talk to him and I couldn't get this hand over to push the button.

O.K. now, does this sound, would this sound logical to you that, ah, the tree knocked off your, ah, left engine cowl, you know the part you preflight right on the outside. Right, you know where the ramp is with the 26 hundred holes are. It knocked off the out rig of that, broke either your left forward windscreen or a piece of the canopy. On this side it came right on through and whapped you in the eye and cut your oxygen mike cords and knocked your oxygen mask off.

I don't think so.

O.K. Why not?

Cause it was, that would have been cold, you see, I think, and this was hot, I know it was hot. Really now I don't know.

Well, think about that.

17 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

Well, the reason I say I'm sure, I don't think it was anyway cause up until the time. Put it this way, I don't know how high the trees are at Cherry Point, but I had a good solid 500 feet. That's my base at night if I don't break out I'll go IFR and not level off before then. On something like a patch of clouds I leveled off and we were pretty well trimmed up. The plane was flying itself, just accelerating out towards climb speed and now I got the Master Caution and looked down all this stuff when I looked down like this the fire caught me right across here which would be the right side. (b) (6)

(b) (6). I don't think so because it was some time after that now whether one second or two seconds - ten seconds I don't know that I saw the altimeter unwinding past 200 feet but the plane was still flying cause I could feel it in the stick. I still had stick control.

Did you have any pressure on the stick?

Yes, and this is when I felt it tip something for the first time this time right there. That's when I had to figure in a hurry. It hit I knew I had lost the airplane right there. I was just waiting for him to go.

So, you hit three separate times which you were in it twice you---

I remember, I remember hitting twice (b) (6) This time then Jezze, a whole bunch of colorful noisy ones and that's when I punched out. The curtain itself was out about when I (b) (6) to force my hands up there it was hanging, this side was hooked in and this side, this side was hanging down just a little bit loose and flapping and that's the time I got out. I didn't - I thought I was on the ground but I know that - I remember hitting twice and after the second was when I got out cause I heard the bang from the back seat. This is pretty distinctive there

Well, you guys were actually close enough to the darn airplane to ejected after hitting the third time, but it doesn't quite seem like it. I don't think you rode through the, ah, through the second-way back there.

Well, I hit twice and the airplane bounced.

That first strike in the trees there - its very possible that you hit so close to the top, it's very possible that you might have not even known it. I ah, just the tank is gone the right drop and it sort of hung on for a while and gradually more of it came off.

We traced down your oxygen system where it's got the motors and all that stuff going over to, ah, this DDU that we'll get back in here some and -----

(1) Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

And the motors were good (b) (6), there was nothing wrong with them.

Yea.

I got all four stages of burner, it came out of burner properly (garbled) the motors are good.

Yea, well of course just for the heck of it you always got to send your engines to DIR I think don't you? What did they tell you at school?

Well, if they were good you didn't have to.

Oh, really.

Both motors were good (garbled).

Well I didn't think so either, especially the right one.

It was either me or the or what happened around here. Either my hands gone-or my mind's convinced it was pilot error or something like that fire, those are the two reasons.

Yea, I can't, I can't find a cause (b) (6) and that's why I was getting so anxious to come down and talk to you, I can't figure out the fire, if it happened before you hit the trees. I can put it together, if you hit the trees, caught on fire, bounced up into the air again, cause this-----

Oh yea, that would fit together.

This is where the parts are shed, the first parts we have are not even burned. Plus the pieces of canopy are, there isn't a scar on them, and then right afterwards as soon as we get into this burn patch, there are also pieces of canopy in there burned you see, and also everything that's fallen off the airplane-has the initial impact of the trees and after the fire has started, are burned. And this is the haunting thing of it.

The canopy, (b) (6) is your canopy and (b) (6), are sooted outside and inside the same amount; also you got to have some kind of fire outside just as well as the one inside.

There was a hell of a fire outside.

Yea, well I (garbled)

/s/Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

But I, the only thing that fits and that's what has got a real concerned, ah, tracked down all sorts of dumb things, ah, I cannot find the cause of the fire; but well, even this, now if the airplane was on fire before it hit the trees, why aren't the parts under the trees burned?

I don't know. (b) (6) I'm pretty sure what fire there was-until such time as I was too busy-I was preoccupied with the damn thing. I think it fully in my cockpit, it was all with me. I don't know, that's what I think.

Do you recall how you got your oxygen mask off?

I remember tearing at the ----- (b) (6) but don't remember how.

O.K. Do you think your canopy could have had a hole broken in it? You think that could have been the "woosh"?

No, because this was a distinctive "woosh" I heard the same "woosh" when I was coming down in the chute, a little bit there and on laying on the ground burning while I was getting out of the koch fittings, here, you know, probably the tree caught the chute and it seemed like the cut off end here, and that damned green apple. The bottle from here and that was spraying and everywhere it sprayed it would catch fire again, and I got rid of that thing. I got the fire out of my suit.

That's the green snake of the seat pan?

Yea sir, that's where these burns here came from and it was the same noise-----

On the ground?

Yes, it was a woosh.

Oh.

I was done, oh, when I made the tumble it was just like the book shows how they teach basic tumbling. I went up in the air tumbled; the chute opened I got the opening shock and I was done some para jumps I know what a opening shock is and it pulled me up like this and I landed in a tree. That's all the time it takes

Well that's-----

20 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

And it just held it up where it could play with me and I've asked myself a couple of questions here too. Number one, why didn't I zoom climb, I don't know, that is the normal thing to do. I should have just pulled that sob up cause that would sure as heck got (b) (6) attention. Pulled it up and hit the burner he'd gone, chances are. This was his first night hop; he hadn't flown quite some time-----

Well he's in good shape, it is just that he didn't get out of it very fast.

He didn't wear his gloves either, he had them with him.

Its kinda hard to see a guys hands when he's tucked in that hole back there.

But the other thing is, I think I fumbled around here trying to get the oxygen. Why didn't I just pull the yellow apple? Cause that is the thing to do in this airplane, don't screw around with the green thing go for the, disconnect your block, that will cut the oxygen off. You know you can feel it you can find it when you are trying to.

If you had an oxygen fire (b) (6) how did it start?

I just don't know (b) (6), I just don't know.

That's the god damnest thing yet.

I know I was hot like, we don't know how it started, I don't smoke in the air. At least in the F4 and at night especially. I will smoke in Willy, I will admit that. I don't know (b) (6) I just don't know.

We found a lot of the oxygen hose and from what these men in the parafoft tell me you know, an oxygen fire when you're hooked up like that this hose just goes real fast. Is the hose burned?

You'll just have a couple of spots of residual, you know, like ground hoses pretty well attached and-----

The hose is good on the inside

Capt (b) (6) had some tests run on your mask you know for, ah, circuitry and O2M meter and like that and it checks out real good, no short

Were talking about electrical

It could be I hit the trees I don't know

1/ Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) talking about, you know, were your stuff in those cords and talk on one and listen on the other. There on down, below your mini-reg, all the way to your yellow apple you spoke of, you had no fire inside your oxygen line and you have complete electrical continuity. Now your mask, hell the ----- burned out of it; the outside isn't too bad where it was protected by that, ah, thing that says (b) (6) on it. But the inside looks worse than that guy that ate the peanuts out there at El Toro. It's pretty well burned up. You know the canals that run down from those two little plastic things that cover the little discs? Those are all burned completely out and through, and the place where it hooks on to the, ah, the little clamp on top of the mini-reg that holds your rubber on there, that little thing that's all kinda burned off right there looking in the top of the mini-reg. You can see where fire was coming out of that dude. Now when you were laying on the ground, laying on the ground, was fire coming out of the end of that thing or was just the oxygen feeding it?

Oxygen was coming out, feeding the fire (garbled) terrible time stamping it out, cause I had fire in my suit while I was coming down through the sky.

Yea, yea, we got your piece of suit.

(garbled)

You tried to, ah, get with a -----

I tried to survey both of those things, in fact the day before I tried the second time.

Over at Navy ah -----

Yea, all they had was 44's 46's and 48's.

That would have saved you -----

(b) (6)

Two, yes. No question about that. Well.

We got a tough one (b) (6) I wish you were out there with us. They tell me you were number 2 man in safety school and we believe -----

I would like to help you more.

22 Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

You weren't number 1, you were just number 2 ?

I was just number 2.

A lot of talk back and forth; can't make it all out.

(b) (6)

I really don't know, I do know that I am almost sure in my own mind that I was level above 500 feet when I got the caution light. That much I know because I leveled off. When I trim an airplane up it's usually pretty well trimmed up. I still keep my hands on it but I (garbled) I try to trim things as I go and it was after I had fire problems that I started going through 200 feet. (b) (6) while I was going through 200 feet. Now this was before I hit anything that I felt and I remember two distinct hits and remember punching out and there was a bunch of noise and stuff I don't know what it was, I was just (garbled).

O.K. (b) (6) now let me slip you this one.

Go ahead.

Where (b) (6) did you get the hit (b) (6), because the wound (b) (6) is not from fire?

Yea, I know that (b) (6). I don't know.

Now answer that sob for me.

If I could I'd have the same question, I don't know.

Talk back and forth about A6 school and going overseas in February.

(b) (6)

From all the indications, ah, it just we've got to have something breaking the canopy and hitting (b) (6). Right. Got to have, we got to have something to ignite something and I can't find anything except, ah, hitting the trees and catching afire. You know, just like we told you. It's bad medicine, the trees aren't too big around there, ah, altitude of them is, ah, I guess total altitude, like altimeter reading, is terrain plus trees maybe 100 and a half, (b) (6). No more than that.

Well, I remember the first time I hit something was after I got 200 knots and I started pulling the stick back, it was too God damn late, but it started to respond cause I could

23 Enclosure (57)

feel it, you can feel (garbled) on the stabilator - you can feel it fight. And I could feel (garbled) tail surface at that time.

Still got one?

The tail went to the bitter end.

Yea, Well, I could feel the plane start to come up, ah, too damn late - just too damn late.

I wish you would give it some thought about what hit you (b) (6) and, ah -----

I haven't thought about that for a couple of days, (b) (6) cause I've been trying to figure whether I hit (garbled) or what.

No. No, you got hit (b) (6) John. You didn't - you don't have a burn there, you got a hit on it. These clowns been talking to you at all?

Yea, They told me I have (b) (6) -----

(b) (6)

Yea, (garbled) from that.

O.K.

And that's why I'm never going to fly again. That's the problem - (b) (6)

O.K. Now, outside your eye - (b) (6)

Yea, (garbled)

O.K. Now, that's the only place you're hit. Something, I think -----

I don't think I got all that coming down through the trees, I came right straight down through the trees, I don't think---

O.K. With (b) (6)

it just leaves me to believe that something came into the canopy and whacked you.

✓ Enclosure (57)

(b) (6)

What, I don't know.

So, I, ah, I don't know. (b) (6), you got, ah -----

ALL OF THEM TALKING AT ONCE

(b) (6)

The doctor has some thoughts on the, ah, like the fire in the oxygen system itself. Had you even taken one deep breath you know that -----

I was exhaling all the way.

That you would have - you know - lungs (garbled) and something else.

When I had the fire I was just (blowing out sound). I did a lot of thinking about some of this stuff, ah, before I go flying.

TALK ABOUT HOW HIS WIFE IS TAKING IT

(b) (6)

Just one question. Did you use any trim at all after takeoff?

I can't say for sure any more, I can't say for sure.

Any unusual stick pressures?

No unusual stick pressure, I took off at standard. When I used the takeoff check, I tell the RO that I'm putting in trim for standard stabilator or slotted stabilator airplane so he can check me on it. I want to standard trim down (garbled) I just trim what I need, I don't really pay attention to it - I just trim what I need - I don't - once I get airborne I just fly the airplane, I don't try to fly (garbled) stick (garbled) I just fly the airplane.

Most of us do.

25 Enclosure (57)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVIR 3750.6 Series

The following information was provided to the AAR Board by Captain (b) (6) on 26 July 1967.

I can't say for sure that I even visually sighted 500 feet on the barometric altimeter. But I definitely did see 300 feet.



After lift off I held the aircraft 8-10 degrees nose high, bringing up the gear and flaps at 180 knots. When I hit 300 feet, I relaxed a little back pressure to take care of the increased angle of attack caused by pulling up the flaps. Before, this has always leveled me off between 500 feet - 600 feet for acceleration to climb schedule.

I believe I saw the fire with both eyes but I need more time to think about it.

A possible source of ignition may be the grimes light. When I fly at night I normally clip the light to the defogging duct directly above the hook handle, and turned on dim.

76 Enclosure (51)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPMVIST 3750.6 Series



M.O.R. CONCLUSIONS concerning RF-4B, Bureau Number 153113 accident on 20 July 1967

Captain (b) (6) statement, his physical findings and the condition of his personal flight equipment lend support to the following conclusions:

- A. That the fire which engulfed (b) (6) O₂ mask and miniregulator was secondary to another fire source and did not originate in the O₂ equipment. Although he sustained (b) (6), the (b) (6)

(b) (6)


The pilot's O₂ mask showed considerable burn damage as did the superior portion of the minireg but no burn damage could be found below this point in the O₂ system. The O₂ hose was intact.

- B. That the pilot's canopy shattered prior to the cockpit fire. (b) (6)

(b) (6) were the result of a striking force and not burn injuries. The (b) (6) would indicate that his hardhat was rotated in a superior direction to expose this area to the fire. Examination of the hardhat reveals that the visor housing had been broken and that the plastic visor housing support on the left side was missing. This was later recovered near the area of initial contact with the trees, and it was found to be free of burn damage or smoke stains. Also Captain (b) (6) indicated in his statement that he had (b) (6) prior to ejection.

Enclosure (57)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPAVIST 3750.6 Series



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 07 JULY 1987 BY SP-4B, P113, P110
ALL HANDLING REQUIREMENTS TO BE OBSERVED WITH REFERENCE TO AFRVINST 3750.0 series

(6)

(6)



EXCERPT () to VECJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, RF-4B,
Pilot: (b) (6)
EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPA/AVIATION 3750.6 series

STATEMENT OF 2nd LT. (b) (6)
Equipment Officer

USMC Aircrew Survival

RF-4B Bureau Number 153113 Modex CY-10 was equipped with Martin Baker MKH 5A ejection seats. The pilots seat serial number 113-84 was accepted 27 DEC 1966 at Navplantrepo, St. Louis. The RSO's seat serial number 116-78 was also accepted 27 DEC 1966 at Navplant Repo, St. Louis. Both seats had only been installed in 153113 and had 265 flight hours. Both seats had completed calendar inspection 3 JUNE 1967 at the same time as the Airframe. Both seats had the following directives not incorporated; Aircrew Systems change 49, installation of pre-flight ejection seat check list, Aircrew Systems change 56, installation of Drogue gun cocking indicator

This pilot pulled the face curtain and all survival equipment functioned properly. The first time the RSO actuated the face curtain canopy separation occurred. The RSO then reactuated the face curtain and ejection occurred.

Both parachutes blossomed normally and both survival radios were actuated by hand.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (62)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with COMNAVJAG 3750.6 Series

STATEMENT OF S/SOT (b) (6) USMC concerning RF-4B
Bureau Number 153115 accident on 20 July 1967

On or about July 13, 1967 a call from Maintenance Control for an altimeter gripe was received by myself ((b) (6)). The JCN was 7194-048. Maintenance Control wanted to know how long it would take to switch the front and rear altimeters around so CY-10 could be ready for the next launch. I told them it would take 15 to 20 minutes and if possible I would like to check the bad altimeter on the VPT-10F (Air Data Test Set) I had the OK to check it out. A few minutes later I had a call again and Maintenance Control wanted to know how I was doing on CY-10. I told them the men were still on the plane and that the tester was set up and ready to check the altimeter. I was told to forget checking it for now and to just switch the indicators. I sent a man out to tell the men that were out on CY-10 to just switch the indicators, which he did.

To the best of my knowledge the above statement is true.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

REPORT OF WEATHER OBSERVATION AT TIME OF AIRCRAFT CRASH
SND MCAS 287 (Rev. 1-62)

METEOROLOGICAL DIVISION
U.S. MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
CHERRY POINT, NORTH CAROLINA

NOTE: ONLY A QUALIFIED OBSERVER MAY FILE THIS REPORT.

DATE 20 JULY 1967

TIME 0150Z

STATION PRESSURE 30.120 INCHES	DEWPOINT 64 DEG. F.	RELATIVE HUMIDITY 87 PERCENT
DRY BULB TEMPERATURE 68 DEG. F.	WET BULB TEMPERATURE 65 DEG. F.	ALTIMETER SETTING 30.15
CEILING AND SKY CONDITIONS		

300 Ft. Variable Scattered

SURFACE WIND DIRECTION (in degrees true)	(Velocity - Knots)	(Gusts)
Balm		
VISIBILITY TO NORTH	SOUTH	EAST
WEATHER AND/OR OBSTRUCTIONS TO VISION		

FOG

STATE OF RUNWAY
DRY

GENERAL WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR PAST HOUR
Visibility varried 1 to 4 miles,

Scattered low clouds varying 100-500 ft.

REMARKS (Include freezing level)
Scattered low clouds varying 200-400 ft.

PILOT'S NAME (b) (6)	(Rank) Capt.	(Branch of Service) U.S.M.C.	(Squadron) VMCJ-2
TYPE OF AIRCRAFT HF 4-B	(Bureau Number of Aircraft) 153113		

DISTRIBUTION:

Original plus one (1) copy to Squadron of Aircraft involved.
One (1) copy to G-3.
One (1) copy to Airfield Operations Office.
One (1) copy to Meteorological Records Office.

for CPL. (b) (6) OBSERVER

ENCLOSURE (64) to VMCJ-2 AAR serial 1-68A occurring 20 July 1967, HF-4B,
BuNo 153113 Pilot: (b) (6)
"SPECIAL H" NO REQUIRED in accordance with OPM/INST 3750.6 series

RESUME OF FLYING EXPERIENCE

CAPTAIN (b) (6)

COMMAND	PERIOD	MODEL A/C	FLT. HRS.	CARRIER LANDINGS	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
MAD, NASC	22JUL62	T-34B	30	0	OPERATIONAL
NAS, PNCLA, FLA.	10JUN63	T-2A	132	6	"
MAD, NASC	18JUN63	TF-9J	78	0	"
NAS, CORPC	26OCT63	AF-9J	48	5	"
		F-11	26	0	"
H&MS-33,	22NOV63	TF-9J	18	0	"
MAG-33,	20FEB64	T1-A	8	0	"
3RD MAW,		F-8C	30	0	"
EL TORO, CALIF.					
VMF(AW)-312,	21FEB64	F-8E	275	15	"
MAG-33, 3RD MAW	29JAN65				
VMF(AW)-312,	1FEB65	F-8E	161	2	"
MAG-11, 1ST MAW	25JUN65	F-8D	5	0	"
		TF-9	4	0	"
VMF(AW)-312,	26JUN65	F-8E	125	0	"
MAG-13, 1ST MAW	18DEC65	DF-8F	2	0	"
VMF(AW)-312,	19DEC65	F-8E	45	0	"
MAG-11, 1ST MAW	7MAR66				
H&MS-2, MWHG-2,	8MAR66	F-8E	2	0	"
2ND MAW, FMFLANT	6APR66	TF-9J	5	0	"
		T1-A	15	0	"
		UC-45J	14	0	"
VMCJ-2, 2ND MAW	6APR66	RF-8A	18	0	"
FMFLANT		RF-4B	435	0	"
		EF-10B	76	0	"

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6 Series

OPRAY FORM 3750-13 (3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 750.06
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL: 8750-1A

10 DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

Vis was $\frac{1}{2}$ mile at the field due to Fog. $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from field Vis decreased to 0. An open field was sighted near the source of the emergency signal and the helicopter was landed. The Pilot was found near the crash scene and had to be carried out by stretcher to the aircraft. Hoist could not be used, due to injuries ^{to} weather.

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

Pilot: (b) (6)
Co/Pilot: (b) (6)
C/C: (b) (6)
C/C: (b) (6)

CAPT.	USMC
CAPT.	USMC
SGT.	USMC
CPL.	USMC

Enclosure (66)

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements	
14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL (b) (6) AIR FIELD OPS O.	SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL
15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL	SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

**Marine Corps Air Station
 Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533**

24 Jul 1967

10-67

20 Jul 1967 0456

ON STATION ☒
OFF STATION ☐

**REPORTING CUSTODIAN
 VMSJ-2**

**MODEL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
 RF-4B**

**BUREAU NO.
 153113**

**Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (SPM)
 TO: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~**

**4 1/2 miles from center
 of runways on a head-
 ing of 320°.**

**VIA MILITARY COMMAND
 CG, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, A. C.**

**SIGNATURE (b)(6)
 (b)(6) By direction**

TYPE OF INCIDENT			FIRE INVOLVED	
TAKE-OFF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LINE OR LOADING	FUELING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
LANDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	PARKED	MAINTENANCE	<input type="checkbox"/>
TAXIING	<input type="checkbox"/>	DEFUELING	INFLIGHT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OTHER (Specify)			IMPACT LIGHTNING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
			DELAYED LIGHTNING	<input type="checkbox"/>

**ESTIMATED CASE
 Aircraft flew into trees
 following take-off**

GENERAL WEATHER PICTURE		CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT	
4 miles with ground fog		WIND DIRECTION	0
		WIND VELOCITY (mph)	0
		TEMPERATURE (°F)	65
		NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT	
		Macadam runway, grass trees, water, trees.	

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY	
ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs)	14,000
ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs)	0
ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (Size in feet)	400x60

OTHER FUELS

PERSONNEL RESCUE	
NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	2
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	2
NO. PERSONNEL ESCAPED UNAIDED	2
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	1
DESCRIBE RESCUE METHODS USED	
Crew ejected. The RIO telephoned location to base. The pilot was rescued via SAR helicopter.	

FIRE FIGHTING			
FIRST METHOD OF ALARM USED			TIME RECORD
TWO-WAY RADIO	EMERGENCY INTER-COM	EMERGENCY PHONE	TIME ALARM RECEIVED
OTHER METHOD (State)	Telephone call from RIO		0445
			TIME EQUIPMENT ARRIVED
			NA

STATION EQUIPMENT					
EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL.	CIV.	FOAM (gals conc used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
NA					

STATION EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE			
TYPE	DEFICIENCY	NO. OF DAYS	EXPLAIN DELAYS TO REPAIR
MB-1	Acceptance check	35	Being worked on.
MB-5	Engine overhaul	21	Parts on order
MB-5	No handline pump	121	Parts on order. Vehicle operating with turret only
MB-5	Engine overhaul	77	Parts on order.
MB-5	Fuel system and FM	2	Being worked on.

Because of dense fog north of the field the crash was undetected. However, according to the weather man, approximately four hours after the crash, the heavy fog had been cleared, and witnesses would have been able to see the heavy wreckage. Five survivors would have been groundslifted through the use of portable air hoist hoisting devices and a 400 pound air-lift belt.

MONETARY LOSSES (Estimated) PERCENT DAMAGE BY IMPACT 20		PERCENT DAMAGE BY FIRE 20	LOSS TO BUILDING PROPERTY U. S. Government Property
DATE 12-11-67	PREPARED BY (Name and title) (b) (6)	SIGNATURE (b) (6)	
SIRE 142-11967	SENIOR DIRMING OFFICER J. D. NOBLE, Colonel, USAF	SIGNATURE J. D. Noble J. D. NOBLE BY DIRMING	









No immediate firefighting. Small pocket fires extinguished with mud and "stomping" eight hours after crash.

SALVAGE

Due to the uncertainty of the cause of the crash, the parent squadron desired the entire wreckage to be returned to their hanger. No unusual difficulties were encountered. Trees were felled through the forest and used as a base for a road on the moist, semi-sunny soil. Large aircraft pieces were removed by a D-4-B wide-truck Cat. Small pieces and parts were handloaded into a six-wheel drive dump truck at the crash site. Complete salvage was conducted by an experienced crew in 475 man-hours.

MSWZFRLEGULYPCZCSLA028
RTTUZYUW RUWJMRA0283 3472411-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU

842-67

R 132111Z DEC 67

FM MARFITATKRON THREE THREE FOUR
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSOMREPAC
INFO RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS

RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSOMHQ

RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRFAC

RUWJMUA/NAS NORIS

RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE

RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUWJBRB/CG THIRD MAW

RUWJBRB/MARAIROU THREE THREE

BT

UNCLAS

FOR NAVAIRSYSOMREPAC ATTN: FRR-33

PRI FAILURE MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS 111841Z DEC 67

1. CANCEL NY 260415Z JUL 67 PRI MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

REF A REFERS.

BT

Cog - 11 + 11

supp

132111Z-DEC

F-45/153786

76728104

NNNNZCZCNASC560ZCSLB692
RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4601 2081335-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE

R 271335Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMPREDON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
RUEOHRA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

560/67

Copy M + M

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE / MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRLANT INST 4730.17A
B. BUWPS INST 4730.6
1. REQ PDIR
A. RF-4B 153113
B. AUTO PILOT AMPLIFIER, SER NO UNKNOWN
C. UNKNOWN
D. AUTO PILOT AMPLIFIER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA4601 UNCLAS E F T O
E. 2RG-6615-709-8395-BFXX/230E4200-1/UNK
F. 89954
G. RA
H. AUTO PILOT AMPLIFIER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
J. REQUEST INFO AS TO WHETHER AUTO PILOT WAS ENGAGED
K. VMCJ-2

BT

JUL

271335Z

(b) (6)

2/20

NNNNZCZCNASC561SLA631
RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4600 2081332-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE

R 271332Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
RUEOHRA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

561/67

Cog MIM

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A

B. BUVEPS INST 4730.6

1. REQ PDIR

A. RF-4B 153113

B. ANGLE OF ATTACK INDICATOR, SER.NO. UNKNOWN

C. UNKNOWN

D. ANGLE OF ATTACK INDICATOR SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA4600 UNCLAS E F T O.

E. 2RH-661B-816-4998-BFCJ/SLZ-9081/UNK

F. 78423

G. NA

H. ANGLE OF ATTACK INDICATOR SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67

J. REQUEST READING AT IMPACT

K. VMCJ-2

BT

JUL
271332Z

NNNNZCZCNASC563CZCSLB693
RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4602 2081330-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE

R 271330Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMPRECON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSOMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
RUEOHRA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. BWFRLANT INST 4730.17A

B. BUWPS INST 4730.6

1. REQ PDIR

A. RF-4B 153113

B. CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER SER NO BLG-11

C. 7NOV66, OVERHAUL ACTIVITY UNKNOWN

563/67

Coy M9M

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA4602 UNCLAS E F T O

D. CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

E. UNK/42400-101-1/7210

F. GARRETT CORP.

G. NA

H. CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67

J. NONE

K. VMCJ-2

BT

JUL
271330Z

NNNNHSSWRPAGUCMMSLA633
RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4603 2081327-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE

R 271327Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMPRECON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYS COMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
ZEN/NARF CHERPT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYS COMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
RUEONRA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

559/67

Copy M+M

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A
B. BUVEPS INST 4730.6
1. REQ PDIR
A. RF-4B 153113
B. PILOTS ALTIMETER, SER NO UNKNOWN
C. UNKNOWN
D. PILOTS ALTIMETER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

PAGE TWO RUEGAWA4603 UNCLAS E F T O
E. 2RQ-6610-895-3854-VAPX/MS25450-1/UNK
F. 97424

G. NA
H. PILOTS ALTIMETER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
I. VNCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
J. REQUEST ALTITUDE AT IMPACT AND ANY POSSIBILITY OF ERRONEOUS
READINGS
K. VNCJ-2

BT

JUL
271327Z

NNNNZCZCNASC562CZCSLB699
RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4604 2081325-EEEE--RUCILSA.

ZNY EEEEE

R 271325Z JUL 67

FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYS COMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW

RUCILMA/COMNAVIARLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSY COMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
RUEOHRA/NATSF

ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION

A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A

B. BUWEPs INST 4730.6

1. REQ PDIR

A. RU-4B 153113

B. ANGLE OF ATTACK TRANSMITTER, SER.NO. BLG-107

C. OVERHAUL TAG ILLEGIBLE

D. ANGLE OF ATTACK TRANSMITTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

562/67

Cog MAM

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA4604 UNCLAS E F T O

E. UNK/SLZ91788/BGL-107

F. 10639/UNK

G. NA

H. ANGLE OF ATTACK TRANSMITTER SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE

I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67

J. REQUEST INFO AS TO POSITION OF TRANSMITTER ANGLE AT IMPACT

K. VMCJ-2

BT

JUL
271325Z

NNNZCZCNASC424CZCSLB375
RTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4490 2071250-EEEE--RUCILSA,
ZNY EEEEE

R 261250Z JULY 67
FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
ZEN/NARF CHERPT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCE
RUEOHRA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
ZEN/MARHAMRON ONE FOUR
BT

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRLANT INST 4730.17A
B. BUVEPS INST 4730.6
1. REQ PDIR
A. RF-4B 153113
B. J79GE8B, PORT 0421070 J79GE8B, STB 0421330
C. 283, NAS NORIS 283, NAS NORIS
D. ENGINES SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE
E. NA

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA
F. GENERAL ELECTRIC
G. NA
H. ENGINES SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE AND HAVE F.O.D.
I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JULY 67
J. DESIRE INFO AS TO WHAT CAUSED F.O.D., WHAT POWER SETTINGS
WERE UTILIZED AT IMPACT, AND DID ENGINES HAVE COMPRESSOR STALL
PRIOR TO IMPACT
K. VMCJ-2/H&MS-24
BT

424/67

Cog: m², m

Index
261250Z

NNNNZCZCNASC 14 ICZCSLA285
PTTEZYUW RUEOAWA4232 2051735-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE

P 241735Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
TO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
INFO ZEN/NARF CHERPT
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
RUEOHRA/NATSF
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
BT

UNCLAS E F T O
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRLANT INST 4730.17A
B. BUWPS INST 4730.6
1. REQ CHEM ANAL
A. RF-4B 153113
B. NA
C. NA
D. OXYGEN MASK

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA UNCLAS E F T O
E. RM1668-761-1613-LA20, MS22001, NA
F. 96906, N383-98721A
G. NA
H. MASK WORN BY PILOT IN ACFT ACCIDENT
I. VMCJ-2 MSG 201530Z JUL 67
J. MASK CONTAINS FOREIGN MATTER
K. VMCJ-2
BT

141
67

Log M + M

July
24/1735Z

NNNNZCZCNASC799CZCSLB792

PTTE JAW RUEOAWA3101 2010056-EEEE--RUCILSA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 210056Z JUL 67

FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO

TO RUENAAA/CNO

RUCILSA/NAVAIRSAFECEN

RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ

ZEN/CG SECOND MAW

INFO RUCIHOA/CNC

RUCINVA/CG FMALANT

RUXHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUCILSA/COMNAB 5ND

RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUVJBRB/CG THIRD MAW

ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR

RUCIHHA/MAVPLANTREPO MC DONNELL ACFT, ST. LOUIS

RUEDNKA/CNCLANTFLT

RUVJABA/DAS, NORTON AFB, CALIF

RUCLAKA/RCVM FOUR

RUCLAKA/RCVM ONE TWO

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

CNC PASS TO AAP

SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

A. OPNAVINST P3750.6F

1. 20 JULY 67, 0455Q, NIGHT

2. RF-4B, 153113, VMCJ-2, 1-68A

4. INJURY CODE BRAVO

5. INJURY CODE BRAVO

9. APPROX 2 MILES FROM TAKEOFF AIRCRAFT CONTACTED TREES, BECAME AIRBORNE AGAIN, FLEW APPROX 1 1/2 MILES, DURING WHICH PILOT AND RSO SUCCESSFULLY EJECTED. INSIDE OF PILOT'S OXYGEN MASK BURNT. BOTH CANOPIES BURNT EXTERNALLY PRIOR TO EJECTION. CAUSE UNKNOWN.

16. SVOBODA MAJOR USMC XO VMCJ-2 2038

BT

RF4B

153113

VMCJ-2

1-68

7-20-67 210056Z

799/67

SUPPLEMENTARY

AAR

JUL

MESSAGE DRAFT
LMD 4412 (Rev 2/80)

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL AVIATION
SAFETY CENTER

Y 1987

DEPT.

NI

ACTION

MARINE COMPOSITE RECONNAISSANCE
SQUADRON TWO

V	PRIORITY	V	INFO
	Mall		CNO
	Night		NAVAIRSYSOONHQ
	Messages		CG, 2D HAW
	Routine	R	MCAS, CHERRY PT., N.C.
	Priority		CG, FVPLANT
	Op Immed.		CNC
	Emor.		COMNAVAIRLANT
	Flesh		NAVAIRSYSOONREPLANT
			NAVAIREWORKFAC, CHERRY PT.
			WFO ST. LOUIS

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

RF-4B BUNO 153113 ACCIDENT

1. LCDR (b) (6) USN CLND TOP SECRET
WILL ARRIVE VIA AUTO TO CONDUCT NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION OF
SUBJECT ACCIDENT. REQUEST BOQ RESERVATIONS.
2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN OPNAVINST P3750.6F PAGE 14 PARA 24B, AND PAGE 20 PARA
32A PRESERVATION OF WRECKAGE APPLY.

REFERENCE MESSAGE

TRANSMIT BY
SAMS

CLASS OF MSG.

CNO

FOR COMNAVSTAFF

DATE/TIME CNO

201543Z

NNNNZCZCNASC741CZCSLA071
PTTE JAW RUEOAWA3021 2011530-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE

P 201530Z JUL 67
FM MARCOMPRECONRON TWO
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
INFO RUCIHOA/CMC
RUCINVA/CG FMFLANT
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUEDNWD/COMNAB 5ND
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
RUWJBRB/CG THRID MAW
ZEN/MARAIRGRU ONE FOUR
RUCIHHA/NAVPLANTREPO (MC DONNELL ACFT, ST. LOUIS)
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUWJABA/DAS, NORTON AFB, CALIF
RUCLAKA/RCVW FOUR
RUWMPEA/RCVW ONE TWO
BT

741/67

Preliminary
AAR

PAGE TWO RUEOAWA3021 UNCLAS E F T O

UNCLAS E F T O

CMC PASS TO AAP

PRELIMINARY MESSAGE OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

A. OPNAVINST P3750.6F

1. 20 JULY 67, 0455G, NIGHT

2. RF-4B, 153113, VMCJ-2, 1-68A

3. MCAS, CHERRY POINT, N.C. 4 1/2 MILES FROM T.O. END
OF RWY 32.

4. (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6) USMC, ACTIVE UNK AMPLIFICATION

5. (b) (6), 2LT (b) (6), USMC USMCR, 7351, ACTIVE

UNK AMPLIFICATION FOLLOWS

6. ALPHA

7. 1A9 -AAVEX

8. TAKE OFF

9. WITHIN 1 MINUTE AFTER T. O. PILOT HAD POSSIBLE FIRE IN MASK
AREA-BOTH EJECTED SUCCESSFULLY.

10. 300V (200 TO 400) SCATTERED V 4 IN FOG WINDS CALM TEMP 68
DEW POINT 64.

11. UNK (INT AIRFRAME CHANGE 309 COMPLETED 20 JUNE 67 REF.
TELCON SAFETY CTR.)

12. UNK

13. MARTIN-BAKER APPEAR TO HAVE FUNCTIONED SATISFACTORILY

14. NONE

15. PILOT (b) (6)

RO (b) (6)

16. (b) (6) MAJOR AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER,

MAG-14 EXT. (b) (6)

BT

RF4B

153113

VMCJ-2

1-68A

7-20-67

July
201530Z